FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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DISENGAGEMENT: WHY? HOW?

By Hugh Gaitskell

ANOTHER article on disengagement? Surely, after the number that have recently appeared, after the spate of speeches, broadcasts and interviews on the subject, there can be nothing more to say. My excuse for nevertheless discussing it again is that, despite all that has been said and written, there still appear to be much misunderstanding and confusion about what exactly the advocates of disengagement want and why they want it.

This is partly because the single word "disengagement" has been used to describe a number of totally different propositions ranging all the way from some "thinning out" of forces on both sides of the Iron Curtain in Europe to the complete removal of United States forces across the Atlantic. Those of us who have tried to put forward reasonably precise proposals which do not involve the withdrawal of American or British forces even from continental Europe may be pardoned if we are mildly irritated when we are grouped not only with Mr. Kennan but with Mr. Khrushchev and subjected to the same attack from Mr. Acheson's blunderbuss. Nor is our irritation diminished by the feeling that some of our critics are so passionate in their opposition to any departure from the status quo that they deliberately introduce confusion, hoping thereby to destroy all heretics together—however moderate—in the flames of their righteous indignation.

Recognizing the deep sincerity of these "conservatives," I feel, nevertheless, that on a subject as complex as this a cooler, more intellectual, more objective approach is desirable. But let me add that the misunderstandings cannot be ascribed to the critics alone. The exponents of plans for disengagement have sometimes been too vague; and failures of communication have often occurred through partial reporting and half quotations. Moreover, the word "disengagement" is itself misleading.

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In this article I hope at least to clear up some confusion. I shall attempt to restate the general approach of those in Britain who believe that the West should put forward proposals for disengagement. I shall explain why we think this is desirable and what form the disengagement might take. And in so doing I shall try to review the latest state of the debate on the whole subject.

It may help to clear some of the confusion out of the way if I begin by outlining what I think is not in dispute between our critics and ourselves.

II

First, whatever the differences of opinion about the situation in the Soviet Union and the intentions of the Soviet Government, we have never for one moment doubted the need to preserve "the deterrent." By this I mean that the risk of aggression by the Soviet Union is still far too great for the Western democracies to give up such power to retaliate as will deter the Soviet from launching a major attack.

Secondly, we believe that the maintenance of NATO is, in present conditions, essential. It could be argued that, because the United States has the strategic nuclear weapons necessary to deter the Soviet Union from attacking, Western Europe can simply shelter behind them without either any formal alliance with America or any significant military power of its own. There are, however, overwhelming military and political objections to this. Without NATO the morale of Western Europe would collapse, and we might be faced with a series of small but growing encroachments and advances from the Soviet against which neither the United States nor the European countries would be prepared to see strategic nuclear weapons used.

Thirdly and consequently, we hold that it is essential for American and British forces to remain at present upon the Continent of Europe, since without them the European peoples, and probably the Soviet Government too, might not believe any longer that the United States and Britain were prepared to join in resisting aggression.

Fourthly, since effective deterrence means being in a position to retaliate against a major nuclear attack, the West must be so armed as to make it impossible for the Soviet Union to destroy the power of retaliation before it can be used. This is the case for a large number of air bases, and for ensuring that a situation

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never arises in which the Russians could destroy all the weapons of retaliation before they could be launched or delivered.

Finally, we reject the argument, sometimes heard in Britain, that there is no purpose in the West retaining the bomb because we shall never use it first and that if the Russians used it first there would be no point in adding further destruction to the havoc which already existed. This is beside the point. The purpose of having the bomb, as has been repeated *ad nauseam,* is to deter the Soviet Union from launching an attack. So long as it does this, it fulfills its purpose.

To sum up, I believe that the policy of defense-deterrence is fully justified in present circumstances and must be continued unless and until genuine all-round disarmament with full controls, together with political settlements, should make it unnecessary. But—and here our differences begin—we do not believe that this simple defense-deterrence posture is enough—nearly enough—as a policy for the West.

To begin with, it has for some time been apparent that the real danger of war no longer lies in a deliberate decision by the Soviet Union to launch a major nuclear attack. Mr. Allen Dulles has recently confirmed that this is his opinion. The real danger lies in disputes leading to minor armed conflicts which, in turn, might develop into a major war. But it is also apparent—and is generally accepted—that strategic nuclear weapons cannot be used for dealing with minor conflicts. The United States would not be prepared to drop thermonuclear bombs on Russia if, for example, rioting followed by armed skirmishing occurred in Berlin or on the frontiers of East and West Germany. I believe this has been the case for many years; but the sputnik has made it certain that no American President is going to risk the wholesale destruction of U.S. cities except as an absolutely last resort.

Since, however, the Russians are perfectly well aware of this, the power of strategic nuclear weapons to act as a deterrent against minor acts of aggression is now very slight indeed. The theory, therefore, that we can rest our policy *solely* on the major deterrent is completely discredited. The possession of strategic nuclear weapons is an essential, but not the only essential element, in our defense policy.

It is for this reason that Western policy has turned to the development of smaller, so-called tactical nuclear weapons. But even these, it seems to me, would never be used in the first in-

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stance to deal with minor conflicts. For such conflicts conventional forces would be required. I am not concerned here with the problem of whether there has been too great a decline of conventional forces and too great an emphasis in the strategy of the West on nuclear weapons. I think we must accept that a change here is unlikely. What I am concerned with is just how far the doctrine of deterrence works and is applicable in the case of minor outbreaks.

One must certainly hope that it is. But one cannot but have doubts; one cannot but recognize some difficulties. In some countries there is a resistance to the idea that smaller nuclear weapons may be used on their territory to restrain Russian forces, while the large cities of the United States and of Britain are kept, so to speak, immune from nuclear attack. The significance of these feelings partly depends in the last resort on how destructive the tactical nuclear weapons are to be, but it is also affected by the general NATO strategy which lies behind the decision to rely on tactical nuclear weapons.

For my part, I believe it would be helpful if certain principles were laid down about this strategy: that no more force should ever be used in the event of a local conflict than is necessary to contain the attack; that any conflict should as far as possible be localized; that in any event every effort should be made to avoid using weapons which poison the atmosphere over wide areas; and, perhaps most important of all, that the object should be not to win any such small war which breaks out but to terminate the fighting by agreement. If a declaration of this kind could be made, some at least of the fears and uncertainties in Europe might be diminished.

Even so, one cannot say that the theory of deterrence applied to minor attacks has anything like the same clarity and conviction as its application to full-scale nuclear war. For there remains a real doubt as to whether, once a small conflict breaks out and conventional forces are engaged, it will be possible to prevent first the use of tactical nuclear weapons and then a gradual stepping up to the use of thermonuclear bombs. Experts can discuss the doctrine of graduated deterrence—there is no doubt much force in the arguments of those who believe in it—but we can never be certain that it will in fact be possible to limit war in the manner intended. This uncertainty is sometimes held to be in itself a deterrent against aggression. I am not so sure. To me it

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seems just as likely to weaken the resolve to resist and thus the significance of the deterrent.

Anxiety remains for another reason. Even though the possible use of small tactical nuclear weapons, instead of the H-bomb, might deter the Soviet Union from any conscious and deliberate minor attack, it is doubtful whether this, any more than a deliberate major attack, is what we really have to fear. Sometimes we are apt to think too much in terms of the Korean War, where a conflict was deliberately started by the North Koreans under the direction of the Soviet Union. Since then, however, we have had two examples of war or near-war which did not spring in any way from a deliberate decision of the Soviet to attack.

In the case of the Suez adventure the decision was made by Israel, France and Britain. It is true that the Soviet Union had supplied arms to Egypt, but there is a big difference between the supplying of arms—and, after all, other countries were supplying arms to other Middle Eastern countries—and the actual decision to attack with those arms. The second instance is, of course, that of Hungary, where the new, revolutionary, disturbing element was not deliberate Soviet aggression but the passionate revolt of the Hungarian people against their Communist government.

In looking at the world today we should not underestimate the danger of passion as a cause of war. It may not be the cold calculations of the Kremlin but the blind anger of repressed or backward peoples which could cause the explosion. In such circumstances the theory of deterrence does not apply, because people simply do not behave rationally; they do not count the cost as we assume, when applying the theory, that the Soviets do.

The doctrine of deterrence as the chief element of policy seems even more inadequate when one takes into account the probability that, as the years go on, the power to make and to use nuclear weapons will spread to many more governments. The process, to be sure, will be a slow one. Such weapons are very costly to produce and call for very advanced scientific techniques. Apart from the three Powers who already make fissionable material, only one—France—appears likely to be able to manufacture a nuclear weapon in the near future. But who can say what the scientific developments in this field will be in, say, ten years' time? And even before that, can one really be sure that countries and governments which are far less responsible, far less likely to calculate the consequences of their actions, may not somehow come

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into possession of these weapons? If this should happen the danger of a nuclear war starting without any deliberate decision by the Soviet Union or any other major Power will be greatly enhanced. The temptation to use an atom bomb and force a quick surrender from a neighboring country with which there is a long-standing dispute before anybody else can intervene might prove irresistible to some governments.

Then there is the special case of Western Germany. Since Germany is a member of NATO, and since the NATO countries have decided that they must have tactical nuclear weapons, there is at least a long-term logical argument for allowing German forces to have these weapons on the same terms as the forces of France, or the Low Countries, or even Britain. Yet, millions of Europeans, including Germans, have an uneasy feeling that the arming of German forces with nuclear weapons may be a step on the downhill path. It is true that at the moment the Americans keep possession of the atomic warheads. They have "the key to the cupboard." But may not this be a first step toward Germany's not only possessing these weapons herself but manufacturing them as well? The present German Government has declared that it has no intention of doing so. But what will future governments do? These doubts and fears may be unjustified, but they exist all the same—inside as well as outside Germany.

For all these reasons many of us have come to the conclusion that the policy of defense-deterrence, though necessary, is inadequate and that the West must also make a great effort to eliminate the danger spots from which small armed conflicts may develop into a major war. We have no illusions about the difficulties. But the attempt must be made, through agreements, even of a limited character, to break down the barrier of fear and suspicion which still dominates relations between the Soviet Union and the democracies.

III

There is one other quite different but very powerful argument in favor of the West coming forward with positive proposals for peaceful settlements. Even if the cold war is regarded in military terms as a secure stalemate with no danger of hot war breaking out, a struggle still continues between the Communist bloc and the Western democracies. It is a political and economic struggle, a struggle for influence and prestige in which propaganda plays

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a large part. While it is no doubt chiefly concentrated in the so-called "uncommitted areas," it is also taking place within the democracies themselves.

It has often seemed to me strange that while the governments of the West are fully aware of this and while the United States Government in particular devotes a great deal of money and effort in this field, they so often fail to realize—unlike the Russians—the importance of the public reaction when forming and expressing their own policy. For some reason Radio Free Europe is regarded as a legitimate instrument of propaganda but statements by the President or the Secretary of State are not. To take into account world opinion when making government pronouncements is looked upon as a kind of dirty trick which only the Russians use. As a result, so it seems to many of us, the West loses point after point in the cold war; and for most of the time it is not even trying.

Now, of course, I do not mean that the West should put forward specious proposals which are obviously insincere and can quickly be exposed as such. That would be just bad propaganda and worse than nothing. But the very fact that our governments appear to consider (and, of course, they may be right) that the Russians are never serious, but are thinking solely in terms of propaganda, should give them—the governments of the West—a huge advantage. For if the Russians do not want peaceful settlements it should be easy enough to make this plain. Yet it will never be made plain if we adhere to a purely negative line both in replying to Russian offers and in refusing to make any of our own.

The best propaganda of all for the West, both in the uncommitted countries and among their own peoples, is continually to put forward definite, clear-cut, reasonable proposals for peace which are not designed to bring relative advantage to our own side (so that on this account they are inevitably rejected by the Russians), but which aim at reducing tension while leaving the balance of security unchanged.

While it would be bad propaganda to put forward proposals which plainly weaken the Soviet position, so, of course, it would be foolish for the West to propose or to agree to plans which weaken its own. I must emphasize that those of us who wish the West to take the initiative are perfectly well aware that in considering any possible change, whether in the field of disarm-

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ament or on political issues, the balance of security between East and West must not be impaired and must not be felt to be impaired by either side.

It is for this reason that although I regard the Rapacki Plan as an advance—because, for the first time, Poland and Czechoslovakia are grouped with Eastern Germany as, so to speak, the equivalent of Western Germany—nevertheless a plan which simply involved a nuclear-free zone in that area would not be acceptable to the West because it would probably upset the balance of security to their disadvantage. That is why we have urged that it should be treated as a basis for discussion, with the understanding that conventional forces should be included as well.

But the announcement that the United States "rejects" this plan seems to me almost a classic case of how not to handle a proposal of this kind. First of all, the reply should surely have come from the West as a whole and not from the United States alone. Secondly, how much wiser it would have been, from the point of view of propaganda, if while drawing attention to the weaknesses of the plan, the United States had expressed its willingness at least to discuss it at a summit conference. It is hard to see what possible drawbacks there would have been to a reply of this kind. Instead of giving the impression of intransigence, which, of course, will now be fully exploited by the Soviets in the satellite states, it would have presented the West as seriously interested in relaxing tension, although quite legitimately concerned to safeguard its interests.

This is perhaps a convenient point to underline an even more fundamental difference between those who are content with the status quo and those who want to go forward to try to achieve settlements. It seems clear from their writings and speeches on the subject of disarmament and foreign policy that some American writers, of whom Mr. Acheson is one,[1] take the view that negotiations with the Russians are useless, because they will never agree to anything which is not to their own advantage and to the disadvantage of the Western Powers. Such persons hold that there are no possible settlements which might remove causes of friction but not be of disadvantage to one side or the other.

Behind this attitude there lies the conspiratorial or melodramatic theory of Soviet policy, according to which the mem-

[1] *Cf.* "The Illusion of Disengagement," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1958.

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bers of the Soviet Government are little better than an extremely clever gang of international criminals whom all right-minded persons must strive to eliminate and with whom, in consequence, our relations can never be friendly or even relaxed. According to this theory, to relax tension can only be dangerous. For it cannot lead to peace and it may be disastrous in undermining our will to resist. Thus, fears and suspicions are good. If they disappear we shall be falling into a trap: we shall be disarmed morally and mentally. Incidentally, this line of reasoning is held to apply not only to the policies of Russia but also to those of the satellites, who are just part of the gang, even though they are small fry compared with the Soviet.

I may have expressed this point of view rather strongly, but something like it seems to me to lie at the heart of so much disagreement in the West that it is well to put it sharply and then give the reasons why many of us in Britain cannot accept it.

To begin with, it seems to us out of accord with the facts. It is simply not true to say that the Russians have been unwilling to make any agreement whatever. They made and kept the agreement on Austria. They have accepted, following the Geneva conference, a situation in Indochina which is now less favorable to them than they might have claimed according to the conference decisions. The truth seems to be that they are prepared to make agreements if it suits them but that they generally keep strictly to the letter of any agreement and take advantage of any loopholes or lack of precision in drafting.

Secondly, it is surely evident that internal changes have taken place within the Soviet Union and that, partly as a result, there has been some change in the Soviet attitude to the outside world. Admittedly, this may be just a change of tactics, but it would be very surprising if, over the years, economic progress in Russia was not accompanied by social change and if these two things did not influence the attitude of the government to the outside world. I have yet to meet a single person who has been in Russia recently who does not comment on the changes in the atmosphere there. The mere fact that Mr. Khrushchev does not slaughter his opponents in the same way as Stalin did is itself of some significance.

Thirdly, it will hardly be denied that whatever may be the position within the Soviet Union, there have been quite remarkable developments in the satellite states, particularly in Poland

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and Hungary. Of course, these states still have Communist governments. But all who visit Poland, for instance, come back impressed by the freedom of speech which now exists there. Without a doubt the Communist régimes there are much less powerful than we once supposed. Although prophecy in this field is dangerous, it does seem as if over the long period further liberalization will have to be allowed or the pent-up forces will break out in another explosion. In any event, the governments in both countries are facing serious problems. The picture of them as being just part of a slick, brilliantly organized, immensely powerful, sinister conspiracy simply does not fit the facts today at all. Nor, for that matter, does the position of Jugoslavia. Very wisely the governments of the West gave Marshal Tito much support when he broke away from the Soviet bloc. They did not then insist that everything was black or white. There is really no reason why they should do so in the case of the satellites.

But if it is an error to suppose that nothing has changed or will change on the other side of the Iron Curtain, it is an even more serious error to imagine that it is an easy matter just to maintain the status quo on our side. The experience of the last few years leads to an exactly contrary conclusion. For example, one NATO country after another has reduced its contribution to the common cause. No doubt this can be ascribed to democracy and the pressure of public opinion. But to some extent this is part of the data of the problem. Democracy is, after all, what we are seeking to preserve.

I believe that this alone makes it virtually certain that a purely negative attitude on foreign affairs is not going to be adequate and that the enthusiasm for NATO among the Western democracies has weakened today principally because the West has no positive foreign policy. Merely to go on preaching that we have to be strong and everything will be all right is not enough. It is quite unconvincing, if indeed it conveys any precise meaning at all. On the contrary, the morale of NATO will be high provided people feel that serious efforts are being made to achieve peace. If these efforts fail it will be unfortunate, but if it is seen that the failure is the result of Soviet not Western intransigence, then there will be a far better understanding of the need for the maintenance of strong defenses. If these efforts are not made, it is virtually certain that the pressure of public opinion will lead to a steady weakening of the West.

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One last point before I turn to the specific proposals for disengagement. I cannot help feeling occasionally that some American citizens suffer from a wholly unnecessary defeatist feeling about talks with the Russians. They give the impression that they expect the Russians will always get the better of them. In the old days we used to be told in Britain that Americans were suspicious of us because we could always outsmart them. Now the same sort of thing seems to extend to Russia. It is not shared, in my opinion, by any European government—certainly not by Dr. Adenauer, who has expressed his willingness to have summit talks continuing over three years. I hope, therefore, that American opinion will become more confident. Judging by conversations I have had with American diplomats and leading politicians, there is no justification for this defeatism.

To sum up our general approach. While fully accepting the need for defense-deterrence, we cannot regard it alone as a sufficient policy for the West. The danger of war, the difficulty of maintaining the status quo, the need to carry public opinion with us, all make it highly desirable that the Western Powers should actively seek a solution to the major disputes which threaten peace. While we have no illusions about the difficulties of negotiating with the Soviet Union, we do not believe, either in the light of what has happened in recent years or as a matter of principle, that agreements with the Kremlin satisfactory both to Russia and the West are inherently impossible.

IV

What kind of agreements? There are obviously two possible kinds: disarmament and political settlements.

If I leave disarmament on one side, it is not because I regard the project as unimportant or the prospect as hopeless. It seems to me that an agreement to suspend nuclear tests should not be difficult to reach independently of other disarmament measures. Such an agreement would be worth while both for its own sake and because it might be a prelude to a wider agreement. But it is necessary that we should at the same time try to reach political settlements without insisting that they must be a condition of disarmament. Moreover, as it happens, the particular proposals for disengagement which we have in mind also involve a measure of disarmament.

What political settlements? The two areas where the dangers

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seem greatest are the Middle East and Central Europe. There are special difficulties in the case of the Middle East and, although it would be highly desirable to reach an agreement which minimized the threat of war in that explosive part of the world, I shall not pursue the subject here.

So one turns to Europe. The problems stand out clearly enough: German reunification; a peace settlement which determines, *inter alia,* Germany's eastern frontier; the situation in the satellite states. But how serious are the problems? How grave is the danger that unless they are solved they may actually lead to war?

These are difficult matters of judgment on which opinions will differ. It could fairly be said that at present the continued division of Germany and the maintenance of a Communist government in East Germany do not give rise to any obvious danger of armed conflict. But for how long will this be true? It seems to me hardly possible to deny that so long as Germany is divided there is present in the heart of Europe a natural source of disturbance and a potential threat to peace. The threat could take more than one form. It could be an armed clash on the frontier between the forces of the two Germanys. It could be a rising in East Germany, followed by armed intervention from West Germany.

Some may argue that Germany ought to be kept partitioned, as Poland was, and that this is the lesser danger. But this would mean permanent occupation not only of East but of West Germany too. And that is all over. West Germany is independent and will shortly become the most powerful NATO country in continental Europe. Today we may feel there is not much to worry about. The present West German Government is unlikely to take any rash step. But in a few years' time, with another government, a larger army and passions roused, can one feel so confident? Surely it is worth while to try to bring about reunification peacefully by agreement and under controls.

The same arguments apply to the peace settlement and the eastern frontier. As part of a wider agreement there is every chance that Germany could and would accept the Oder-Neisse line today. More than one of her political leaders have hinted as much. Until this issue is disposed of, there inevitably will be continued nervousness over the possibility that sooner or later it may be settled by force.

I have already referred to developments in some of the satel-

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lites. The possibility exists—not perhaps this year or next year, but sooner or later—of further risings. We shall then again be faced with the hideous dilemma of allowing the revolution to be brutally suppressed while we stand idly by, or of ourselves risking, by armed intervention, a third world war. We escape danger only by shame. Can we not find some way of avoiding this? Is it not possible, again as part of a wider settlement, so to change the status quo as to ensure that the satellite peoples can become freer in a process of peaceful development? It may sound far too ambitious but is not the possibility worth exploring?

It was, indeed, no coincidence that recent plans for disengagement were first put forward just after the Hungarian rising in the autumn of 1956. The plans have been described and discussed often enough. But to avoid misunderstanding, I set out again the one which I believe is the most sensible. Let me call it the "full" disengagement plan. It covers five points:

(1) The evacuation by foreign forces of an area comprising West Germany, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

(2) Agreement upon and international control over the national forces permitted to the countries within this area, the controls to be as comprehensive as necessary.

(3) The reunification of Germany on the basis of free elections.

(4) A security pact under which the territorial integrity of the frontiers of the countries included in this area would be guaranteed by the countries themselves and also by the four major Powers—the United States, Britain, France and Russia.

(5) When the preceding points have been agreed to, an undertaking to be given that Germany would be prepared to leave NATO and that Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.

A few explanatory comments are required.

First, we have never suggested that so ambitious a plan could possibly be agreed upon quickly. We have recognized that negotiations would take several years.

Secondly, there would be no question of putting forward this plan until it had been first agreed upon by the Western Powers—including the German Federal Republic.

Thirdly, the plan must be subject to modifications agreed on in the course of negotiations. I have set it out in detail at this stage only because so much confusion and misunderstanding have sprung from vagueness.

Fourthly, the plan does not involve either the end of NATO or the withdrawal of American and British troops from the Con-

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tinent. These troops would remain in Western Europe, *i.e.* France and the Low Countries, and of course in Britain.

Fifthly, although I have not specifically mentioned Germany's eastern frontier, agreement on this would probably be necessary as part of the wider settlement.

The advantages of these proposals are clear enough. The reunification of Germany, the withdrawal of Soviet troops to their own frontier and the establishment of controlled disarmament in one of the danger zones of the world are surely all highly desirable aims. Not that the plan is designed to improve the *relative* strength of the West, for if this were the case, there would be no reason to hope that the Soviets would ever accept it. The intention rather is to leave the *relative* balance of security unimpaired. That is why, if we really desire German reunification and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the satellite states, we must concede the withdrawal of Germany from NATO.

That a change of this kind would lead to a great relaxation of tension is surely undeniable. But it is equally true that before it is ever likely to come about, tension must first be relaxed to some extent. Above all, there will have to be a genuine desire on the part of America and Russia to coöperate in solving the problem of Central Europe.

Now for the criticisms.

It has been said that the neutralization of Germany as well as the three satellite states will inevitably lead to the spread of "neutralism" in other NATO countries and, therefore, to the break-up of the alliance. This is surely based on a misunderstanding. The withdrawal of Germany from NATO does not mean that Germany contracts out of her geographical position and somehow escapes becoming involved in a European war. Nor does it mean that she can stop spending money on defense any more than Sweden, Switzerland or Jugoslavia. She will have her own conventional forces which she would be committed to use if there were a breach of the security pact and with which she would be expected to repel any minor attack. No doubt, also, radar screens covering the frontier of the neutralized area would be available to the West and the Soviets. Thus, to speak of a vacuum being created in Central Europe is a misconception. If Russia decided to attack, West Germany could not possibly keep out of the war. Neutralization is the price to be paid for reunification. It does not mean "non-involvement." The idea that it would be attractive

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for other countries to imitate Germany, therefore, simply does not follow.

Another criticism is that, if American and British forces were withdrawn from Germany, they would have to leave continental Europe and perhaps Britain as well. I see no reason for this. It is true that the rehousing of these troops on their present scale would be expensive and would take time. But it is certainly not impossible. There are at present five American divisions in Europe. We could reasonably hope that in an atmosphere in which such a far-reaching political settlement was reached the size of the American forces could be reduced so that the total number of American and British troops would not exceed, say, 100,000. To claim that these could not be physically accommodated in France, Belgium and Holland does not make sense. If the argument is, rather, the psychological difficulty, this seems to me likely to be diminished rather than increased by the change. For much of the opposition in Europe today to the presence of American forces is because of what is regarded as the needlessly warlike attitude of the United States Government. If tension were relaxed and the prospects of peace greatly improved, opposition might very well die down. I emphasize, however, that like the rest of the plan, the movement of American and British troops must be looked upon as essentially a long-term operation.

Then there is the reëntry argument. It is said that if Russian forces withdraw from the satellite states and the Communist régimes then were threatened with revolt, the Russians would immediately march in again; there would thus arise an even more dangerous situation than the present one. The reëntry of foreign forces into the specified area would certainly be a breach of the security pact. If it were to happen, NATO forces would also have the right at once to reënter from the West. But there is no reason why a surprise attack would be any more possible under the new situation than it is today. Why, after all, should the Russians be more likely to reënter the Poland from which they had withdrawn—even though they knew this meant facing resistance from the West—than they are to launch an attack today over the West German frontier?

The fact of the matter is, however, that if they intended to reënter because a Communist government was threatened with revolution or displacement, then it is unlikely that the Russians would have made the agreement in the first place. Again, I

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emphasize that the assumption underlying the plan is that the Soviet Union has decided it is worth while trying to achieve a permanent settlement and that so long as her own security is not impaired she is prepared to loosen the bonds on her satellites.

One cannot help feeling, moreover, that behind this particular criticism lies an altogether excessive timidity. For the implication is that the West cannot afford the slightest risk of a disturbance to the Communist régimes in Eastern Europe lest this may involve the danger of war. In other words, we must cling to the status quo because even a desirable change might involve risks. That there would be risks cannot be denied, but they exist today. That is one of the reasons why it is so necessary to try to eliminate them, not by accepting that dictatorship in Eastern Europe is permanent and inevitable but by trying, through agreement, to ease the transition to more liberal régimes.

A fourth criticism is that it is dangerous not to have American and Soviet forces actually facing one another. It is held that so long as the Russians know that, if they attack, American troops are involved, this will provide a sufficient deterrent to any kind of aggression. This argument is irrelevant if, as I have already argued, it is no longer the case that a deliberate decision on the part of Russia to attack constitutes the real danger. But in any event the point cannot be sustained in face of the absence of American troops in Scandinavia, Turkey, Greece and the Middle East. The deterrent still applies in these parts because nobody doubts that if the Russians were to launch an attack in force there the Americans would be involved. This, surely, is the crucial point.

Nor does the case of Korea, as is often claimed, alter the matter. For it was not the departure of the Americans in itself which led to the Korean War, but the accompanying statements of Mr. Acheson and General MacArthur that the Americans had no strategic interest in Korea. To suggest that the only way to avoid war is for American and Soviet troops to face one another is certainly not a doctrine which is put into practice. They face one another today only in a very small sector of Europe. Yet nobody really believes that this means that Europe is the safest place and that other parts of the world, where there are no American troops, are correspondingly more dangerous.

Nevertheless, I must freely admit that on the basis of the present relationship of Russia and the United States, there is little

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hope of much progress being made for the time being towards the full disengagement plan. Both sides appear to think that it would upset the balance of security to their disadvantage.

The Soviet leaders, in particular, have made it plain that they will not consider either the complete withdrawal of their own forces from Central and Eastern Europe or the reunification of Germany. Although the fact that the Soviet Union takes this view really makes nonsense of the idea that the West would be at a disadvantage if the disengagement plan were to be agreed upon, and although to propose such a plan would still, in my opinion, be worth while—partly as a long-term objective and partly because of the impact on public opinion—nevertheless at this stage it is no doubt necessary to accept a more limited objective. This means in effect dropping from the plan what the Russians will not at present accept, together with what consequently becomes irrelevant—the complete withdrawal of foreign forces and the reunification of Germany on the one hand, the security pact and the neutralized area on the other.

This leaves the possibility of a modified plan, which involves a reduction in foreign forces and a pilot disarmament plan in the area—the second of the five points outlined above. Such a plan, to have any value, must, of course, be accompanied by the establishment of international controls. But it would then be a definite advance, a step towards a wider disarmament pact. Judging by the proceedings of the Disarmament Subcommittee, it does not seem very likely that the Soviet Union will agree to really effective controls on her own territory. She might, however, agree to controls in Poland, Czechoslovakia and even Hungary. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that Poland at least would warmly welcome a development of this kind. Apart from the advantages in the way of a pilot scheme for disarmament, it would also reduce tension generally and, to some extent, encourage a greater degree of liberalization within the satellite states. For these reasons it seems to me well worth while trying to agree on a limited pact of this kind. And, if so, then there are surely good reasons why the West should gain credit by proposing it themselves. It seems to me regrettable that they did not do so in answer to the Rapacki Plan.

It is, indeed, hard to see what objections there can be to such a change. None of those levelled at the more ambitious plan applies. Germany does not leave NATO; foreign forces are re-

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duced but not wholly withdrawn (the foreign forces of the West in Germany are in any case being reduced); there is no "reëntry" problem. Neither NATO nor for that matter the Russians need fear that the balance of security is being changed to their disadvantage. The only criticisms I have heard are that it discriminates against Germany because she alone of the Western Powers becomes subject to controlled disarmament and that, for some reason, it is supposed to freeze the status quo.

The first argument makes one despair. If those countries which happen for geographical and historical reasons to be in a danger zone are going to complain that they are treated unfairly when it is suggested that special controls should be set up to reduce the dangers in which they live, how can we hope to get peace? Moreover, the Paris Treaties themselves discriminate against Germany.

The second argument, though more respectable, is equally unconvincing, especially when it is put forward by those who are themselves resisting any proposal to change the status quo. In fact, there is no reason whatever why this limited form of disengagement should prevent a political settlement, unless, of course, it is suggested—which is sheer lunacy—that uncontrolled military force is to be used to bring such a settlement about.

One can only hope that, despite the rejection of the Rapacki Plan, the West will be prepared to reconsider its attitude on this if and when the summit conference takes place. Perhaps the statesmen concerned may be induced to do so, if not from any real conviction, then at least because the events of recent months should have revealed to them how very much more effective Western diplomacy is when it puts forward positive, reasonable proposals instead of just turning down offers from Moscow. If the NATO meeting at Copenhagen was successful, if the allies are rather less disunited, if there is a general feeling that the West has at last scored a few points in the cold war, it is only because for once in a way it is the Russians who have been saying "No" to our proposals, rather than we who are saying "No" to theirs. Although point-scoring should never be regarded as the main object, nor affect the type of proposals put forward, a certain amount of it can be expected as a by-product of the kind of Western initiative for which some of us have long been pressing.

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KHRUSHCHEV'S NEW ECONOMIC GAMBIT

By Philip E. Mosely

IN the past twelve months Nikita Khrushchev, since March 27 Chairman of the Council of Ministers as well as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has pressed forward with a major reshaping of both Soviet industry and agriculture. While engaged in dislodging any serious competitors for political power, he has also been carrying out a far-reaching reconstruction of the vast system of production and management. Was there a really dangerous challenge to his power just before his defeat of Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich a year ago? Or did he deliberately provoke their opposition to his "adventurous" tinkering with the machinery of production in order to wrench their practiced hands from the apparatus of rule?

Which came first, the political goal or the economic one? This remains a matter of dispute and conjecture. If Khrushchev did, in fact, take on a risky gamble in his revamping of industry, he has now compounded it by scrapping one of the main controls over agriculture. But his elimination of the "old guard" has undoubtedly made it easier for him as undisputed boss of the Party machine to press ahead with a drastic change in the collective farm system: the elimination or reduction of the Machine-Tractor Stations, the mainstay of Moscow's control over collectivized agriculture for nearly three decades.

For Khrushchev, the new methods of management are an essential means for achieving Stalin's goal, that of "overtaking and surpassing the advanced capitalist countries." Today only one of them—the United States—remains to be overtaken. In his speech of November 6, 1957, on the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution, Khrushchev set a series of ambitious goals for the Soviet economy to achieve by 1972. For example, the target of 100 to 120 million metric tons of steel, as against 51.1 million tons last year, though feasible will be costly.

Actually, this and other targets represent a somewhat lower rate of economic growth than some of those previously attained over the past 25 years. Declines in percentage rates of Soviet growth are inevitable, for the most dramatic increases are normally achieved in the earlier stages of industrialization, against a low initial level of output. In most fields, later increments of

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investment provide a smaller return, measured in percentages. The Soviet economy, like other maturing systems, will have to make larger investments than in the past for the maintenance and replacement of equipment, for rounding out the mechanization of the productive process and for raising the average productivity of a relatively less abundant labor force. The morale of the Soviet people also requires more attention to consumer goods and services and to housing, as Stalin's successors have increasingly recognized.

To some extent the Soviet economy is now forced to pay a higher price, in real terms, for many of its raw materials. In the first spurt of industrialization, the Soviet Union has used up some of its most accessible high-quality ores. Last year the Kuznetsk Combine calculated a loss of 50,000 tons of pig iron, due directly to the increased ash content of coking coal over the preceding year. Under the new Seven Year Plan for 1959–1965, the Government plans to make large investments either to upgrade poorer ores or to open up more remote high-quality sources. When such unfavorable factors as these have been noted, the fact remains that annual additions to Soviet output will become steadily larger, even though the *rate* of growth is gradually declining. The reason is, of course, that the Soviet economy—the base on which the rate of growth is measured—is now a very big one.

One very important way to promote further growth is to reduce waste and inefficiency and utilize more effectively the large and rapidly growing investment fund which each year is squeezed out of a slowly improving standard of living. By late 1956 the search for more efficient and expeditious forms of industrial management was made even more urgent by novel and competing demands on Soviet resources.

These resources, of course, are not unlimited, and the insatiable need for new factories and new facilities comes into competition with other demands upon them. Among the claimants, the new military technology is exceedingly expensive, whether its cost be measured in dollars or rubles, or in scientific and production man-hours. Now that the race for nuclear power has passed into the production stage, it faces the Soviet leaders with vast new requirements for resources. At the same time the promise of credits to Communist China and India, to Egypt-Syria and Jugoslavia, and to many other countries, have set up claims to real resources, and particularly to the relatively scarce supplies of

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new and complex equipment, which are also in high demand for developing the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia. The unforeseen assertion of Polish independence in October 1956, Hungary's revolt, followed by new Soviet costs for restarting their economies, and the smaller sops thrown to the more obedient satellites, have piled new and unplanned burdens on Soviet industry.

II

Toward the close of 1956, it was clear that Soviet investment resources were severely strained. One way to get the maximum effect from them was to strengthen the administration of the economy. The upshot was an attempt in December of that year to improve the central decision-making processes by placing Mikhail Pervukhin in charge of a considerably strengthened State Economic Commission for Current Planning. In retrospect, this move may have been the final spasm of the strictly centralized, traditional approach to the management of the economy. At the same time the plan goals set earlier that year at the Twentieth Party Congress were tacitly revised downward.

On February 14, 1957, Khrushchev proposed a sweeping reorganization of Soviet industry, breaking up many of the industrial ministries and replacing the vertical structure of management with a territorial organization, to be centered in an unstated number of regional Councils of National Economy. The publication on March 30 of his detailed "Theses" was followed by numerous discussions at meetings in which some glimmerings of doubt and dissent were allowed to show through the mantle of praise. In early May the new structure was enacted by the Supreme Soviet, to take effect on July 1. A review of production goals must also have been proceeding in the inner sanctum of power, for in late September Moscow announced officially that the current Five Year Plan for 1956–60 had been scrapped and would be replaced after two years of annual plans by a Seven Year Plan for 1959–1965.

Just what are the powers and responsibilities of the new regional councils? Has over-centralization given way to over-localization? What powers have been retained by the central authorities in Moscow? Has Soviet industry been "decentralized," as has been widely assumed in the West, or merely "reorganized," as Khrushchev insists?

The advantages sought through the change-over can be sum-

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marized briefly. The ministries were making decisions in Moscow —or not making them—without an adequate knowledge of the problems or opportunities of the individual plants. The regional councils will be familiar with local resources and will be able to use them better. The Soviet press has been peppered with descriptions of the bad results of remote control by the ministries. Horrendous examples of the waste of compound ores have been cited. At Mizur, because of departmental barriers, only zinc, copper and lead were extracted, and seven other elements, including sulphur and tin, were discarded as waste. At the Nerchinsk deposits, only lead and tin were extracted; indium and cadmium were thrown away, because they came under the authority of another ministry. At Yaroslavl the new oil refinery is to supply by-products to a new chemical plant; this was allegedly not possible under the régime of the centralized ministries of the Oil and Chemical Industries.

The chairman of the Azerbaijan Economic Council has reported that his new agency has gotten the production of synthetic rubber under way, after it had been delayed during several years of inter-ministerial negotiations; it has organized the by-product utilization of industrial carbon and found unused space in factories formerly controlled by central ministries for setting up the production of cables, electric equipment, insulators, air-conditioners, electric stoves and fans, and kerosene heaters. To save on transportation costs, the Krasnoiarsk Economic Council is preparing to shift several factories to the use of local coal and to produce packing materials locally.

While the new regional councils are designed to break down the vertical industrial empires of the former economic ministries, they have shown some tendencies of their own toward empire-building. A. G. Sheremetiev, chairman of the Cheliabinsk Economic Council and formerly minister of Ferrous Metallurgy, has complained that very few of the 2,050 officials in his former ministry have shown any desire to exchange Moscow for Cheliabinsk; in building up the new councils it has therefore been necessary to draw upon, and hence weaken, the managerial staffs of the local enterprises. Other former ministers have also turned up in the new regional "command posts."

Each of the 105 regional councils has worked out a substructure, supposedly based on the size and needs of the industries it administers. But according to one complaint, the Arkhangelsk

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Economic Council, like the ministries it supplanted, is three links removed from actual production. Within the economic councils of Group I (apparently those with the most important industries), the number of subdivisions varies from 11 to 35, and the size of the professional staff from 350 to 1,600. The Irkutsk Economic Council, perhaps an average one for Group I councils, has a total staff of 520.

The Moscow City Economic Council, responsible for some 8 percent of the country's industrial output, was established with 16 branch administrations, 4 trusts, 38 research organizations, 33 construction-design bureaus, 2 main administrations for supply and distribution, 8 functional administrations (production, technology, planning, etc.), 6 functional departments (bookkeeping, transportation, arbitration, etc.), and a technical and an economic council. No wonder Khrushchev has recently admitted, though in guarded terms, that, ". . . although the new system of administration underwent a period of establishment in the first months, and this undoubtedly affected its work . . ., yet, the management of enterprises has considerably improved. . . . In the future the favorable aspects of the reorganization . . . will be manifested to an even fuller extent. . . ."

One difficult problem facing the regional councils results from Moscow's temptation to cut through the decision-making maze by turning them into direct operating agencies. An example of this is the decree of April 20 on the reorganization of the Machine-Tractor Stations which places ". . . on the chairmen of the Councils of National Economy the personal responsibility for the production of spare parts and ball bearings for tractors, automobiles, agricultural and earth-moving machines. . . ." Even if the decree presumably applies only to regional councils of provinces in which spare parts and ball bearings are actually produced, rather than to all 105 councils, it is easy to predict that their chairmen will tend, under Moscow's concept of "personal responsibility," to usurp and divide the authority of the managers of the plants, and not merely to supervise them.

III

The devolution of some measure of economic control to the regional councils points up a further problem: the presence of two "masters" within the same district. For example, side-by-side with the new Moscow City Economic Council, the Moscow City

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Soviet also administers a network of 900 enterprises with 440,500 employees in the fields of construction, building materials, automobile transportation, garment industries, bakeries, etc. The Kherson Economic Council has complained that, while it has control of wall-board making, granite and some lime quarries, the executive committee of the province has taken over the brickyards, all gypsum and some lime plants, and sand quarries; it has urged that all construction materials should be brought under the council's own control.

Even more serious has been the outcry against "localism," the tendency of the regional councils to meet the planned and even the "above-plan" demands of "their own" plants ahead of deliveries to "foreign" regions. "Coöperativized deliveries" destined for other areas under the detailed central plan have often suffered. Whether territorial "parochialism" will prove less serious than the ministerial "parochialism" which the new organization is designed to cure, it is impossible to say, at least on the basis of the scattered data available. That the central government is deeply concerned about it is shown by the announcement on May 19 that officials who fail to carry through the planned deliveries to other provinces and republics will be subject to measures of "disciplinary, material or criminal responsibility," including prison sentences for a second offense.

One of the main complaints against the new system has been the uncertainties which have arisen in the handling of both supply and distribution. Formerly, each centralized ministry had its own mammoth administrations charged with procuring equipment and raw materials, and with distributing the products of its factories more or less according to the central plan. Now, each regional council has been ordered to set up two "main administrations," for supply and distribution, and each of these will have numerous subdivisions to serve its various industries.

Even more striking has been the move of the State Planning Committee (*Gosplan*) in Moscow to take over the functions and staffs of the former ministries in the fields of supply and distribution. Instead of 30 marketing organizations existing under the former ministries, *Gosplan* was ordered to set up 17 new ones, and to turn over the local offices and warehouses to the economic councils. Last month *Gosplan* was instructed to organize central divisions for inter-republic deliveries.

There have been many complaints against the malfunctioning

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of supply under the new system. The Azerbaijan Economic Council has raised its voice against the failure of Perm Province and the Georgian Republic to carry out their deliveries to it. The Irkutsk Economic Council has complained that 46 economic regions had fallen short in their deliveries to it of steel sheets and other products; the Irkutsk Heavy Machine Plant had piled up 3,000,000 rubles' worth of incomplete equipment because of the failure of plants in Kharkov, Cheliabinsk, Stalino and elsewhere to deliver components according to the plan.

Last December, a deputy from Estonia raised an especially plaintive note: "The U.S.S.R. Ministry of Agriculture used to order and allocate spare parts for equipment; true, not in sufficient quantity; but now one does not even know where to obtain these goods. Several economic councils of the Russian Republic that used to send us these goods report that they are reducing their output and can no longer deliver anything to us." In general, the response to this crucial problem has been to re-centralize the control of supply and distribution within the industrial and distribution administrations of the State Planning Committee.

Subject to the final decisions of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (and the Party Presidium), the State Planning Committee has taken on the main functions of top industrial management. By July 1957, it had 23 industrial departments, roughly corresponding to the ministries which had been abolished, and since then it has presumably added to this number, and to its staff. The central ministries of Medium Machine Building, Chemical Industry and Electric Power Stations, among others, have survived, but the ministries of Aircraft Industry, Defense Industry, Radio-Engineering Industry and Shipbuilding Industry have been replaced by State Committees of similar names. Presumably, the State Committees deal with problems of research and development, and the operational control of the industries has been integrated into the structure of *Gosplan.*

From this reshuffling, *Gosplan* has emerged with enormous powers, not unlike the All-Union Council of National Economy of the early 1930s. Its chief, I. I. Kuzmin, is one of the six vice-chairmen of the Council of Ministers and seven of its vice-chairmen and directors of departments also have ministerial rank. What is more important, it exercises (subject to higher control) the main authority in making decisions on new investment, in managing the supply and distribution system, and, with the

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Ministry of Finance, in drawing up both the national and republic budgets. It also exercises a direct supervision over the fulfillment of the plan, both by receiving constant reports and by sending out its own teams of inspectors.

The new regional councils are expected to exercise more responsibility in making full use of local resources, in supervising local enterprises more closely, in making more rapid decisions—but all within the over-all plan laid down at the center. They have a little more elbow room and more responsibilities. But the plans, drawn up by the regional councils and integrated by the republic *Gosplans,* undergo final decision in Moscow. Aside from the day-to-day control now exercised by the industrial divisions of *Gosplan* instead of by the former ministries, the regional councils are also under constant supervision by the executive and Party committees both of the provinces and the republics. The success or failure of the regional councils is judged on the basis of their record in meeting the national production plans, not by their local popularity. "Decentralization" is a misnomer. There has been a devolution of decision-making functions to strong regional agencies, but all important decisions are still made in the center and are now coördinated through an expanded super-ministry, *Gosplan.*

IV

A parallel transformation is being carried out in the management of collectivized agriculture. The proposal to eliminate many or most of the Machine-Tractor Stations was first presented by Khrushchev in January of this year at an agricultural conference at Minsk. It was implemented on April 20 by a joint decree of the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Ministers. This latest reform means that in many regions of the Soviet Union the state-owned Machine-Tractor Stations are transferring most of their machinery and their machine-operators and a part of their repair equipment to those collective farms which are able and willing to buy them. The basic aim is to do away with a situation in which "the field has two masters"—the collective farm and the M.T.S. The argument is that the collectives, having grown stronger in management and resources since the reforms of 1953 and 1955, will now make better use of the equipment than was possible when they had to "coördinate" with the M.T.S. to get their plowing and harvesting done. This, Khrushchev be-

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lieves, will lead to an increase in the productivity of land and labor and thus "overtake America."

The discussions of the failings of the M.T.S. system have thrown a clear light on many disadvantages of Soviet agriculture. The M.T.S. have not found it to their interest to carry out deep plowing of long-fallow or unused lands, since they were paid according to the amount of "soft plowing" completed. Even when not in use for plowing or harvesting, their machines were often hoarded and were seldom made available to the collective farms for other productive purposes. On the other hand, an M.T.S. had to take whatever assortment of machines was assigned to it by "the center," as in the case of the useless cabbage-pickers and potato-diggers assigned to the Crimea. Between 1954 and 1957 more than 1,200,000 mechanics were trained at a cost to the Government of over nine billion rubles, but sample surveys showed that only a small proportion were subsequently employed at their new skills.

The basis for transferring the farm machinery to the collectives had been prepared by the consolidation of many collective farms into larger units, which Khruschev pressed for in 1949–51. Between 1949 and 1957, according to Khrushchev's speech of March 27, the average size of collectives, measured in hectares of plowland, had risen from 557 to 1,954; the average monetary income had increased from 111,000 to 1,247,000 rubles; and the number of collectives had declined from 250,000 to 78,000. In some regions of very large collective farms, as in the Kuban and in Stavropol province, the experiment of turning over the M.T.S. equipment had, it now appears, been tried out successfully during 1957. In such regions the change will probably work out well; in others, made up of small and scattered collectives, it may be long delayed and have little benefit.

One of the effects of the change is to encourage the absorption of small and weak collectives into their larger neighbors. Many instances of this are being cited in the Soviet press, without making it clear how the two unequal partners to the fusion may feel about it. One manager felt that ". . . there is no need to maintain the M.T.S. for several years, even with reduced staffs, just to serve the weak farms; these collective farms should be advised to merge with large, economically strong farms." On the other hand, in Khabarovsk Province there is no one zone or district in which all the collectives can dispense with the services of the

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M.T.S. And in the Georgian Republic, the industrial crops, the most valuable ones, are still carried on intensively by hand labor and will benefit least from the sale of the M.T.S. machinery.

One further reason for the change was mentioned casually by Khrushchev in his speech of March 27. The grain and other products by which the collectives pay the M.T.S. for their services have recently been costing the Government more than its direct purchases from the collectives. In addition, the Government will benefit to the tune of some 20 billion rubles through payments to be made by the collectives for the M.T.S. equipment. By comparison, in 1957 the collectives set aside some 16 billion rubles in their "indivisible funds" (out of a total cash income of 94 billion rubles) to pay for all types of improvements, such as new buildings, purchases of equipment, livestock, and so forth.

Many of the collectives are planning to set up small repair stations of their own, but the main reliance for this service will be placed on the Repair and Technical Stations (R.T.S.), which will, where necessary, continue to supply tractor and harvesting services to those collectives which cannot buy the former M.T.S. equipment. But they are to do so on a cost-accounting basis, which will save money for the Government but raise the cost to the collectives. The R.T.S. are also to provide repair services through mobile units as well as at the station, and they are to check and report to the Government on the condition of the collectives' equipment. After much dispute over what agencies should provide spare parts, fuel, lubricants and other requirements for the collectives, it was decided in April that the R.T.S. should supply these materials and also fertilizers, insecticides and other production needs. In addition to the control exercised by the R.T.S., the district soviets are to establish a system of inspectors to watch over and "guide" the work of the collectives, in place of the control previously exercised by the M.T.S.

While there have been many published reports boasting of the smooth transfer of the M.T.S. machinery to the collectives, some new problems have come to light. In many places, the tractor drivers of the M.T.S. would have received a lower wage than before, if paid as members of the collective on the basis of workdays performed; the Government has intervened to insist that the collectives provide them with a "guaranteed minimum" equal to their former wages. In some villages the new equipment has been abused or fallen in disrepair. Many collectives have also

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insisted on buying only the newer machines, and in at least one district they were ordered to take machines they did not want. Large numbers of houses must be built to accommodate the farm experts, veterinarians, mechanics and tractor drivers as they are transferred to the collectives. The cost of setting up even small repair stations in the collectives will be considerable, and for several years payments for the machinery will reduce sharply the amounts that would otherwise be available for improving farm production directly.

Whether the change will work out favorably for the economy as a whole will not be clear for some time. Its effect should be to strengthen further the productivity and management of the stronger collective farms—those which, in any case, provide most of the marketable crops. Like Stolypin, Khrushchev is "betting on the strong," only this time on the economically strong collective farms and on the tens of thousands of experienced Party administrators who have been sent out over the past three years to stiffen the collectives. The M.T.S. represented a steady, reliable channel of control and a sure source of foodstuff deliveries, but they have tended to inhibit the growth of productivity. Now, without releasing the collective farms from the system of centralized planning and centralized pricing, Khrushchev expects to raise farm production rapidly by placing the collectives under unified leadership at the local and district level.

From the discussions of the change-over have come several indications of further problems which worry Soviet leaders. Some have urged the establishment of a pyramid of district, provincial and national "collective-farm councils" which would represent the interests of the collective farmers at the various levels of the Soviet administration. A sharp rejoinder to these "Populist" echoes was given by one correspondent in *Pravda*. "Some comrades say that collective-farm councils will allegedly protect the rights of the collective farmers; but does or can anyone in our country infringe upon these rights?" Instead, the district collective-farm councils are to be heavily weighted with soviet, Party and administrative officials to watch over the work of the collectives.

For the time being, Khrushchev has rejected the proposal to pay uniform country-wide prices for collective farm deliveries. In order to avoid ruining the weaker collectives and also to force the stronger ones to contribute more to the state, differential

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prices will continue to be set for deliveries and purchases of farm products. On January 1 of this year the Soviet Government abandoned the collection of taxes in kind from the private garden-plots and private livestock of the collective farmers, at a cost to itself of three billion rubles, but it had previously raised to 14 percent the income tax on the collectives' net cash income (net of production costs and state deliveries). One proposal has been made that the Government should provide a stronger incentive to improved work by announcing its deliveries requirements for five years ahead, instead of one year. Another proposal, echoing an abortive reform of several years ago, has been to change the tax on the cash incomes of the collectives into a land tax, based on the area and quality of the arable land. Even though it would provide a strong stimulus to raise production, this proposal has been rejected as involving "great difficulties."

V

Both of Khrushchev's major gambits point in the same direction. Their purpose is to push operational decision-making downward, away from the congested bureaucratic maze of Moscow ministries. Khrushchev is betting on the accumulated experience, administrative judgment and material ambitions of tens of thousands of Party executives in the provinces, republics and enterprises, and even in the collective-farm managements, to take on-the-spot decisions in harmony with a detailed central plan. The central authority, as has happened repeatedly since Stalin's death, is increasing the size of the "carrot" and reducing the size and visibility of the "stick."

Khrushchev, who has had much practical experience away from the "center," appears confident that the machinery of industrial and agricultural production will respond favorably to these new methods of management. At the same time he has taken care to keep the basic levers of plan, investment, supervision and control in the hands of the central government. For this purpose, he has strengthened the control of the Party apparatus over the economy, while tightening his own control over the Party.

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SOVIET POLITICAL LIFE TODAY

By Cyril E. Black

A VISITOR to Russia today who has the opportunity to meet a representative cross-section of Soviet officials cannot fail to be impressed by a spirit of local initiative and self-confidence which is in significant contrast to the political style of the Stalin era. To some extent this impression may reflect Khrushchev's own animated personality. He can shift rapidly from a rather weary thoughtfulness to lively humor as he tries to gauge with his shrewd eyes the effect of his remarks, and he leaps from one subject to another with assurance and imagination. It is not without cause that in proposing Khrushchev's candidacy for premier on March 27 Voroshilov noted among many other qualifications that "his talks with political leaders of various countries and with representatives of the world press have considerably enlarged the circle of friends of our homeland and greatly increased the Soviet Union's prestige on the international scene."

The visitor need not, however, base his judgment primarily on the personality of the boss of the Communist Party. There is much other evidence of the new spirit in which Russia's affairs have been conducted since the death of Stalin. The control of economic production, which in a sense is the Party's first order of business, has undergone a fundamental reorganization. In the field of industry, 141 all-union, union-republic and republic ministries have been dissolved and their functions divided between 105 regional economic councils and the central planning bodies. In agriculture, during the past winter, the collective farms have been encouraged to purchase the agricultural machinery which in the past they have rented from the Machine-Tractor Stations. The latter are being converted into Repair and Technical Stations, which will retain their service functions while relinquishing much of the centralized control which they have hitherto exerted over agricultural production.

The basic economic changes have been accompanied by a relaxation of overt police terror and apparently a significant depopulation of the slave labor camps. There has also been a marked increase in the frankness of public statements, and still more in unpublished speeches, as witness Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin

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at the Twentieth Party Congress. A flood of foreign tourists has been admitted since 1955, and there is good evidence of a willingness to engage in extensive exchanges with the United States and other Western countries of students, artists and delegations representing a wide variety of professions.

The significance of these changes inevitably raises the question as to how far the assumptions about the Soviet political system that have been so firmly fixed in the thinking of the Western world in the past generation are still valid. Does the Party still have a firm hold on political power? Does political activity, as reflected, for instance, in the procedures of the Supreme Soviet, show any evolution from the practice of Stalin's time? How has the nature of Party controls changed under Khrushchev? What, indeed, are the capacities of the Soviet political system for evolution, given the pressures of rapid industrialization and the traditions of Russian society?

II

One impression left by even a cursory visit to the Soviet Union is that the Communist Party shows no signs of relinquishing its monopoly of power. The recent elections for the Supreme Soviet provided an impressive demonstration of the Party's control. The Supreme Soviet is a bicameral legislative body, with a Council of the Union of 738 deputies elected from districts representing every 300,000 of the population and a Council of Nationalities of 640 members representing on a proportional basis the various national administrative subdivisions of the U.S.S.R. In the elections on March 16, no less than 99.97 percent of the 133,836,325 eligible voters went to the polls. Of these, only 580,641 exercised their right to vote against the régime by crossing out the names of the candidates for the Council of the Union; the number was 363,736 in the case of candidates for the Council of Nationalities. In the case of the Council of the Union, this negative vote was more than double the 247,897 negative votes cast in 1954. The 1958 figure nevertheless represents only 0.43 percent of the total number of votes, and cannot be interpreted as a significant challenge to the régime. These electoral results are achieved by the assertion of effective Party controls—not advertised, but in the last analysis frankly acknowledged by Party officials—at each stage of the electoral process.

Under the direction of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet,

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the elections are administered by a Central Electoral Commission. This body supervises electoral commissions for each of the major administrative divisions of the country, as well as for the electoral districts of each of the two Councils of the Supreme Soviet and for the voting precincts. The latter are the same for the two Councils, although the electoral districts do not coincide. These electoral commissions, which comprised a total of some 1,200,000 members in 1958, are made up of representatives of what are officially known as "public organizations," a term which includes all professional organizations of workers and employees, and organizations or societies representing coöperatives, the youth, and cultural, technical and scholarly interests, as well as collective farms and the military. Of the recognized organizations in the Soviet Union, only the churches do not play a rôle in electoral activity. Each of these organizations, again with the exception of the churches, has its Party unit which is the directing element in all political matters. Indeed, the Party normally prefers to act through these public organizations rather than in its own name, although it is also represented on the electoral commissions.

This indirect exercise of Party authority through public organizations is the key to the process by which candidates are selected. Not less than 30 days before the date of the election, the electoral commissions organize a meeting in each of the electoral districts of the two Councils of the Supreme Soviet to nominate candidates. Before these formal nominating sessions, names of candidates have been put forward at meetings of one or more of the public organizations in the district. Thus a factory, a collective farm, a military unit or a branch of the Academy of Sciences—to name only a few of the possibilities—will on the initiative of its Party units suggest trustworthy candidates. How these various proposals are narrowed down to a single candidate for each electoral district is not clear from the public record, but a talk with a local Party secretary helps to clarify the situation. The Party, he will tell you, wants respected public figures as deputies to the Supreme Soviet—persons who are popular among their professional colleagues and at the same time trustworthy from the point of view of Party and state. The Party sees to it that from one to three such candidates are agreed upon at the formal nominating session, and it also sees that all but one of them declines to run for office when invited by the electoral com-

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mission. Indeed, when more than one candidate is nominated, one or two are generally national figures nominated for many districts. When these announce in which district they will run, the appropriate adjustments are made and the list of candidates is published.

The outcome of this process of selection is that one candidate, and only one, is nominated for each electoral district. This has been the case in all elections, national and local, since the existing electoral system was established under the Constitution in 1936. The official rationale of this system is that Soviet society, unlike that of the "capitalist" states, is not divided by conflicting interests resulting from the exploitation of man by man. Since there is only one interest, there is need for only one candidate.

In so far as there is a political campaign in the Soviet Union, it is conducted during the last month before the election. The list of candidates has now been published, and every day the press carries election stories, biographical sketches of the candidates, reviews of the régime's accomplishments since the last election in 1954 and accounts of the meetings at which the candidates are presented to the voters. The number of times a candidate is able to appear in public will depend on how busy he is at his regular occupation, but he will at least put in an appearance at one formal meeting organized by the electoral commission in his district.

At a typical meeting of this sort in a provincial town, half a dozen speakers—including perhaps a scholar, a worker, an army officer, a housewife, a collective farmer and even one or two school children—will extol the merits of the candidate. The candidate himself, who is seated on the stage with members of the electoral commission, then reviews the accomplishments of the government and promises to work for higher production and better living conditions. The audience has been brought together by the distribution of free tickets to the public organizations, and it claps politely at the end of each speech. There is no spontaneity or enthusiasm, however, and indeed there is an audible murmur of whispering and gossiping during the speeches. Even the candidate himself may chat and joke with his neighbors while his achievements are being praised a few feet away. The whole ceremony does not take more than an hour, and is followed by a concert or a variety show which seems to attract more spontaneous interest than the political part of the program. Climaxing

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these provincial meetings are those in Moscow, where the First Secretary of the Party and his principal colleagues give their pre-election addresses.

After all of this careful preliminary work, the election day itself holds little suspense. Elections are held on a Sunday with the polls open from 6:00 a.m. till midnight, and by noon most of the voters have cast their ballots. The cynics say that this gives the Party 12 hours to round up the rest of the voters. However this may be, it is a risky business to refrain from voting. Except for those who have avoided getting their names on the registration list (and this may be a sizable number in the larger cities where many are said to flaunt the strict limitations on residence), there is no more public way to defy the Party than to refrain from voting. Each voter presents his domestic passport at the registration desk, and his name is checked on the list of voters. He is then given two ballots, one for each Council of the Supreme Soviet, with the names of the single candidate already printed on them. All he has to do is to drop the ballots in the ballot box and he has fulfilled his obligation. For those who are travelling, there are ballot boxes on trains and boats. Seven electoral districts for each Council are provided for members of the armed services stationed abroad, and even outposts in the Antarctic have their ballot boxes. Officials with portable ballot boxes visit the hospitalized and bedridden, and no stone is left unturned to get all of the voters to the polls. Considering the size of the country and the number of voters, 99.97 percent is not a bad record.

A negative vote is somewhat less hazardous than failing to vote. Booths are available—some with easy chairs and potted flowers—but only a small fraction of the voters make use of them. Some may use a booth only to write a slogan praising the Party or to sign their names, a superfluous gesture. But the 580,641 and 363,736 adverse votes in the case of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities respectively were cast by actually crossing out the names of the candidates. No substitution of names is valid. To cross out a name nevertheless constitutes defiance of the Party and requires courage. No formal record is kept of those who use the booths, but it would be easy for an election official to notice who entered one. It is difficult to tell whether scratching the name of a candidate is a sign of protest against the régime itself or simply represents a dislike of the individual candidate. The Party interprets it in this latter sense,

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and in the occasional instances in local elections where candidates are defeated by failing to receive 50 percent of the votes the local authorities are blamed for failing to select popular and respected candidates.

III

The 1,378 candidates thus elected to the Supreme Soviet form an impressive cross-section of the Soviet élite. Official statements stress the popular origin of the deputies. It is claimed that 44.6 percent are workers and collective farmers directly engaged in production and that more than 60 percent are workers and peasants by social status. Another 26.4 percent are women. The Western student, however, can see the other side of the coin. About one-half of the deputies are high Party and state officials, including ministers of the union and of the constituent republics, generals, police officials, bankers and so on. Perhaps another quarter are managerial and professional personnel below the directing level, including many of the nominal workers and farmers who are in fact trade-union and collective-farm officials. At the same time, some 25 percent of the deputies are genuine workers and farmers, selected by the Party to represent their stratum (as there are no "classes") because of their local prominence.

As a legislative body, the Supreme Soviet does not bear much resemblance to the American Congress. The members keep their regular full-time jobs, which in most cases are not seriously interrupted by their work as deputies. The Supreme Soviet normally holds two sessions a year of about ten days each, but a certain amount of this time is devoted to ceremony and organization and it has been estimated that the deputies have averaged no more than seven working days a year since the first session met in 1938. Since the death of Stalin this average has increased to about ten days a year. All bills are adopted unanimously and with little debate. Indeed, so far as the general public is concerned the Supreme Soviet appears to be little more than a bureau for legitimizing the directives of the Party.

Behind the scenes, however, there is more activity than meets the eye. There are nine Standing Committees—for each of the two Councils dealing with legislative proposals, the budget, foreign affairs and credentials, and, in addition, one dealing with economic affairs for the Council of Nationalities alone. These review in advance most of the legislation presented to the Su-

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preme Soviet at its various sessions. Their size varies, but in the newly elected Supreme Soviet some 259 deputies participate in the work of these Standing Committees, which may last for several weeks before sessions of the Supreme Soviet. Moreover, each bill examined by a Standing Committee is first drafted by an *ad hoc* subcommittee which includes deputies who are not necessarily members of the Standing Committee but who have specialized knowledge of the matter at hand. In addition, at the subcommittee level a wide range of governmental specialists may be called into consultation in the drafting of legislation. Only the final recommendations of the Standing Committees are published in the proceedings of the Supreme Soviet, and their procedures as well as those of the *ad hoc* subcommittees are not known from direct observation or official records. From the available accounts, however, it appears that at this level divergent views are expressed and divisions of opinions are recorded. It is possible that three or four hundred deputies may spend as much as several weeks in Moscow apart from the public sessions of the Supreme Soviet.

To the extent that such discussion takes place, the Supreme Soviet should perhaps be regarded not as a rubber stamp but as having the function of formulating as legislation the directives of the Party. Much of the burden of this work is performed by the secretariat of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and by the smaller secretariats of the nine Standing Committees. But the deputies themselves also play a rôle in so far as the business before the Supreme Soviet comes within their special competence. At the same time, the existence of this preparatory work does not alter the fact that the Supreme Soviet drafts legislation rather than formulating policy. While legislative initiative is vested in a variety of institutions, these institutions, like the Supreme Soviet itself, are instruments of the Party. Indeed, since the appointment of Khrushchev as Chairman of the Council of Ministers on March 27, the unity of Party and state has been if possible closer than ever.

The question is sometimes raised as to why the Party bothers with elections and a parliament. It bothers with them because they are essential instruments of Party control. The electoral process gives the average voter a sense of participation in the political process, and indeed it may in some subtle psychological fashion commit him to sharing responsibility for the Party's direc-

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tives. The laws, in substance made by the Party, become public instruments through institutions in which all mature citizens participate. At the same time, the members of the Supreme Soviet are an important transmission belt for Party policy. When these respected citizens go back to their places of work after a session of the Supreme Soviet, they carry with them the prestige of the capital city. Nor are the Supreme Soviet deputies the only persons involved. In 1957, no less than 1,549,777 deputies were elected to local soviets. In addition, there are the 1,200,000 members of electoral commissions. While there is some overlapping, probably more than 2,000,000 citizens were thus associated with Party and government through the electoral process. Since many of these were not Party members, the local and national elections play an important rôle in promoting the acceptance of Party directives as national policy. Finally, the elections also provide an intensive period of propaganda for the national policies of the Party. While propaganda is a year-round process, in the month preceding the quadrennial election to the Supreme Soviet, hundreds of leading national figures in many walks of life join in a chorus of praise for the government's achievements and promises of better things to come.

IV

The political power which is not held by the voters and is not exercised by the Supreme Soviet is found, of course, in the Party, which is still firmly in the saddle. At the same time, while events since Stalin's death have shown no weakening of the Party's control over the political system, they have given evidence of significant changes in the spirit in which Party affairs are conducted —changes which have been reflected in the Party's method of control.

In the Stalin era the political leaders operated on the assumption that not only the population at large but even the bulk of the Party officials were hostile and untrustworthy. As Khrushchev recalled in his unpublished speech, 70 percent of the members of the Party Central Committee in the late 1930s were arrested and shot. Stalin placed the entire administration of the country, including all major industrial enterprises, under a highly centralized bureaucracy in Moscow, which in turn was closely supervised by a ruthless police.

Under this system control from the center was assured, but it

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was bought at a very high price of inefficiency and over-bureaucratization. Since Stalin's death, control has devolved significantly from the central bureaucracy to the local organs of Party and administration. In the United States this shift has frequently been referred to as a "decentralization," but this term is not used in Russia. The Russians call it a "reorganization," and indeed it might better be referred to as a "recentralization."

This new and in many respects more dynamic centralization is achieved through the Party apparatus around the country, which like a central nervous system initiates all stimuli in the body politic. The police, through which Stalin used to terrorize local Party officials, no longer serve as the primary means of control. Khrushchev has built up his own cadres of local Party secretaries whom he is apparently able to trust. In talking with them, the casual visitor gains the impression that they understand and support the policies he has initiated. One senses that a degree of relaxation among higher Party officials around the country has replaced the paralyzing fear in which they must have lived in Stalin's day. One can imagine that they treat Khrushchev with deference when they visit him, but are able to argue with him on matters of policy without the apprehension that the police will knock on their door before the next day dawns.

Economic reorganization has strengthened the hands of the local Party organizations, and through them of the central organization of the Party as well. Similarly in agriculture, the new confidence in the collective farms reflects a great increase in the authority of the Party representatives in the collectives at the expense of the Machine-Tractor Stations, which were essentially an instrument of the central state bureaucracy.

It will take time to see how all of Khrushchev's innovations work out, but the main outlines of his political strategy seem to be clear enough. The surviving top leaders who worked for Stalin in the home office—notably Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Bulganin—doubtless shared Stalin's distrust of the larger Party organization around the country. One can well imagine their remonstrating with Khrushchev that the confidence in local Party and administrative controls implied by his innovations was bound to undermine the authority of the central Party organization. Long isolated from local officials by many layers of state and Party bureaucracy, these leaders apparently felt that the demonstrated inefficiency of Stalin's way of doing things was

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a necessary price for the monolithic controls underlying the security of the political system. Khrushchev, whose career has been spent in the main away from the home office, was in much closer rapport with the new generation of officials.

Like Stalin before him, Khrushchev has bypassed competing Party leaders by building up his power through appointing local Party secretaries and members of the Central Committee and its staff. Yet the differences between the two are much greater than the similarities. Not only is Khrushchev 20 years older than was Stalin at a similar stage in his career, but the style of his régime is strikingly different. The significant relaxation of tensions within the Party and between the Party and influential non-Party segments of the population would seem to preclude under Khrushchev's régime sweeping purges such as those in the 1930s. It also appears likely that the sudden demise of Khrushchev would present less of a crisis to the Party than did the death of Stalin in 1953.

V

If the impression is correct that the Party is now more relaxed and self-confident than in Stalin's day, and that its control of the levers of political power is as firm as ever, what is the outlook for the further evolution of Soviet politics?

The greatest handicap to Western thinking is the tendency to measure Russia by Western standards. The number of telephones, radios and cars per capita is compared with that in Europe and in the United States. It is assumed that Western democratic forms are inevitable in all modern countries, and that the longer they are delayed the stronger the opposition to the government must become. There is a whole school of thought devoted to seeking out tensions in the Soviet system, and squads of government officials try to exploit these tensions through propaganda. Tensions indeed there are in Russia, perhaps more than in most societies, and if comparable tensions existed in the West they might well cause an explosion. The struggle for power among Party leaders, especially when succession to the top leadership is in question, similarly gives rise to situations which in Western eyes must inevitably lead to widespread disorder. Yet the Soviet political system survived the death of Stalin without too much strife, and a successor to Khrushchev will doubtless be found when it becomes necessary to do so.

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In thinking about Russia, perhaps only two assumptions can safely be made. One is that the traditions of Soviet politics are significantly different from those of the West, and the other is that we do not yet know enough about non-Western political systems to make any very accurate predictions about the evolution of Soviet politics. All we can do is to try to understand the ways in which Russia differs from Western societies, and to estimate the range of possibilities lying ahead.

Modern societies are produced by the interaction of historically formed traditions with the more or less universal imperatives of industrialization. Considering the significant differences between Russian traditions and those of the West, it would be prudent to expect that a modern Russia will not resemble very closely what we know as modern Western society. In many respects (to limit the comparison to the United States) Russian traditions have been the very opposite of ours. We have long been one of the wealthiest countries in the world, while Russia has been desperately poor by European standards. We have enjoyed almost complete national security between the defeat of the British at New Orleans in 1815 and the revelation of Soviet technical achievements by the sputniks in 1957. Russia, on the other hand, has been the battlefield of many nations from earliest times down to 1945. We started out with the freest institutions of Europe, while the Russians in wrestling with their problems drew on the experience of the Byzantine and Mongol empires and of the enlightened despots.

Human nature may be the same the world around, but political institutions are molded by the life experience of organized societies. History has taught the Russians that poverty can be overcome only by subordinating the individual to the group, and that unless they have a strong government they will be over-run by foreign enemies. Only the state can bridge the gap between Russian poverty and individual and national security. The history of Russian politics is the history of state power, transformed through the centuries by a variety of influences and in fact accepted by most segments of public opinion. Indeed, the recognition and acceptance by the Bolsheviks of the rôle of state power was a significant factor in their victory in 1917.

Industrialization, or more broadly modernization, has had much the same impact on Russia as on other societies. Rapid industrialization began in the 1880s under the impetus of state

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policy, and its inexorable pressure has been felt ever since. The proportion of workers and of city dwellers in the population has grown. The organization of political and economic activity has become more centralized, with great emphasis on capital formation. Social mobility has increased and there has been an extensive mixing of ethnic groups. Literacy and popular education have grown by leaps and bounds. This has led to a secularization of thought and a general acceptance of change. Traditional values and family ties have been undermined, and national symbols have been developed to cope with the resulting psychological insecurities.

These pressures affected the later Tsarist empire as well as the more recent Soviet period, as they have influenced all societies under the impact of modernization. Indeed, it is fascinating to speculate whether Russia would be very much different today if the Communists had not come to power. The differences would probably be far less than are generally acknowledged, although it would be difficult to convince any Russian of this today. It should at least be recognized, however, that the impact of Communism has been more on the methods of modernization than on the quantitative results. Communism as we know it today can perhaps best be defined as the Soviet method of modernization, and it may never be possible to unravel the intricate inter-relations within this ideology of Marxism, Leninism, the Russian revolutionary tradition and, indeed, the ambitions, goals and methods of Russian society in general. Each has played its rôle in forming the values and precedents which motivate Communist leadership, and each has in turn been altered by daily interaction with the practical problems of transforming Russia into a modern society.

Foreign affairs is the one phase of Soviet policy which still seems to be strongly if not predominantly influenced by the Marxism of the old-fashioned variety known to the West. It is perhaps natural that the further a problem is removed from practical Soviet knowledge, the more a solution is sought in ideology. One gains the impression in talking with Khrushchev and with younger members of the Soviet élite, even those who have visited the United States, that they have very little conception of our values and methods of work. What they see is an irrational, disorganized, confused society, with no clear table of organization and no ideology set forth in logical theses and interpreted in an

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official journal. They are at least as aware of the tensions in our society as we are of theirs, and they too have squads of government officials seeking to exploit these tensions through propaganda. They see a rising Soviet curve of production which must inevitably cross a declining American curve at some future time. They doubtless believe literally that Marx's predictions about the decline of what they call "capitalism" are as scientifically dependable as are the laws of natural science. They envisage a future world organized more or less the way the Soviet Union is organized today, with political and economic institutions adapted as necessary to unpredictable exigencies.

It follows that Soviet leaders do not expect to reach anything more than short-range agreement with "capitalist" governments, which are by nature transitory. As they see it, the decline of capitalism will be more rapid in an era of apparent peace than in one marked by Soviet threats. Khrushchev's disarming manner supports a policy designed to weaken NATO by removing the situation that called it into being. Encouragement of the idea of disarmament will tend to undermine the defense industries, which the Communists regard as the principal bulwark of "capitalist" prosperity. "Peaceful coexistence" is the name they give to their policy at this stage, although it might better be called "watchful waiting."

The only safe assumption one can make about Russia is that the Communist way of doing things is likely to survive for the foreseeable future. The ruthlessness of a future government is not likely to exceed that of Stalin's régime, and the degree of liberalization which may eventually result from Russia's achieving a new position of security will in all probability not be so great as to affect our policy. Perhaps the one way in which we can seriously influence Soviet politics is by seeing to it that Soviet leadership gets a better idea of what our world is like. While all peoples tend to judge the world by their own standards, and we no less than most, the Russians have a particularly narrow and doctrinaire view of foreign affairs. It may be that no fruitful negotiations will be possible until each side accepts the other as a going concern with indefinite chances of survival.

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CAMBODIA NEUTRAL: THE DICTATE OF NECESSITY

By Prince Norodom Sihanouk

CERTAIN misconceptions have arisen from insufficient knowledge of the true situation in my country since it attained independence in November 1953. Although I am convinced that the leaders of the United States Government and the State Department's experts on Southeast Asia are fully conversant with Cambodian policy, I do not feel that the public has always been accurately informed about us. Americans will have learnt, from the type of magazine that serves up complex world problems in palatable and easily digested form, that Cambodia has more or less cast off its former friends in order to seek new ones further east, that it practises a "pro-Red neutralism," is "rotten" with Communist propaganda and constitutes a "breach" in the front of the "free nations." I have received a number of touchingly naïve letters from American citizens imploring me to end this state of affairs and warning me of the dangers that would face my country if it put its trust in a certain "bloc."

I would like our American friends to know how mistaken they are in such appraisals. I can think of no better way of convincing them than by giving a frank account of Cambodia's present situation, its difficulties and the way in which it is trying to overcome them.

Cambodia is a country of six million inhabitants, including 400,000 Vietnamese and 350,000 Chinese. Our army—and this is important to remember—numbers only 25,000 men. After Laos, which has a population of two million, we are the smallest state in the Indochinese Peninsula. But at least we are united. With our long-standing tradition of monarchy, we are drawn together by the Throne. As sincere democrats, we hate disorder, and as exponents of a purely national form of socialism, we can only be indifferent to foreign ideologies. We go our own national way, unswervingly.

First and foremost we are Cambodians, and lackeys of foreign Powers have no hope of success here. Since we achieved independence, our policy has always been suited to our national needs. In our foreign relations we have favored neutrality, which in the

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United States is all too often confused with "neutralism," although it is fundamentally different. We are neutral in the same way Switzerland and Sweden are neutral—not neutralist like Egypt or Indonesia. Let anyone examine our votes in the United Nations; they are not often "aligned" with those of the bloc of "neutralist" nations.

Our neutrality has been imposed on us by necessity. A glance at a map of our part of the world will show that we are wedged in between two medium-sized nations of the Western bloc and only thinly screened by Laos from the scrutiny of two countries of the Eastern bloc, North Viet Nam and the vast People's Republic of China. What choice have we but to try to maintain an equal balance between the "blocs"?

Furthermore, how could our neutrality be taken seriously if we had persisted in maintaining diplomatic, commercial and other relations exclusively with the Western bloc? As it is, we have refrained from recognizing the non-unified countries. The United Kingdom has an embassy at Peking; we have not. France has a general delegation at Hanoi; we have not. Our connections with these countries are limited to economic, commercial and cultural relations.

We are receiving some $25,000,000 in economic aid from China over a period of two years, with no conditions attached. But we do not forget that American economic and military aid amounted to almost $40,000,000 for the 1957–58 budgetary year and that it was also offered unconditionally, as is the aid afforded by France for equipment.

Assuredly all these aid programs are of great help to us. We feel particularly indebted to the United States for underwriting a great part of the maintenance of our army; for constructing the highway which will directly connect the seaport of Kompong-Som with our capital of Phnom Penh; for the teacher training school of Kompong Kantout; and for the projected Police Academy and important irrigation schemes.

It is true that we wish this aid might be less "rigid" in its conception; more flexibility is desirable so that we can face unforeseen needs and situations. Finally—why not say it?—we would like to be reassured about the continuity of aid, especially for the army, which is of such vital importance to the security of our country.

Chinese aid has been granted us for only two years. But it is

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very flexible. On a grant basis, we receive from China consumer goods which are used both to meet the requirements of the population and at the same time to provide our Government with much needed revenue. Thus, from the sale of aid goods received from China, we have been able to dig wells, build dams, furnish schools, construct administration buildings and help victims of national disasters. In addition, the Chinese are building three factories in Cambodia which they will equip and donate to us. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has promised to build a 500-bed hospital in Phnom Penh entirely equipped and provided with consultation services.

As to France, she maintains a military mission which provides advisers and instructors for our army. A French economic mission puts experts at our disposal and offers numerous scholarships to our students and military personnel. France has undertaken to provide us with a seaport at Kompong-Som and a modern airport at Phnom Penh with longer and more adequate runways. Several other important projects are under study, but whether they can be undertaken depends on the French financial situation.

By far the most important aid is that from the United States, since its purpose is to provide us with the framework of a modern state. For this reason American aid is conceived in anticipation of the future. Our élite understands this. The poor, however, are less sympathetic to it because what they think about above all is the quick and easy satisfaction of their most pressing needs. This is the reason why other aid programs, more tangible because they are in response to present demands, perhaps bring higher returns to their authors.

We have nothing to reproach ourselves with in so far as our old friends are concerned. Most of our students and soldiers receive their basic or advanced training in the West. Our élite has retained its French culture and many of the younger generation are learning English as well. Our foreign experts and military instructors are from the West. No Westerner has ever met with the slightest hostility here and all our visitors speak favorably of our hospitality, even "Eastern" diplomats and travellers, who seem to appreciate the atmosphere of freedom they find here.

Are we "pro-Red"? Our neutrality is neither complaisance nor surrender to anyone. When a great Power tries to submerge us beneath a flood of propaganda or to tempt our youth away from

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its duty to King and Country, we take a firm stand. I have twice had occasion to put my compatriots on their guard against such attempts, regardless of the consequences. And our people have approved and supported me wholeheartedly on both occasions. In these circumstances it will be difficult, if not impossible, to "corrupt" us.

We are taking all the necessary precautions—and we will go to considerable lengths if necessary—to prevent anything of the kind. Besides, the loyalty of our people would doom any such dividing tactics to failure from the start. As for the foreign minorities living in Cambodia, we shall, without ever repressing them, see that they respect our neutrality and security. In that regard we are far more vigilant than is generally believed.

I have sometimes been represented to the American public as trying to "flirt with the Reds." The fact is, I abdicated in 1955 to save the monarchy—not to abandon it. However strongly democratic, I am sure that the citizens of the United States can appreciate that, short of being mentally deranged, a Prince and former King must be well aware that the first concern of the Communists is to get rid of the King and natural élite of any country they succeed in laying hands on. By that I do not mean to imply that the Communists wish to take possession of Cambodia; that may not enter into their plans at all and, for the moment at least, they have far weightier matters to occupy them. But I am not overlooking any possibilities, and that one is quite enough to deter me from any "flirtation."

If I have no particular liking for Communism, neither have I any cause or means to join a crusade—even a moral one—against the nations that have adopted that ideology and which since 1954 have not given my country sufficient grounds for complaint. It would be absurd to suppose that a tiny country like mine, geographically situated as it is, would risk provoking the Chinese and Soviet colossi now that planes fly so fast and rockets so far.

We are not a "breach" in the Western bloc merely because we cannot be a "rampart." In the event of a world conflict, we might very well become one of the first victims of a harsh occupation. In that case, the "free world" would have other things to do besides undertaking our liberation—or rather the liberation of what little remained of us.

Are we selfish or "wrong-minded" in thinking as we do? I

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maintain that we are merely being realistic. By practising a genuine neutrality which eliminates any pretext for aggression we have a chance of not bringing down a storm on our heads; and a storm can be dangerous where there is no lightning-conductor.

Our precautions may be to no avail and we may one day be invaded notwithstanding them (I am not afraid of internal subversion which stands no chance here). If, in spite of our manifest good intentions and our utter propriety in respect to the blocs, one of these should attack us, then I would be the first to advocate reconsidering our policy and invoking aid from the opponents of our aggressors. I profoundly hope that our country will never have to take such a step.

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RIVAL ECONOMIC THEORIES IN INDIA

By John Kenneth Galbraith

IF WE are to understand the impact on India of foreign economic ideas we must first recognize how immune the Indian economy is to influence from any source, including that of the Indian Government. Indian life, as we have so often been told, resides in the villages. The great cities—Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi, Madras—are, in any quantitative sense, on the fringe of Indian society. Eighty-three percent of the people live in the villages; and these number a nearly unimaginable 612,000.

The isolation of the Indian village is something that can be both seen and felt. The thin, searching people, the mud and thatch, the patrol of silent cows, the meagre surrounding fields, all convey a sense of solitude. Village government is primitive and but slightly tied to central authority. There is no priest who is in communication with his hierarchy and no telephone or telegraph lines to the city. Often the village can be approached only on foot. Those who have approached it over the mud dikes or along the dusty paths in centuries past have been the agents of old oppressions or the harbingers of new misfortunes. At best they have been bearers of promises that were never kept or prophets of reforms that were never made. Out of the depths of this experience the village has a deeply ingrained mistrust of the world outside, and this mistrust is directed first of all at those who presume to govern.

The economic life of the village is concerned, indeed preoccupied, with the production of food. And so, therefore, is Indian economic life as a whole. Approximately half of India's gross national product is made in agriculture, and approximately 70 percent of the people are directly dependent on agriculture for their livelihood.

In an economy where food is so important, so, inevitably, is land. There are very few generalizations which can be made about landholding in the Indian villages. Some people own a great deal more land than others, but a great many people do own some. The state governments are trying with varying degrees of efficiency, determination and success to broaden the base of land ownership. Perhaps it is enough to say that the Indian agrarian community is one of marked but not limitless economic and social

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inequality. At its bottom, however, are to be found perhaps the world's most unfortunate men—the mass of landless laborers for whom idleness, hunger and privation are endemic. All in all, the Indian village is no Auburn.

The villages do not, of course, comprise the total of Indian economic life. India has long had an excellent transportation network—by far the best in Asia. There is a highly developed urban trading community. And long before Independence, India had a large and efficient cotton textile industry, the world's principal jute manufacturing industry, a small steel industry and some development in other fields. But apart from the textile mills, industry was a thin fringe. Much has been made of Indian (or Parsi) enterprise in building a steel industry. But prior to Independence this had brought India only about a million tons of capacity. Canada, with colonial antecedents and only a minute fraction of India's population, had several times as much.

Most of our recent attitudes toward the Indian economy have been shaped by the government activities since Independence. These have centered on the two Five Year Plans, the first of which was devoted primarily, although not exclusively, to expanding food production and particularly to the development of large and small irrigation enterprises. India is now midway in the Second Plan, in which the emphasis has been more especially on industry—on expanding the steel industry, on launching an engineering and machinery industry, on developing an electrical equipment supply, and so forth. The industrial expansion has gone forward under both public and private auspices although in the last couple of years the private sector has expanded rather more rapidly than the public. However, most of the new industries—in contrast with older ones that are being improved and enlarged—are being developed under government auspices by publicly-owned corporations. This is being done as part of a formally proclaimed intention to develop a "socialist pattern of society." The commitment to the goal of a socialist society is central in modern Indian thought. It is regularly averred by the government and, indeed, by nearly all articulate Indians. Even the most intransigent Indian capitalist may observe on occasion that he is really a socialist at heart.

This reiterated reference to socialism is extremely important for an understanding of the Indian economy—or, to speak more precisely, it contributes greatly to the failure to understand it.

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The word socialism implies social control of the economy by the government. Five year plans carry the same connotation. It is easy, as a result, to imagine that the Indian economy is managed by the government and that New Delhi has in its hands the necessary instruments for such control. Clearly a great many foreigners, both East and West, share this illusion. Nothing could be farther from the fact.

The Indians are indeed engaged in an imaginative and energetic effort to expand their economic plant and its output. Both by choice and by necessity they are doing much of this under public auspices. Yet, by almost any test, the economy of India is less responsive to public guidance and direction than that of the United States. Indeed, it is one of the world's least controlled or "planned" economies. In the United States the several levels of government dispose of about 20 percent of total production (of $434 billions in 1957). In India the corresponding figure is not over ten percent.[1] By this test—the size of state activity in relation to all activity—more than twice as much of the American economy is managed or planned by government as is the case in India.

No one should make too much of these figures. Military outlays, which are a sizable part of our figures, may not be a useful index of resources under social control. But even outside the field of direct public activity our economy is subject to a far greater degree of public guidance and direction than that of India. Our agriculture is much more subject to control and is more extensively controlled by the state. The agriculture of the Indian villages is only gradually being brought within the purview of the counterpart of an extension service. Wages, hours and conditions of labor are much more extensively regulated in the United States, and in one way or another we can do more about manpower supply. Taxation and fiscal policy are subject to the same manipulation in free enterprise Washington as in socialist India, and in our case the tools in the hands of the government are almost certainly more efficient. Our industrial price-making is subject quite generally to the administration of large corporations. As a result, it is decidedly more restrained than the truly free markets of India.

In the aggregate, there can be little doubt that ours is both

[1] For detailed comparisons of a slightly earlier date, see Harry T. Oshima, "Share of Government in Gross National Product for Various Countries," *American Economic Review*, June 1957.

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much the more manageable and the more managed economy. India has, in fact, superimposed a smallish socialized sector atop what, no doubt, is the world's greatest example of functioning anarchy.

II

To this economy come both the prophets of Communism and Western capitalism. It can easily be argued that both fail to make contact with it. There is at least some slight comfort in the knowledge that the Russian difficulties may be as great as our own. Conceivably they are greater.

Our own difficulties are compounded of a failure to understand both the Indian economy and our own. It has long been remarked that, where economic wisdom is concerned, we have both a domestic and an export product. The domestic product is an intricate blend of pragmatism and compromise. It abhors government intervention in principle but not in practice. Social security and social insurance, a large range of subsidies and controls, a policy for containing depressions and inflation, a farm policy, and a resource development policy are all recognized to be either essential or desirable. We are categorically opposed to government intervention only when it is categorically for someone else's benefit. This social pragmatism—this accommodation to circumstance—far more than rigid adherence to doctrine accounts for what measure of economic success we have enjoyed.

But the common export version of American economic policy is very different. This is a pure distillate of boisterous enterprise and undiluted laissez-faire. Rugged individualism and rigorous competition are the thing. Men who wouldn't think of taking this medicine themselves unhesitatingly prescribe it for foreigners. Particularly, it is what is needed to stir Indians out of their age-long torpor. Thus lurking just below the surface of nearly all our formal relations with the Indians is the suggestion that they should forthwith dispense with socialism and go in for free enterprise or capitalism. All would be well for them and all would be well between our two countries.

As I say, such rejection of the state, in contrast with its pragmatic use, reflects a misreading of our own experience. The misunderstanding of India lies in the failure to see the unique inapplicability of the free enterprise formula—either in its pure or diluted form—to that country. As noted, the Indian commit-

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ment to the semantics of socialism is at least as deep as ours to the semantics of free enterprise. (Nothing is more engaging than the way both countries affirm valiantly in principle what they find so inconvenient to put into practice.) And until recent times a good deal of capitalist enterprise in India was an extension of the arm of the imperial power—indeed, in part its confessed *raison d'être*. As a result, free enterprise in Asia bears the added stigmata of colonialism, and this is a formidable burden.

But much more important, it is very doubtful if free enterprise is either functionally or socially applicable to India. For India and the Indian Government, economic development is a political imperative. Perhaps—just perhaps—if development were left to market incentives, it would proceed as rapidly as under public auspices, or more rapidly. But suppose it did not. Suppose the private vision and entrepreneurship were lacking. Or the capital. Who can be sure? Did India lag behind the West in the last century and the early part of this one because the British repressed growth or because of more deeply seated causes? If more deeply seated and enduring factors prevented rapid development in the great age of enterprise, then to count on free enterprise now would be a dreadful risk. Who can be sure that things have changed? It is a risk that American prophets of free enterprise, were they based in New Delhi rather than New York, would be reluctant to take.

There are also the social consequences of capitalism to reckon with. Left to itself, as the specifications would require, capitalism is a system of manifest inequality. Inequality has ceased to be a thing of great social urgency in a country where opulence is general. It still has grave and even revolutionary implications in a country where nearly everyone is poor and where many are hungry. Anyone who is familiar with India will also be aware of the talent of its people for conspicuous consumption. This is a part of the world where the rich are rarely discreet.

I have been adverting to the pure or export version of capitalism as it applies to India. But the pragmatic version which we in fact employ is not more relevant. It too leaves initiative to the private firm with the consequent risk that in India it will not be forthcoming in response to market incentives. Inequality remains considerable, and it obviously is not open to the Indians to use general opulence as a solvent for the resulting tensions. Unemployment compensation, old age insurance, farm price

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guarantees, and the numerous other ways by which we blunt the sharp edges of the capitalist machinery for the ordinary citizen, also help to make tolerable the wealth of the well-to-do. These social luxuries are also unavailable to the Indian Government. A good deal of our social regulation, imperfect though it is, requires a precision and subtlety of administration which is beyond the reach of a government like that of India.

In the last two or three years a remarkably aberrant phrase, "people's capitalism," has come into official use to characterize the modern American system. It is evidently presumed to describe a system in which ownership of the means of production is widely distributed through the medium, principally, of widely held securities. The case for a broad distribution of such ownership rests, invariably, on a bogus use of statistics. (Individual owners are counted as equal regardless of the size of holdings, and their holdings are, in fact, highly unequal.) Share ownership has also been of minor importance as compared with increased income or improved social legislation in softening the tensions of capitalism. But though the synthetic talk about people's capitalism has little relevance to the United States, it has no meaning at all for countries like India where the masses of the people will never, if they own anything at all, own more than a minute patch of land.

Thus to talk in India of the virtues of capitalism, classical or modern, is to make little or no contact with the realities of Indian economic life. The person who does so serves only to deny himself influence except with a handful of Indian businessmen. Our situation is partly redeemed, however, by the fact that on the whole Americans adhere badly to a popular creed or an official line. Large numbers of the people whom we have actually on the ground—State Department, technical assistance and information service personnel and businessmen—have seen or sensed that India cannot follow our example. It is not our habit to conceal our convictions on these matters even though it may be wise to exercise a measure of discretion in the presence of visiting legislators and tycoons. I imagine that many Indians know that many Americans take a pragmatic view of their policy.

Yet how much better it would be if inapplicable ideology did not supervene at the top. One cannot be in India without feeling that most of our efforts at understanding consist in laboriously trying to undo the damage of those who run the store in

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Washington. In our society there is an unquestioned correlation between the majesty of official position and the irrelevance of the generalizations that are solemnly articulated.

III

The Russians also have problems. In contrast with the exponents of laissez-faire capitalism, they show a capacity to accommodate doctrine to circumstance. The difficulty is, however, that the Soviet Union is a full-blown example of socialist planning and India, as I have noted, could scarcely be farther from this goal. Russia is the most managed and centralized society in the world. Both its industry and its agriculture are subject to a formidable apparatus of control. Objectives are pursued with the rigor and determination of an old authoritarian tradition. Nothing could be more strikingly in contrast with the minimal guidance to which the Indian economy is subject. And, one ventures, nothing could be less in keeping with Indian temperament and the character of the ruling Congress Party than the vigor and on occasion the violence of Soviet governmental techniques. No one has suggested that Indian socialism is revolutionary socialism. On the contrary, it identifies itself wholly with the tradition of non-violence.

Thus while the Russian accommodation to Indian attitudes is certainly greater than in the days of Stalin, one can reasonably conclude that there are still difficulties. Russians must negotiate the chasm between a country that is genuinely socialistic (in the Soviet sense of the term) and a country that chooses to call itself socialist but, in fact, is at the opposite pole in actual organization. The Soviet leaders cannot tell a friendly socialist country that it is no such thing, nor can they make recommendations which accept the fact of a total absence of central control. Russians are more or less under the obligation to believe that the Indian economy is what it is not.

While I was in India the year before last, I had some opportunity to familiarize myself, directly and indirectly, with the general drift of Soviet (and associated) economic comment on India. It seems to be recognized that Russian and East European agricultural experience is inapplicable to India. But other agricultural suggestions strike one as having a rather uncertain or even academic tone. The remnants of feudalism and exploitation should be abolished; this is easier to suggest than to reduce to blue-

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prints. The "surplus product" in agriculture should be appropriated for the needs of development; the questions of procedure are more difficult, especially in a country where the governing party is extensively identified with land ownership.

One of the most serious Indian problems involves the adjustment of investment as between the public and the private industrial sector. So far as there is a Russian formula for dealing with this problem it must, inevitably, be to discriminate sharply against the private sector. Given the importance of this sector for earning foreign exchange and the scarcity of managerial talent, as well as the vested interests of part of the Congress Party, this has the same unrealistic ring as proposals for universal free enterprise.

One senses that even Russian attitudes toward the socialized sector, at least as they emerge in the attitudes of sympathetic Indians, have been but slightly adjusted to Indian conditions. The Indian Five Year Plan is treated as though it were indeed a master industrial plan for the administration of all economic resources. There is much concern for matching and reconciling inputs and outputs in different sectors. And there is a heavy-industry mystique.

In fact, the Indian Five Year Plans have their kinship not so much with the *Gosplan* as with a Western capital budget that has been spread out to provide for industrial capital formation.[2] The urgent questions are not those of matching inputs and outputs and rates of growth; these are rather readily solved. The infinitely more difficult questions are those of maximizing foreign exchange resources, and of getting the maximum of domestic saving and capital formation with the minimum of inflation. With these problems it would not seem that the Soviet attitudes make appreciable contact. In post-revolutionary Russia a massive development of heavy industry could seem the *sine qua non* of survival. And in World War II this proved to be the case. The development of heavy industry is also important in India, but it would be hard to say that it has unique urgency as compared with food, clothing, medicines and like products for her vast population.

Finally, India, as a parliamentary democracy, has a difficult

[2] A point that was indeed made about the first Five Year Plan by M. N. Rubinshtejn, a Soviet writer on Indian economic development. For this and other observations on Russian attitudes I am much indebted to Mr. L. Kirsch who has let me see his unpublished paper on "The Development of the Soviet View of the Indian Economy."

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problem of reconciling efficiency and maximum growth with the political pressures and religious preferences of her people. Some of these pressures—the Gandhian emphasis on cottage industry with the resulting limitations on factory production, for example —are decidedly inimical to growth. In the past, Russian comment on Gandhi and the economic policies of his followers was invariably contemptuous, but of late there has been a marked tendency to rationalize these policies as very desirable. They are seen as the alternative to capitalist textile production and a solution to the admittedly tragic problem of village unemployment. Neither position reflects the realities of the Indian situation. This requires a sympathetic view of the religious preferences and the problem of unemployment but fairly strong resistance to restraints on factory enterprise or the diversion of scarce capital to village industry. For this would mean merely more privation over an even longer time.

IV

In fact, neither an advanced capitalist country like the United States nor a highly organized economy such as that of the Soviet Union has an economic formula that is immediately applicable to India. It is perhaps especially unfortunate that among those who fail to recognize this are a great many Indians themselves. Indian Marxists, who are a considerable and influential group, naturally assume that the formula for India's future is given by Marxist-Leninist doctrine and current Soviet experience. It is to these (and in recent times also to China) that they look for essential guidance. I sense that little effort is made to modify this doctrine in applying it to the Indian scene. And plainly, much of it is as remote from the realities of the Indian life as are Marx, Lenin and the modern Soviet leaders in time or temperament.

A very much larger number of Indian economic leaders look for guidance to the sophisticated economic theory of the West. To be in communion with this doctrine is a mark of scholarly achievement. Again, no great store is set by its modification and adaptation to the Indian experience. As a result, an astonishing proportion of the economics that is taught and discussed in India has little relevance to Indian problems. Indeed, some of the more refined theoretical models discussed are not notably relevant to the Western communities where they originated.

At the same time it is becoming increasingly clear that Indian

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economic policy is at its best when it is most self-reliant. Adaptation of action to circumstances has on numerous occasions produced better results than the adoption of foreign models. The First Five Year Plan was a pronounced success at least partly because it reflected the enormous importance of food in the Indian economy. Perhaps the greatest success of both the First and Second Plans has been the Village Development Program. This effort, designed to establish communication with the villages, to lift the level of their technical achievement, stimulate the use of their latent resources and improve the quality of their life, reflects the importance of the village in Indian economic life and is adapted to the mood and aspirations of the Indian village dweller. It has no close counterpart either with the West or in the Communist countries. (While it serves some of the same functions, it is an error to identify it too closely with the modern agricultural extension service of an American state.) Perhaps the greatest unsolved problem of the Indians is to find some way to insure efficient public entrepreneurship under the general ægis of a parliamentary government. As I suggested earlier, there is no alternative to such entrepreneurship, and hence a solution of the problem must be found. On this question neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has much experience to offer. The one lacks the public corporations and the other the parliamentary democracy.

I do not suggest that the Asian countries have nothing to learn from the experience of the more developed lands. But I am persuaded that these lessons are not revealed in any comprehensive doctrine or theory and that this is equally the case with Western capitalism and Soviet Communism. The best Asians and the best friends of Asia will be those who first learn this lesson.

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THE U.N. AND NATIONAL SECURITY

By Lincoln P. Bloomfield

IN 1945, when the United Nations was founded, its *raison d'être* was to provide greater security for its member nations. As the basic conflict of interests between Soviet Communism and the free nations unfolded, the cold war rapidly came to suffuse the entire organization like a sort of nerve gas, paralyzing but not killing. In a relatively short time, it was seen to be incapable of resolving or even seriously affecting the dominant world conflict. The United States and its principal allies were forced to conclude that except as it provided a forum for counter-propaganda the United Nations was irrelevant to the over-riding short-term military and security problem posed by aggressive and expansionist Soviet Communism.

The Korean War threw a new light on the capabilities of the U.N. as a political mechanism for organizing and demonstrating world-wide resistance to limited Communist aggression. But the disproportionately large contribution which the United States had to make to that fight strengthened the doubt whether the U.N. could play a central rôle in the short-run protection of American national security. It continued to exercise a powerful attraction for the American people, since it exemplified their great will for peace. But as the custodian of the peace it seemed to be in a fiduciary relationship not to us but to an unborn generation of men who might have a capacity for managing their affairs rather more harmoniously.

Reasons for the American public to favor continued participation in the U.N. were, besides the moral attraction of the Charter ideal, the possibility of using the organization selectively in the settlement of disputes within the free world, and its "secondary" activities involving dependent areas, technical assistance and the humanitarian achievements of the Specialized Agencies. Those functions turned out to be important enough to sustain American membership. But no amount of enthusiasm for the potentialities of the organization under different circumstances could overcome the conviction that at best it must be considered to be "on ice" so far as concerned the profound and immediate security problem that preoccupied us.

Meanwhile great changes have been taking place in power

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relationships and in the policies designed to protect national security. The capacity of the United States to influence international events decisively has seemed to decline in recent years. We cannot afford the luxury of misusing any available means of making our influence felt. What of the United Nations? Has our estimate of its capabilities taken account of our new insights into the present realities of international political life, specifically as they relate to political and technological developments? What contribution might it make to security in the years immediately ahead?

II. THE CHANGING U.N.

Four things have happened in recent years to put in question our old basic attitudes toward the U.N. as an agency promoting our national security.

The first is the loosening of the alliance structure on both sides. In the early days of the cold war it was not uncommon for the vote in the General Assembly to be 55 to 5 on a whole range of issues. The lines were sharply drawn; the balance of power was so rigid that little flexibility for manœuvre was left within the U.N. or for that matter outside. Even so, U.N. action played a part in varying degrees in Iran, Greece, the Berlin blockade, Korea and, later, Hungary. In the over-all it was not much. There clearly was no possibility of "U.N. action" in the cold war apart from whatever the United States and its allies were themselves able or willing to do.

In view of the cold war, the presence of Soviets and Americans under one roof posed a novel problem for Western diplomacy. In a time when we were struggling to organize a world-wide defensive coalition against the Communist threat, we had to meet and negotiate with our allies in the presence of the enemy. Each issue and each vote thus came to represent a separate test of free-world unity, and often it was more important in this sense than because of the actual question involved. As time went on, the unity of the non-Communist world was put under increasing strain by the growing split between the poles of what might be called North and South, primarily on issues arising in the colonial field. But the over-all alliance held together, albeit with difficulty.

Since 1952, the tone and mode of Soviet diplomacy, in and out of the U.N., have altered. The political effect of this has been acute, coming at a time when the bipolar political world was

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itself beginning to splinter. With the development of something like a military standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, forces within the two coalitions began to assert their freedom of manœuvre and to move toward positions relatively independent of the two leader states. Britain, India, Jugoslavia, Poland, Egypt, China and Germany suddenly began to emerge as foci of new independent leadership. "Automatic majorities" and "automatic leadership" in the U.N., if they had ever really existed, became things of the past. The world was changing, and the U.N. was changing with it.

A second development was the enhanced rôle of the uncommitted countries. The success of the West in gathering support from these countries through the U.N. has become increasingly dependent on the stands which Western nations take on issues of primary importance to the peoples of that "third world." These have not been such issues as capitalism vs. Communism, or German unification, or liberation of the satellites, but colonialism, "self-determination," economic development and racial discrimination. Out of the present membership of 81 countries, approximately 45 members for one reason or another see these as the crucial issues and put the United States to the test in regard to them with increasing frequency. Here again the issue often is purely symbolic; it may reflect an accumulated heritage of resentment or be designed to play off the East against the West. But in the U.N. these issues take concrete shape in resolutions and action programs in which Russian and American performance is constantly made the measure for a host of other attitudes.

The way in which we have restructured the U.N. itself has added to the American dilemma. For perfectly good reasons the United States urged a greater rôle for the General Assembly (where all nations, whatever their size, have equal votes) in order to offset the impotence of the Security Council. In the fall of 1950 it appeared essential to re-mobilize the capabilities of the U.N. for collective military action. Happily the American display of determined resistance in Korea as well as other subsequent developments have tended to discourage military risk-taking by the Communists. The Assembly's real rôle in this field therefore is still not measurable. But as part of the same development the Assembly has become a prime political forum for the nations which remain outside the East-West camps and pursue their own

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goals of political independence, economic improvement and racial dignity. In this situation what might be called the North-South conflict cuts across the East-West issues and makes its own powerful demands on American diplomacy, while offering magnificent opportunities for the Soviets to seize the political initiative.

The third change is in the military scene. It is by its performance here that many people would have the U.N. stand or fall. Of course, it long since became clear that the Security Council would not be able to carry out its enforcement powers. Yet in the 13 years since the Charter was drafted there has been no general war, and one of the chief reasons for this has certainly been that the important operational principles of the Charter—collective action for security and avoidance of violence in resolving disputes—have been in *general* effect. It might be said that the San Francisco principle has failed in detail but has had general validity in the sense that it has been translated into regional and self-defense arrangements which, because the Charter existed, were able to borrow from its spirit and purpose.

The U.N. has also invented new military and quasi-military functions connected with the security task. UNEF in Egypt and the earlier military observer teams in Palestine and Kashmir are cases in point. And despite waning confidence in the validity of its major premise, the U.N. displayed unforeseen capabilities in a "hard" case of Communist aggression—Korea—which could scarcely be envisaged in 1945. Both in and out of the U.N., then, many states have acted as though they had assumed an important general commitment and meant to take it seriously. In a way which the old League of Nations could never achieve, all states are involved in each successive crisis. This has obvious disadvantages in potentially widening an otherwise limited conflict. The offsetting advantage may be in keeping these crises from ending in general war.

The "failure of collective security," then, turns out to be a failure in the procedure which had been established more than in the substantive result achieved. The notion of universal collective security based on an abstract commitment to fight anyone, anywhere, anytime, on the call of a majority, has evaporated; but it had never really been a legitimate expectation, in the absence of a true world community and given the wide variety of meanings ascribed to the concept of "justice."

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But something more than this must be said about the political rôle of the U.N. as an agency of military security in the period ahead. The revolution in military weapons has changed both the kind of wars most likely to be fought and the attitudes of the great Powers toward war itself. The political status quo of the West is anathema to the Soviets, and the territorial status quo of world Communism is unacceptable to us. Yet as general war becomes an increasingly unattractive proposition for both parties, the de facto line between the two worlds has hardened. When it is crossed in strength, as in Korea, the entire world appears to recognize it as a plain violation of the peace, and counter-action becomes politically feasible. Even India and Egypt voted initially to oppose the Communist aggression in Korea. On the other hand, as we saw in Hungary, a general military counter-action across the line was quite impossible politically even if we had been willing to lead it—which we were not.

Unlike the Communists, the United States through the President and Secretary of State has specifically renounced force to resolve political differences. There is no doubt that we would react vigorously to open Communist aggression, *i.e.* action across the line. But we explicitly avoid steps that could lead to general war. We have applied this self-denying ordinance to ourselves in the case of Communist China, the Berlin blockade, the crossing of the Yalu, Indochina and, most recently, Hungary. We have also applied this policy to our friends, as in the Suez crisis of 1956. It is argued that the United States could and should have blocked the shipment of Soviet arms into the Middle East, with the aim of heading off the subsequent crises, but the President was being entirely consistent in refusing to countenance a local military action that could lead directly to world war, however great the provocation to our friends. A significant result of the Suez fiasco is the realization that both the United States and the U.S.S.R. are likely to veto military action by third parties that might commit them to expanding potentially uncontrollable situations. Barring a drastic change in Soviet estimates of Western power, it would appear that the paraphernalia for all-out war has more political than military significance today. In turn, lesser instruments for exerting power assume increasing importance. The United Nations is one of them.

The fourth change is in the significance of disputes within the free world. Cases in point are the Indian-Pakistani dispute over

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Kashmir; Palestine, in all its ramifications, including the status of international waterways; India versus South Africa over Indian minority rights and racial discrimination; Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom over Cyprus; and Indonesia versus the Netherlands over West New Guinea. Each might "go critical." As Suez illustrated, a dispute which did not directly involve the two great Powers can quickly pose life-and-death decisions for the entire human family. As things stand, the control rods of "the Suez pile" are held by an international brigade of U.N. troops. The chain reaction can start there again. But for the moment the world is buying time with the help of a variety of U.N. instrumentalities and functions, including UNEF, the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization and the activities of the Secretary-General. If Kashmir should be the scene of renewed fighting, and if the Soviet Union backed India and the United States backed Pakistan, the risks that the direct Soviet-American confrontation might develop into general war would be that much greater, given the geography and the stakes.

Whenever possible, the United States has preferred to leave disputes not directly involving Communist nations to the U.N. It is within this range of issues that the U.N. machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes has been brought into play. The Suez case is an indication of how we have become prisoners of outmoded ways of thinking about the organization. Throughout the intense and futile negotiations in the summer of 1956 the United States and its partners rigidly shunned any positive use of U.N. instrumentalities. One American motive in this was to avoid the possibility of a public discussion of the Panama Canal, by association, as it were. Consequently we relied exclusively on the so-called London group. This forum was unacceptable to Egypt. At the same time we failed to avail ourselves of a wide range of possible actions through the U.N., including appointment of a U.N. mediator, or of a U.N. agent-general to operate the Canal in the interim without prejudice, or the establishment of a joint régime, or, at a minimum, recognition through a U.N. resolution that the Canal was international in character. Reasonable proposals that enlisted heavy U.N. support could conceivably have altered Egypt's intransigence. We now see that when the British and French finally went to the U.N. in early October it was to clear the way for unilateral action. Only when fighting broke out did we ourselves turn to the U.N. to stop it.

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And this was of course the one thing the U.N. was unable to do apart from its exertion of purely moral force and apart from whatever outside pressure individual members such as we and the Russians could apply.

Western statesmen have spoken for years, quite correctly, about the great value of the U.N. in getting the parties to a dispute around the table, substituting talk and mediation and conciliation, however endless and frustrating, for bullets, and offering a variety of institutional means for limiting the conflict and facilitating peaceful change. In the case of Suez we underestimated the preventive capacity of the U.N. before the crisis became acute, overestimated its capabilities when the crisis arrived, and again lost interest when the crisis had passed. Our attention immediately wandered to another dimension of the problem—the possibility of overt Russian military aggression. The resolutions regarding a peace settlement and the refugee problem which we introduced in the hectic early nights of the crisis were never again referred to, and instead we brought forth the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East. It may have been worth while to post a U.S. "keep out" sign in the area, even though the possibility of overt aggression was and is comparatively slight. But this was our only real move to remedy a whole set of critical local situations which did not primarily involve the Communist bloc but which were the basic sources of conflict in the area. Because all of these, including specifically the refugee problem, have once again been passed over, it can confidently be predicted that the next local explosion will be that much more potent.

III. SECURITY OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

How should the considerations just mentioned affect American policy toward the United Nations in the years immediately ahead? Let us first identify some of the over-riding security goals of this policy today and see how the U.N. might help in achieving them.

Of course, our principal and obvious security objective is to create the kind of world order in which we and every other nation can cultivate our respective societies free from external threats of disruption. Everything else falls within this governing purpose. Fully spelled out, it would comprehend a wide variety of subordinate objectives in the economic, social, humanitarian and

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cultural fields. Here, however, we shall concentrate on the most acute problems which determine our choice of means and our allocation of resources.

Objective number one, then, is to reduce the generalized threat which Soviet Communist power presents to the United States and all Western society. This broad objective has three components. The first is to reduce the Soviet capability to inflict intolerable physical damage upon us. The second is to moderate hostile Soviet intentions. The third is to limit and if possible reduce present international support for the Soviet Union.

The second objective is to find means of limiting warfare if it does break out.

The third is to ensure, in the event of general war, that we rally maximum political support to our side, in order that we may have the best chance of organizing the postwar world in an acceptable way.

The fourth is to reduce the possibility of a general war developing inadvertently.

Reducing Soviet military capabilities. Since the U.N. does not have any military force of its own it would seem of little use to us in attaining this first objective. It can provide a variety of forums for negotiating the limitation and regulation of armaments and restricting the use of outer space to non-warlike purposes. True, whether or not these questions are to be resolved depends on agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R., and in this sense the decision will be bilateral rather than multilateral. Nevertheless the wide choice of means of negotiation offered by the U.N. should not be discounted, as was shown when Russia wanted to talk privately with us about liquidating the Berlin blockade. A summary appraisal must be, then, that the U.N. can affect Soviet military capabilities only indirectly, by furnishing a negotiating vehicle.

Affecting Soviet intentions. This objective is more complex. At its least complicated level—military intentions—Soviet policy since Korea seems to have consciously excluded the overt use of military force in favor of more profitable and acceptable techniques of political and economic warfare. Secretary Dulles has said on several occasions that if it were not for the U.N. we would be in World War III. The real significance of the commitment undertaken by 81 nations—including the Soviet Union—to refrain from the threat or use of force is obviously not in its legal

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quality. Because any warlike act will immediately be brought before 80 other nations, the Soviet Union is faced with the fact that it must persuade an effective majority that it has not breached the existing line which neither side can properly cross, whatever it may be doing behind that line.

This deterrent is not comparable with the deterrent of our Strategic Air Command, but there have been too many examples of Soviet sensitivity to world public opinion for us to write it off as meaningless. It is not always remembered that the U.N. resolution condemning the U.S.S.R. in Hungary was supported by 15 Afro-Asian states, with none in opposition. The Soviets periodically stumble badly because of the difficulty of sustaining a soft line in the U.N. when their line outside hardens. Soviet troops are still in Hungary, but the Soviet Union's reputation in the uncommitted nations was gravely tarnished just when its efforts to woo them were at a peak. On balance, the fact that the U.N. exists can be set down as a consideration affecting Soviet calculations about the profitability of military operations, but it hardly figures as a prime factor. On the other hand, regional and collective self-defense arrangements largely embody the Charter commitment to oppose aggression, and these manifestly shape the Soviet estimate of the non-Communist world's vulnerability.

If, however, we think of Soviet intentions in the context of an evolution of Soviet society into something more tolerant and more tolerable, there are additional dimensions to the possible U.N. rôle which may not always be fully grasped. Certainly the U.N. cannot transform the nature of Soviet Communism significantly, but in various ways it might exert a favorable influence.

The fact that it is a continuous point of contact between the Communist bloc and the West may acquire special significance in a changing situation, if only by giving the Soviet Union assurance of being readily accepted into the community of nations as a great Power even though it is rejected as a messianic and apocalyptic force. Meanwhile, U.N. membership can have the effect of sustaining and encouraging the independent identity of such satellites as Poland.

Thus we should continue to offer the Soviets alternative courses of action that one day may appear realistic and attractive to them. With or without them, we should continue to work to

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institutionalize areas of common action and to create an international community that can compete successfully with the barren Soviet variety. We have already led the way in nonpolitical programs such as health and technical assistance, which the Russians, for many reasons, ultimately have come to join. Seen in this light, the cold war should spur us to greater experiments with multilateralism among those disposed to coöperate; it should not serve as an excuse for us to retreat into inaction and defeatism.

One further matter may be mentioned conveniently here even though it is not directly related to Soviet intentions.

The U.N. is a demonstration and testing point for the unity of the free world. When that unity increases, the Soviets have seemed to raise their estimates of Western capabilities; and conversely, Western disunity has encouraged the Soviets to calculate their opportunities as more promising. Sometimes the U.N. has been an embarrassment to us when used as a place for airing the free world's dirty linen. Sometimes the Russians have been able to use it as a place to disrupt free world unity. If we are to live successfully in the kind of U.N. that has developed, and retain majority support when it really counts, we must do a number of new things. We must be prepared to go a great deal further than we have with our close friends on issues which are of great political importance to them but of only secondary importance to us. Primarily these represent differences over essentially procedural matters such as elections or budgets or the composition of committees, which often have been the source of more inter-allied friction than any substantive policy issues except Chinese representation or Suez. We might do better not to engage the prestige of the United States on such procedural issues but to save it for the big ones. We might also gracefully accept an occasional minority position on some issues instead of insisting on having our own way, or going over the heads of friendly delegates, or threatening retaliation, however subtly.

Limiting international support for the Soviet Union. This support is coming primarily from the underdeveloped, neutralist, anti-colonial countries and territories. No actions of ours can be expected wholly to reverse this tide until it has run its course. Nevertheless, it is here that the battle is being fought, and our task is to find ways of diverting local forces of discontent into constructive channels, to furnish incentives for native leadership

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so that the forces of nationalism may be harnessed to tasks of building rather than destruction and hate.

The prime factor here is economic. We should estimate afresh the political and economic benefits that might stem from greater use of the U.N. in financing the development of underdeveloped countries. But there also are important psychological factors, and here the style and sensitivity of our diplomacy can be crucial. Both in and out of the U.N., our ability to command the support of an effective majority depends heavily on the way we handle the legacy of bruised feelings left by centuries of Western claims to racial superiority, and on the understanding with which we view the ambition of Asians or Latin Americans to "catch up," to become industrialized, to be less dependent on a peasant economy that offers only continued human misery and poverty.

The U.N. is the one place where all of these tensions and claims and expectations come into focus in full view of virtually all the world. There the uncommitted nations have found their place in the sun, there the concept of the legal equality of states offers them the self-respect and dignity they seek.[1] There they acquire a parliamentary strength entirely disproportionate to the amount of real power they command in the world. This power is used primarily to bring before the rest of the world their ambitions and grievances, incorporated in concrete issues and demands: freedom from the only kind of foreign domination they know about; generous economic assistance for development, specifically grants, low-interest loans and fair capital investment; protection of their exports from uncontrollable fluctuations in world prices; racial equality in practice; freedom for the remaining colonial possessions of Western Powers; in short, equality with the rest of the world.

If we are to have the political support of these nations we must find better ways than we have done so far to relate our own interests to their interests, aspirations and goals. Where the U.N. provides the only agency acceptable to them we must utilize it to the utmost.

Limiting warfare if it breaks out. Our general military objective here has three parts. One is to avoid a direct military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, as already discussed. Another is to keep such a confrontation within

[1] This, incidentally, is why a weighted voting system, for all its logic, does not seem feasible unless and until genuine powers are reposed in the General Assembly.

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bounds if it happens. A third is to keep outbreaks within the non-Communist world from spreading into a general war.

The scope of hostilities between free-world and Communist nations would undoubtedly be determined by the estimates each side made of the intentions and the capabilities of the other. Given the will of each to keep them limited, the U.N. can then offer the advantages it did when the United States made its decision to resist the Russians in Korea.

These advantages are several. First, the U.N. furnishes one means for us to secure maximum world-wide political support. This support is indispensable if we are not to lose the sense of legitimacy and moral right which we as a people need in order to sustain a military effort. The second advantage is the opportunity given us by the commitment made by all U.N. members to assist the organization in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter. This does not have to mean "action" in the legal sense of Security Council enforcement. Marginal offers of bases, transit rights—even "a sharpshooter on a camel"—cannot merely demonstrate the breadth of international disapproval of a Soviet act of limited aggression but can pay important strategic dividends. The third advantage is that the mere fact that the conflict is before the U.N. tends to discourage participants from expanding the scope of the war recklessly or setting extravagant war aims.

Perhaps the situation most likely to arise is one in which a military outbreak does not directly involve the armed forces of the United States or the U.S.S.R. Here the rôle of the U.N. is essentially political. When there is an effective majority against the continuance of hostilities, and the parties involved are responsive to it as they were in the Suez crisis, the conflict may be halted before it gets completely out of hand. An international military force such as UNEF can then play a most important rôle in helping restore conditions favorable to peaceful settlement and perhaps peaceful change.

Schemes for a standing U.N. force to counter large-scale aggression call for a relative preponderance of power at the center. Without some form of world government this is unattainable. Yet there is a more limited military rôle for the U.N. that is realistic and at the same time would serve to meet a vital contemporary need. Only the U.N. can develop and perfect the sort of limited and neutral force needed to prevent or deal with local

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situations which we know constitute a real and present danger to world peace. Such a force would not be supposed to undertake full-scale military action but only police functions. The response of the smaller nations in 1956 proved that they are ready, able and willing to contribute to such a force. Rather than continuing to present the U.N. as a club of like-minded states all prepared to take identical action, we should be grateful that some of them may form a "third party" available to be interposed in such situations. We ourselves have been the "third party" on occasion, as in the Indonesian Good Offices Committee, or in Algeria, and might well play such a rôle again.

A defect of various valuable suggestions recently made for establishing a permanent force along these lines lies in their failure to reckon fully with the formidable financial costs involved. One way to overcome this problem would be to set up a training command with a small permanent cadre. Selected units from member countries would be rotated there for a specified period, but would then return home to be held as a reserve.

Using the U.N. in a general war situation. We are prone to believe that general war would mean the end of the U.N., and this may be so. Yet as we saw in the case of Korea, the U.N. can serve as an umbrella under which the United States can legitimize its military response to a Communist aggression. Our planning must not ignore this possibility. We must assume there will be a postwar world to organize. The U.N. might accord legitimacy to non-Communist representatives of peoples in the Soviet bloc while hostilities were still in progress and thus arrange a vital political focus for the forces which would coöperate to bring into being the sort of world for which we had fought. Finally, if the political war aims were defined by the U.N. rather than by a single nation this might bring hostilities to a satisfactory end more promptly.

Reducing the possibility of general war developing inadvertently. Since it is unlikely under present conditions that general war will be launched by the deliberate decision of any nation, the chief concern of responsible statesmen should be to prevent the outbreak of war by inadvertence. If we rule out the use of force to remedy the legitimate grievances of states, we are obliged to find other means for the solution of those problems. It is here that the U.N. has possibly its most vital future task to play in terms of our national security. But to energize the U.N. to under-

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take this task and to exploit its institutional potentialities fully the United States is going to have to attach a wholly new order of importance to developing better means for peacefully settling disputes and facilitating peaceful change. We must apply political muscle to the "preventive peace" about which we speak so frequently. It may mean a concentrated political and financial effort to resolve the Palestine refugee deadlock. It may mean taking the Peace Observation Commission out of mothballs and urging that it be dispatched to an unquiet frontier like that between Tunisia and Algeria. It may mean leading the way to greater use of the International Court of Justice, instead of setting an opposite kind of example by falling back on the domestic jurisdiction plea, as in the Interhandel Case. It may mean pressing for the international regulation of international waterways—including the Panama Canal. In short, it means doing what no one has ever done before in all history—expending an effort to prevent violence comparable to the effort usually made in picking up the pieces afterward.

In working with enlarged purpose and effort on the chronic causes of instability and friction, we should not find our motivation only in the Soviet threat. Persistent international tensions threaten our ability to fulfill the promises of our own society. For our own internal good our rôle in the world must be more than that of a powerful negative force. Our well-rounded development as a people has come to depend on the development of stability for other peoples. Means must be found to resolve peacefully the clash between the status quo and the dynamic forces that continuously challenge it.

In the period ahead the United Nations may have extremely important uses both in support of the national interest and in support of the common interest in a more stable peace. These uses, as indicated here, may have little to do with the stereotypes and symbols of U.N. action that we still cling to, expressed in terms of universal collective security, "misuse of the veto," overemphasis on purely military estimates of the cold war, excessive U.S. control over multilateral funds and programs, the "popularity contest" theory, and expectations about altruistic international behavior. The crisis is too grave for us to afford to misunderstand the capabilities of any instrumentality offering genuine opportunities to advance our national prospects and the prospects for a tolerable world around us.

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GERMANY'S ECONOMIC GOALS

By Ludwig Erhard

THIS June 20 marks the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the new German economic policy, by now known all over the world as the "social market economy." It is no coincidence that this date is also the tenth birthday of the new Deutsche Mark. The two events necessarily were simultaneous. The *volte-face* in economic policy, away from a hopelessly stagnating, directed economy towards a free market economy, could succeed only on the basis of a currency reform. I am generally called the father of the social market economy, and this is true to the extent that, in addition to being one of the engineers of the currency reform, I developed the principles of the new German economic policy and put it into practice, above all on the political level; but praise for the success of the policy must go in the last analysis to the honesty and indefatigable efforts of all classes of the German population.

Before I go into the matter in more detail I want to stress that there was and is no such thing as a "German economic miracle." There is no mystery about what has happened in the course of these ten years. To be sure, strength of soul and spirit were needed in order to believe that a new world could be built up from the war's ashes and ruins; but in all other respects it was the purposeful use of economic means and strict adherence to the market economy program which brought success.

The road behind us can be described as follows: The currency reform ended the inflation which had accompanied price fixing and which had been characterized by abundance of money, rationing and a black market. It then became necessary to establish a responsible monetary and credit policy. When this foundation had been laid, it was possible to remove all the restrictions characteristic of a directed economy and, above all, to restore the free formation of prices. Of course, the new equilibrium could not be reached without creating tensions and disturbances, and no wonder many politicians wanted to halt the process of adjustment and return to rationing and controls. The market economy was the main object of political, economic and social criticism; and since I was its most representative supporter I was at many stages and in many fields regarded as Enemy Number One.

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Furthermore, in order to restore Germany's productive capacity and competitive position, it was indispensable to free the economy from its national isolation and to initiate a liberal trade policy. For me this was not a matter of pride or megalomania. On the contrary, it sprang from a consciousness that the only way to link the German economy with the world economy, and thus to lay the basis for future German prosperity, was for the German people, following their tragic catastrophe, to find the strength to stand this test. Only if one takes into account the enormous burden imposed on the western part of divided Germany, notably by the influx of more than 10,000,000 refugees simultaneously with the need to solve immense economic and social tasks, can it be fully recognized what perseverance was needed to bring the experiment to success. The courage shown by the German people in that plight might be called the courage of despair. But the secret of their success was perhaps the very fact that they had rid themselves of all illusions, no longer believed in miracles and knew they must trust to their own powers. At this juncture, too, came the Marshall Plan. Beyond its substantive importance, this aid proved so beneficial because it gave the German people fresh reason to hope that they had not been given up by the free world but could again become honest partners in it and find a way out of their country's ruins.

In those times of distress it was not always easy to persevere on the path of economic virtue. Above all, the figure of more than 2,000,000 unemployed out of a total of 13 million workers constituted a heavy social and political burden. The result was that there were repeated calls for "made" public work, abolition of the market economy, relaxation of the monetary and credit policy and abandonment of the liberal trade system. Even officials of the Military Government and of the Allied High Commission expressed serious doubts time and again as to our ability to continue a policy of market economy, given Germany's position in the world at that time. In their opinion, the abolition of rationing and price controls was a crime. Indeed, I was accused of disobedience or megalomania after the outbreak of the Korean conflict when I resisted the reintroduction of controls despite the shortages of raw materials which then began to appear. I considered that such a policy would be entirely unproductive. My experience has been that nothing is more likely to cause or aggravate shortages than useless attempts to control them.

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The German economic policy entered one of its most dangerous phases when the credit margin which had been granted to the Federal Republic within the European Payments Union was exhausted. I was called a careless debtor and a gambler because I admitted imports beyond the extent of possible exports; but this I did quite deliberately in order to increase German productive capacity and create more jobs for German labor. The result was strange. Hardly had the additional credit margin granted to the Federal Republic been used up before the debts could already be paid back. A liberal policy which instead of fearing world-wide competition actually encouraged it brought the Federal Republic—as everyone now knows—the strongest creditor position in the E.P.U.

Though I do not intend to give a chronological description of events, I must mention that the German economic policy stood the test once again during the Suez conflict. As far as I can see, the Federal Republic was the only European country which did not impose restrictions on oil and fuel supply at that time. Even more important, during these ten years the Federal Government and the German central bank have constantly endeavored to defend the stability of the German currency—the new Deutsche Mark. Our monetary and credit policy, already considered to be severe, together with a consistent promotion of competition and several unilateral reductions in the German tariff, have succeeded in keeping the German price level relatively stable, at least more stable than in most other European countries. This has been true despite the fact that full employment was meantime reached. My hard struggle for the enactment of an anti-cartel bill, which approximately corresponds to the American philosophy, is sufficiently known. Though my ideas are not fully embodied in the "Law Against Restrictions of Competition" as finally enacted, I do believe that it can be called the most progressive law of the sort in the world.

There really is no need to prove by figures and statistics how successful the social market economy has been from every point of view. The fact that the Adenauer administration has been confirmed in every election, and each time with an increased majority, must be credited in large part to the German economic policy.

But it is not my intention to dwell on past successes and to underestimate the obstacles or dangers which still confront the

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effort to establish liberal economic coöperation between national economies and a sound international monetary order. There is no doubt that we have overcome the particularism of the thirties, and this is largely due to the American initiative. Under the gentle pressure of the Marshall Plan, the European countries have arrived at a better "European coöperation." The O.E.E.C. has achieved a great deal here—except for complete freedom in the field of trade policy and free convertibility. It would probably be too harsh, though not quite unjustified, to say that those in charge of the national economies have recognized the principle of freedom where it was obviously to their advantage, but that they have not conquered their prejudices and instead have insisted on protectionism and egoism at a time when it was necessary for Europe to find a way, over and above the dictates of national policy, to a true economic community.

Here we come to the point at issue: the European Economic Community. We would certainly underestimate the spirit underlying this six-nation community (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg), embodied first in the European Coal and Steel Community, if we supposed that it served economic purposes only. Even before the failure of the European Defense Community its political aspects had become apparent. Today the Common Market, or European Economic Community as it is now called, likewise pursues the ultimate objective of a political confederation. I do not oppose this but on the contrary fully support it. Any scientifically trained mind must ask whether, how far and under what conditions economic integration which requires that opposing principles of economic and social policy be reconciled can create the basis for an integration of countries within the meaning of political law.

Obviously, the countries concerned differ considerably as regards their determination to defend the internal and external stability of their economies and currencies. Further, their trade policies range from relatively stringent protectionism to a readiness to practise extreme liberalism. One side would reject the consequences of free competition based on efficiency; the other would cheerfully accept them. Because an integrated European economy can be designed only as an integral part of a free world economy, I have even on occasion been quite willing to be called a "bad European," for example, when I fought against the imminent danger of European isolationism in the guise of protec-

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tionism and when I was suspected of opposing the Common Market simply because I objected to protectionist provisions which would have prohibited structural changes. The Common Market could not fail to increase economic efficiency and—much more than attempts at social harmonization in the absence of sufficient economic productivity—it would guarantee economic progress and social security. I am ready to make great efforts to ensure that our economic aims will also serve a political aim; nevertheless, I always warned that the establishment of the European Economic Community must not result in dividing the European nations which still live in freedom. Developments have proved that my apprehensions were justified. Today I am ready to reaffirm that the E.E.C., which in form and concept ultimately serves a political objective, is justified only if the separation of Western Europe into two hostile economic blocs is avoided by instituting a free trade area bigger than the original Six. Precisely because the E.E.C. is essentially a political organization, it is not realistic to point out that it will be open to all nations that wish to join; for in practice this simply means that in order to avoid economic disadvantages a country would be forced to accept the political consequences of membership. For various reasons, then, I am happy that with the consent of the German Federal Government and of all the parties of the German parliament I can stand for a policy aiming at the creation of a vaster free trade area.

In this connection, I think it is most interesting that since the E.E.C. came into being increasing numbers of American businessmen have been eager to establish plants of their own in one or more of the six member countries or participate in national enterprises there. They fear that in the future the trade policy of the Community as regards third countries might discriminate against them, and they want to create a basis for their own economic initiative within the area. Now, I am far from objecting to international inter-connections in finance and investment. Nevertheless, I have warned the American business world not to be too active in this respect, because that might be understood to mean that the free world had already taken for granted that E.E.C. trade policy would be protectionist. Even though the risk of this will be avoided by establishing a free trade area—as no doubt will be done—I consider that any concepts and actions which might lead to the formation of artificial blocs within the free

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world economy in the shape of so-called "large economic areas" are definitely prejudicial. The free world has shrunk in size so seriously that we cannot afford such "luxuries." Measured by the highest standards, integration on the pattern of the E.E.C. is justified only if it leads to intensification, *i.e.* liberalization, of world trade and simultaneously to a consolidation of the international system of currencies.

For instance, if Latin American and other countries that have tropical or subtropical climates object to French and Belgian colonies situated near the equator being included in the Common Market, or if they expect the scheme to prejudice their own national economies, their objections can be countered not just by providing additional development funds, necessary as that may be, but by adopting a free trade policy which opens the Common Market to the whole world. If only the peoples of the free world would realize how often false and irresponsible egoism and protectionism prevent them from demonstrating their political power and from rallying together in genuine solidarity!

I agree that, given the widely different conditions prevailing in the free nations, it is most difficult to achieve a sense of solid common interest and agree on a harmonized policy. This raises the problem of assistance to the so-called emerging countries. German capabilities to make capital loans are often overestimated. Actually, Germany is still badly in need of capital herself. To mobilize her gold and foreign currency reserves for aid to underdeveloped countries on the scale often urged would inevitably have inflationary results. The Federal Republic and the German Federal Bank regard it as their chief duty to defend the stability of the Deutsche Mark and with it the country's social order. Nevertheless, as recent trade negotiations have made quite clear, the Federal Government is fully aware that greater efforts will have to be made to help underdeveloped areas. Nor do I deny that Germany has a moral obligation in this respect, if only because of the fact that it was American aid which enabled her to embark on her own program of rehabilitation.

The Federal Republic does not wish to burden economic aid by awakening the suspicion that it is trying to acquire political influence. It therefore has refused, as a matter of principle and regardless of Germany's own fiscal situation, to give credits from government to government. Instead, it has opened the way for private industries to give credits and by offering government

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guaranties has helped private industries to grant more generous credits and arrange longer terms of repayment.

On the other hand, just as nations who supply aid must be careful not to use it to exert political influence, so they need to be satisfied that they are coöperating with honest partners who do not intend to operate back and forth between the two fronts but wish of their own accord to be part of the free world. Only in these conditions of mutual trust will it be possible to maintain and build up a spirit of solidarity against the nefarious ideology of totalitarianism.

The very range of subjects dealt with here is enough to make clear that no country, however large and powerful, is able on its own to determine and rule the fate of this world. We must face the fact that two social systems exist side by side and we must try to ensure that the struggle between them is fought out in the realm of the mind and the spirit. It will not be hard to develop the technical forms and methods of coexistence; but if force and violence aim to defeat reason the result can only be chaos. The truth of this should also enable us to recognize that the aim of establishing a social order which is in harmony with human nature need not involve an arms race but can be even better realized by way of jointly controlled disarmament. The free world does not need compulsion in order to remain alive to the merits and blessings of freedom. If the totalitarian system must resort to compulsion in the effort to unite the human race, this fact alone condemns it alike before God and man.

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ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF THE WEST

By Lord Salter

THE Western world is now confronted with two kinds of major economic problems. The first is comparable with what was presented after the First World War; it is that of diagnosing and curing defects in our economic system and customary principles of policy. The second is a novel one; it arises from the competition between the Western world and the Communist world in armaments and in economic influence on other countries.

To equip themselves for this competition, as well as for other reasons, the countries of the West will need to consider, with the aid of recent experience, both what reforms in their own system will strengthen their resources and what is the best economic strategy to adopt in their external relations.

If actual war is averted, the issue will depend upon the demonstrated success of the two rival economic systems, both in their impact on other countries and in what is seen to be their ability to provide their own peoples with what they want.

The leaders of the Communist world, whatever else in Marxian doctrine they may have forgotten or abandoned, still apparently believe that the Western or "capitalist" system is destined ultimately to perish of its own intrinsic conflicts, and that therefore all they need to do is, by skillful policy and use of opportunities as they arise, to accelerate the process. Doubtless they are now watching, with special and eager interest, the visible strains within the Western system and its attempt, under American leadership, to arrest the development of the present recession into a serious depression and to remove the causes which will otherwise lead to a recurrence of it. It is with this in mind as well as more immediate anxieties that current issues of policy must be faced.

Rather more than 12 years have passed since the end of the second great war. It is now becoming more possible to distinguish between the merely transitional problems of a return to peace conditions and those which reflect deep-rooted defects in the economic system of the free world.

It was about 12 years after the first war that, in spite of a remarkable recovery, the world fell into the great depression. Happily the present situation is in very important respects more favorable than that of 1930. The main causes of the disaster of

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that time, as we shall see, do not now exist. Nevertheless this year's recession, after the long and almost continuous expansion which preceded it, appears to reflect both weaknesses in our economic structure and errors in the principles which determine our policy. Some of these recall past experience while others are novel, at least in their relative importance.

Successive crises during the last year have confronted the statesmen and financial authorities of the principal Western countries with difficult issues of policy. There was the devaluation of the franc, reflecting a serious deficit in France's balance of payments; there was the struggle in Britain against inflation and the threat to sterling; there was the puzzling conjunction in America of inflationary and deflationary tendencies, of rising prices and falling employment. Then came the recession, marked by rapidly mounting unemployment figures and (ominously recalling the earlier depression) a sharp fall everywhere in commodity prices, with great loss to the primary producing countries on whose custom the exports of the industrial world so largely depend.

While this recession lasts—and it is still uncertain how long, how deep, how wide it will prove to be—the effort of all concerned will doubtless be concentrated on dealing, by improvised measures, with the immediate difficulties it presents. But when this exceptional period of emergency is past, the time will be opportune for fuller inquiry, in a longer-term perspective, of the more enduring problems which are likely to confront us for many years.

The purpose of this article is to discuss these two major problems, the internal and the external, and to suggest, very tentatively, the direction in which answers to some of the more important questions they raise should be sought.

II

It will be a convenient preface to what follows about possible changes in our present system and doctrine to recall the issues of policy which faced statesmen and financial authorities in the years following the first war, the decisions then taken and their consequences. I was at that time engaged in work at Geneva which brought me into intimate association with the influential members of the League of Nation's Financial Committee and also with the central bankers and treasury officials on both sides of the Atlantic; and I remember the objectives of the relatively small number of men who then shaped the course of events.

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The war had been such a shattering and unprecedented experience that it seemed a sufficient explanation of the troubles from which the world was suffering when it ended. The material destruction, the dislocation of world trade, the burden of war debts, both internal and external, the depreciation of currencies by war finance, were in themselves so great that they obscured any more profound and lasting damage to the old economic system which had originated before the war itself. It was therefore natural that reconstruction was thought of in terms of restoring the old foundations and rebuilding on them to the old design. By comparison with 1919, the world of 1913 seemed to most of us a paradise from which we had been banished for a time by a flaming sword and to which we could hope to return now that the sword was sheathed.

Our effort therefore was to win our way back to what had been lost, and this was attempted by seven separate but converging paths.

Capital equipment had been destroyed and its normal renewal had been interrupted; the arrears must therefore be made up. The old automatic adjustment of supply to changing demand by competitive prices had been impaired, and largely replaced, by state controls; the conditions under which the old system could function again must therefore be reëstablished. Currencies, under the stress of war finance, had broken away from their metallic anchor and had ceased to have any stable relation to each other; the gold standard must therefore be reëstablished and national budgets be so reformed that it would not again be destroyed by the printing press and "borrowing from the bank." Normal trade channels had been blocked by that most extreme form of "protection," the blockade and the submarine, and their resumption impeded by new and high tariffs; so tariffs must be reduced and then made more stable. The world's financial structure had been overburdened by the two great international obligations of reparations and inter-allied debts; a great effort must be made to limit these debts and make them compatible with adequate new foreign investment. Some countries, such as Austria, Hungary, Greece and Bulgaria, had been so weakened and exhausted that they could not unaided keep in step with the general recovery of Europe; the stronger Powers must therefore combine to help them. Only in one respect was it seen from the first that a radical change must be made in the prewar system, and that was pri-

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marily political, not economic: the League of Nations was created.

Here along seven lines was a consistent and comprehensive policy which apparently promised success.

And in a decade success seemed to have been achieved. The prewar system had been reëstablished; prewar standards of prosperity had been surpassed; currencies were again linked to gold; there was once more a stable medium of exchange for both internal and external transactions, and world trade had recovered. Reparations for some years poisoned international relations and impeded recovery, but with the Dawes Plan of 1924 a final settlement seemed to have been reached; and capital was flowing freely (alas! as it proved, too freely) from capital-forming countries to those needing development. The weaker countries had been reconstructed, largely through the dramatically successful efforts of the League. And behind economic reform was equally notable political progress. Hitler had made a momentary appearance soon after the war, but in the period of prosperity which followed the Dawes Plan he, and the forces which he represented, had disappeared from sight. Europe's central problem of relations with Germany seemed near solution with the rapprochement that found expression in the Locarno Treaties and Germany's welcome into membership of the League. Free political institutions had been established in Germany, Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere; and except in Italy there was no notable instance of a previously free constitution being replaced by dictatorship. The League of Nations was fulfilling its task and seemed likely to continue to do so. 1929 seemed the threshold of the land of promise—not the edge of the abyss.

What followed afterwards was thus not a simple tragedy of failure. It was the deeper tragedy of illusory success, collapsing into disaster through hidden weaknesses, but so dazzling while it lasted as to persuade all but a few critical minds of its permanence. Not to recognize this—and it is too rarely recognized—is both to do injustice to those who shaped policy some 40 years ago and to neglect a warning which may now be salutary.

There was the devastating collapse, in rapid succession, of the normal economic structure of trade, of the world's financial system, of parliamentary government, of the new international institution, of peace itself. A decade of recovery was followed by a decade of collapse—into a second war.

The weaknesses which account for the collapse quickly became

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visible. The gold standard to which the world had returned proved at once too rigid and too weak. There was no institution like the present International Monetary Fund, with its real, if inadequate, power to give emergency help to a currency in distress. As a country's balance of payments deteriorated it could only restrict its imports, and thus spread the trouble to other countries, or adopt deflationary policies which caused unemployment and evoked strong public resistance—or allow its currency's link with gold to snap.

The inflation in so many countries during that period was somewhat different from recent inflation in that it was usually due to the use of the printing press (or "borrowing from the bank") by governments to eke out deficiences in their revenue. It could be, and for a time often was, checked by the government, but at the cost of great strain and hardship; and at last the strain became in some cases intolerable. Germany, for example, which had a vivid memory of the misery caused by the fall of the old mark, was determined to preserve its new currency at any cost; and the cost was heavy indeed, for it was Brüning's extreme deflationary policy that gave Hitler his chance to return. In all cases the responsibility for supporting a currency rested solely on the particular country. Countries which had such a positive balance of payments as to impair dangerously the currencies of other countries did not recognize even in theory, still less in practice, any obligation to take complementary action to reduce the strain.

Even more serious was the burden of international debt. After some years during which the governmental debts, reparations and the allied loans had disastrously impeded recovery, this burden had been at last relieved in 1924. The consequence, however, was an orgy of irresponsible and reckless lending through private channels. In the general optimism following the Dawes scheme and the subsequent burst of prosperity it was easy to float loans which were eagerly bought by a credulous public. In a vast number of cases the issuing houses were content to sell to the public and get out, without recognizing any responsibility for ensuring that the loan was used by the borrowers for productive purposes or that they were likely to meet its service. There was neither governmental control nor generally accepted doctrine to distinguish between good and bad loans. The consequent mountain of international indebtedness in 1929 and the following years broke the general financial structure of the world, submerged good

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loans with bad, stopped normal and necessary investment, and forced many banks, especially in America, to suspend payments. And it was this collapse of the financial structure which converted the economic depression, which would otherwise have been serious but not fatal, into a world catastrophe.

Lastly, governments and financial authorities had not then accepted as orthodox the methods, already being advocated by many economists, by which depressions could be foreseen, partly prevented by timely strictness during boom and mitigated by laxer policy when they came.

It was a combination of these defects in institutions, in doctrine and in policy which explains the ultimate failure of the temporarily successful efforts made after the first war; the frustration of all the hopes of the five years' period of boom, from 1924–1929; the catastrophe of the following years.

III

To recall this earlier experience is to remind ourselves how different is the situation of 1958 from that of 1930. No mountain of international debt now weighs on the financial system. Allied indebtedness during the second war was averted by lend-lease; what was borrowed outside the scope of that great act was offset by Marshall aid and other forms of help; what remains is of a less dangerous character. While some reparation in kind was exacted from Germany, no attempt was made by the victorious allies to saddle her again with a large cash debt. Indeed, the amount poured into Germany from 1945 onwards for reconstruction immensely exceeded any reparation in kind exacted from her. Moreover, the world's financial structure, thus relieved of the burden of governmental indebtedness, was not, as it had been before, burdened by reckless private loans. The public and the financial institutions concerned had learned their lesson. After the collapse of 1931 the banking system of America had been placed on a sound foundation. The disastrous speculation on the Stock Exchange in the 1920s, on margins and borrowed money, was prevented from reappearing on any similarly dangerous scale by new safeguards and acts of policy. There is now, too, a much greater mass of built-in support for continued expenditure in time of recession in the form of pension schemes, investments by insurance companies and defense expenditure.

In all these respects the present situation is much more favor-

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able. It must be borne in mind, moreover, that the defects in the prewar system discussed above were not only among the causes of the great depression; they were the main causes. Nevertheless there remain serious weaknesses and dangers in our system, as we have been sharply reminded by this year's recession.

Attention is at this time naturally concentrated on immediate anxieties. The tonics and tranquillizers now available for use in depression and boom are more numerous and less distrusted than a generation ago, and some have been tested in practical application (though their possible after-effects may still be open to some doubt). The tonics include a resort to deficit budgets, with both additions to government spending and reductions of taxation, and the supply of easier money in various ways to encourage both consumer expenditure and business enterprise. They doubtless will be used, as each changing phase of the recession seems to require, until they become unnecessary through the resilience of natural recuperative forces.

When the immediate emergency is past, however, the deeper causes of the recession will doubtless be the subject of full inquiry and study, both official and academic, in the light of recent as well as earlier experience. Both inflation, in the somewhat different form in which it has appeared in recent years, and the technique of averting and arresting depressions will occupy the center of the stage. They need not be further stressed now. It is more useful to emphasize a third problem which has hitherto received less attention than its importance merits.

In the environment of economic organization and policies within which it works, the present currency system on which world trade depends is dangerously unstable. The great difference in the size and strength of the present economic units makes some currencies which are of great importance to the economy of the West very vulnerable and subjects them, recurrently, to excessive strain. This is an international problem because of the far-reaching effects of sudden devaluations or of desperate measures to avoid them and because only concerted policy, novel at least in the scale of its application, can give a solution.

The main root of most of the impediments to external trade since the last war, such as quota restrictions or inconvertibility of currencies or forced devaluations, has been the disequilibrium between the dollar and the non-dollar world. This is both serious and likely to be long-lasting, as the cumulative result of several

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factors. The American economy is not only the strongest in the Western world but also the most dynamic and most rapidly advancing. If it were simply the strongest, a stable basis of trading would be established through a compensating difference in living standards, wages and therefore wage costs. But as it is also the most dynamic, a new equilibrium thus attained is constantly liable to be again upset. In the second place, what the non-dollar countries buy is (with some exceptions) more essential to their economy than imports are to the United States. Moreover, the external trade of the United States, though important in relation to that of the rest of the world, is only a small part of its own economy, and government action affecting it is likely therefore to be determined to a greater extent than elsewhere by the condition of the internal market, especially in time of depression.

For the same reason the impact of an American tariff is likely to be disproportionately greater on smaller industrial nations. Nor is any surplus in America's balance of payments likely to be corrected, as it has been in the case of other surplus countries in the past, by a large outflow of private investment. There has indeed been very little of such investment (with the investors bearing the risk) except for oil and mineral development or for the establishment of subsidiaries of American companies or in special areas, Latin America and Canada. It was indeed natural that an American investor who could get 6 percent in good equities at home should not take the additional risks of political disturbance and currency trouble involved in investment abroad. The massive aid of the United States Government through the Marshall Plan and in other forms has, in addition to its direct purpose, made such a precarious equilibrium possible as to preserve reasonable stability in most other currencies. It cannot, however, be expected that such philanthropic aid will continue and increase sufficiently to prevent dangerous disequilibria from developing again.

The logic of the balance of payments is, however, inexorable. Nothing can prevent such adjustments in the credit and debit items, capital and current, as will make them, at all times, and for every country, cancel out to zero. Thus so far as there is a gap in any country's balance of trade it can be bridged only by credits of one kind or another, or by gifts, or by increases of exports, or by a depletion of reserves, or, so far as these do not suffice, by a reduction of imports. A continuance of this process will inevitably not only upset the stability of the weaker currencies,

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and prevent their convertibility, but will destroy such measure of regional convertibility (through the E.P.U. and in the sterling area) as has hitherto been maintained and on which a very large proportion of world trade has depended. It follows that, after a short and disastrous period of depletion of reserves, the position will be reached in which any remaining gap in the current balance will inexorably compel an equivalent reduction of the American exports which would otherwise be sold. In other words—once this point is passed—if an American tariff or a subsidy to a particular class of exports, *e.g.* shipping, reduces foreigners' dollar earnings by x dollars, other American exports of what would otherwise be sold abroad competitively under free conditions (*e.g.* such manufactured goods as automobiles) will then be reduced by exactly x dollars. Thus the aid given to particular industries, by tariff or subsidy, will then be exactly matched by equal loss to other industries—apart from the loss to the American consumer through higher prices. Other factors are involved, of course, but at least it is well to bear in mind, as part of the background to every problem, this inexorable logic of the balance of payments.

Along what lines, then, should a solution be sought for the long-term problem of the dollar disequilibrium which will otherwise make the basis of all currencies and of world trade permanently unstable?

A primary responsibility, of course, rests upon the countries with the weaker balances and more vulnerable currencies. In the long run, the attempt to create a larger economic unit in Western Europe, through the Common Market of the six countries and the "free trade area" including the further eleven, might give an ultimate solution. But at best the first will become fully effective only over many years; and the second, without which the smaller union will be insufficient, is the subject of difficult negotiations with the issue still uncertain.

In the meantime it must be expected that the pressure of the stronger dollar on the weaker currencies of smaller economic units will continue. If each country must shoulder by itself the task of defending its own currency the strain evidently will prove too great.

The way in which the strain will reach the breaking point may be illustrated by the case of the sterling area. The benefits which this system brings to the members of the area as a whole, and the strength which it adds to the economy of the West, are immense.

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If the system collapsed it would be difficult to replace it—perhaps impossible without great loss to the whole free world. But there is now serious question whether it can be maintained under present conditions. The positive margin in Britain's balance of payments and her exiguous and precarious reserves are insufficient to meet her other commitments and at the same time to serve as the central reserve of the sterling area. Various proposals have been made to cope with the situation which is developing, among them extra support in varying forms for the sterling area system, with perhaps some wider sharing of the responsibility for its management; and an enlargement of the resources and functions of the International Monetary Fund. These are items which would need to be carefully considered in the wider inquiry proposed above.

I suggest that more important than any such specific reforms is the need (now gradually coming to be recognized, but very inadequately applied in practice) of a basic change in the accepted doctrine governing international economic relations. The world has departed from the nineteenth century form of gold standard and consists of tariff-protected economic units of widely different size and strength. In this world the old principles of policy—"most-favored nation," "no discrimination"—are either obsolete or inadequate. The present precarious equilibrium and currency system cannot be maintained unless countries with excessively positive balances of payments take as definite steps to redress the inequality as do the countries which have an adverse or inadequate balance and are struggling to maintain their currencies. Disequilibria can be redressed only by complementary and differential action on both sides, not on one side alone. This change of doctrine has already received some recognition. In the European Payments Union, for example, countries with an embarrassingly strong balance have recognized the obligation to proceed further with liberalizing their external trade policy than their fellow members; and in the sterling crisis of 1957 it was noticeable that simultaneously with the increase in the United Kingdom bank-rate there were reductions of the rate in Germany and the United States, the strength of whose currencies was imperiling the pound. These are limited and slight examples of the growth of a new doctrine which may prove of vital importance. It would perhaps be the principal item on the agenda of a general survey.

For the moment this question is partly obscured by the urgent

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problem of arresting a depression and by the fact that some of the measures which would be required by the application of the above doctrine are identical with those likely now to be taken by the United States as anti-depression measures. This does not apply, however, to such measures as the lowering of tariffs. And in any case the problem just discussed will remain long after this year's menace of a depression has been dealt with or has passed away.

Here, then, are some of the reforms needed to strengthen the economic system of the West. The repair of its present weaknesses is not only required in the interests of those who live within it; it is now also the prior condition of meeting successfully the challenge of the rival system.

IV

To meet this challenge it will not be enough for the West to strengthen its own system. A well conceived strategy and a skillful technique in the provision of aid are also necessary.

The West must of course present its own system in such a way as to make it more attractive than the alternative offered by the Communists. This is much more than a matter of propaganda and salesmanship. The West must really develop what is best in itself in addition to presenting its best aspect.

The Communist world starts with some advantages. The personal freedom and rights which rank so high among the benefits given by the Western system to its own citizens are much less highly valued by most of the uncommitted peoples, who have never known them, than the material increase in living standards which the Communists can plausibly promise that their system will give more quickly. Secondly, the demand for "independence" is politically more powerful than either a desire for personal freedom or even for material gain. This is proved by the extent of the reaction against "colonialism." As practised by the Western empires at least, colonialism brought immense material benefits, which with independence are likely to be lost or reduced. Further, it is of course a disadvantage to the West that the uncommitted countries of Asia think of colonialism in connection with the Western empires, which they have seen, and not with the much harsher Communist imperialism of which they have had no similarly direct experience.

These initial handicaps increase both the need and the difficulty of devising and applying an appropriate strategy. It must

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be flexible and capable of adjustment to the varying psychologies of the different uncommitted and hesitating peoples and to changing circumstances. For this reason it is impossible now to suggest anything like a detailed "plan of campaign." All that can be done is to suggest the requirements which different and successive plans must satisfy and the methods of forming and adapting them.

Financial help, however generous, rarely wins gratitude and friendship—and this is at least as true in the relations of nations as of individuals—unless the benefit is real and obvious and unless, in addition, the manner of giving is such as to spare the recipient's sensitive pride and minimize any feeling of inferiority or dependence. In most underdeveloped countries the value of aid is limited by the inadequacy of the local administration. Large sums merely handed over to the government, even if not corruptly diverted to improper purposes, may be largely wasted through inefficiency. In some cases, too, there is an obvious danger that a country will play off West against East and ultimately use the aid given by the West in such a way as to make it, from the Western point of view, worse than useless. Thus technical assistance, and proper conditions and supervision, may often be essential if financial help is to yield its fruit in either material benefits or improved political relations. Sometimes a foreign expert (like the present American member of the Iraq Development Board) may be accepted in the direct service of the national administration and accorded the same executive power as the national members. Where this is possible he is likely to be much more useful and effective than if his relationship were only that of an external adviser. No form of technical assistance is likely to be so well worth while as a financial supplement to enable really first-rate men to accept such positions.

But more often technical assistance will be in the form of expert advisers. The advisory relationship is a delicate one which requires personal qualities not possessed by many who would be highly competent at home in their own national service. Much depends, however, on the character of the task. Expert advisers for a temporary and technical job such as building a bridge or a road or helping to establish a policy for dealing with specific agricultural problems are likely, if well chosen, to be of great value. On the other hand, a foreign official with many years experience in the civil service of his own country is much less likely

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to be able to adapt his experience to a country in which officials have to work within a completely different social, economic and political environment. There is also some danger that a large number of foreign officials, who with their wives and families form a distinct and comparatively large community in a small capital, may be a perpetual reminder of dependence.

To take advantage of opportunities to supply experts either for executive or advisory posts, administrative arrangements need to be made beforehand. Lists of suitable and available experts of many kinds must be kept constantly up to date and there must be machinery for selection and for the provision of such supplementary financial inducements as may be appropriate. The World Bank has much relevant experience to offer in this connection.

Governmental action should not be such as to discourage private investment in the sphere where the latter is more appropriate. After the first war private lending was excessive and reckless; now the opposite weakness is conspicuous. This is in part due to the fact that the policy of such official institutions as the Export-Import Bank is apparently not based on any clear distinction between what is appropriate for public and private investment respectively, and often undercuts the latter by offering lower and essentially uneconomic rates. There is a wide sphere, of course, in which public lending is essential and private investment impracticable. But there are also many cases where a particular enterprise, with both substantial prospects of profit and some inevitable risks, could well afford to pay a rate sufficient to attract private lending or investment. In such cases there is a double advantage in the private system being given its opportunity. In the first place, there must obviously be limits to the total amount of taxpayers' money and commitments; secondly, private lending and investment escape some of the political and other dangers involved in official action and the use of public money. Official policy should be reviewed and directed towards encouraging and not handicapping private investment in suitable cases. At the same time, it is desirable that there should be arrangements to secure at least informal consultation between private investment institutions and the administration, so that the former may benefit from the advice and information which are available from official sources.

A reform of policy of the kind suggested must of course be

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based on the best available expert advice, both diplomatic and economic. In the first place, there are ambassadors and their staffs in each local capital. The selection of persons of the requisite experience for diplomatic service in underdeveloped countries may be of even greater intrinsic importance than for the more-sought-after capitals of great countries where policy is more likely to be influenced by direct contact between the ministers of the respective governments than by ambassadors. There is also now a wealth of expert advice available from those who have had direct experience of assisting in development work in different parts of the world.[1] Especially valuable are the advice and guidance that can be obtained by private consultation with officials carefully selected from the large numbers who have been engaged in distributing aid from the United States or other Western countries or in providing technical assistance through the United Nations, through national organizations, or the World Bank. The experience thus available urgently needs to be crystallized into doctrine, subject to constant review and modification, and then widely applied.

It is difficult to overestimate the extent to which the practical and political value of the financial aid and resources provided by the Congress could be increased by such study and review and consequent improvements in technique and method.

V

The assumption that the competition between West and East will be on the economic and not the military plane is of course predicated on the hope that the annihilating power of the ultimate weapon will continue to deter both from its use. If we survive the perils of this first and most dangerous period, when each side is feverishly competing to improve its nuclear weapons and the equipment to launch them, a better prospect may begin to open before us. What can we foresee as the possible, if precarious, stages of advance toward a less insecure world? Long-term objectives of policy may help us in the choice of our first steps.

When it becomes evident to both sides, beyond hope or illusion, that each can destroy the other, both may realize that "enough is enough" and that it is useless to go on with the present increas-

[1] Much of it has been published, *e.g.* Maurice Zinkin's "Development for Free Asia" (Fairlawn, N.J.: Essential Books, 1956) and a recent pamphlet by David Blelloch ("Aid for Development," London: Fabian Society, 1958) who has worked with technical assistance missions in South America and the Middle and Far East.

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ingly expensive experiments and to add to the then sufficient stocks of atomic bombs and equipment. This would at once relieve the burden on both economies, and perhaps work a change in the psychology of the Communist as well as the free world which would help to transform the conflict into a less dangerous form. Conditions might then become more favorable for achieving a phased and controlled reduction of armaments, with each phase preserving the balance of power, but at a lower level. The next stage—if we reach it—would be one in which, as the available economic resources on both sides increase, the cold war would more and more concentrate on economic competition. This economic rivalry would doubtless still be hostile and perilous. Both sides would bid for the uncommitted areas, and some methods adopted by the one would be bitterly resented by the other. But these very methods might well become increasingly unattractive to the countries whose favors are sought, sensitively jealous as they are of any impairment of their national independence.

At this stage the West could perhaps take much of the venom out of the economic conflict by publicly proposing to channel economic aid to underdeveloped countries through a strengthened organ of the United Nations, to which both the Western nations and Russia might make equal contributions. If the offer were accepted, the economic competition would take a less dangerous form; if it were rejected, the West would gain in the eyes of the uncommitted world. The rivalry of the two systems might even begin to provide an incentive to each to develop what was best in it, and most attractive to others; and incidentally to reduce the difference between them. In the end the issue would turn upon the demonstrated success of each system in giving what its own citizens most want and other peoples most envy. In such a competition it rests with those who live within the system of freedom and free enterprise to ensure its success.

Every stage of such an advance must of course be precarious and subject to reversal. But assuming we survive the first one, each successive stage will be less dangerous and will generate forces which will help progress to the next. Such a prospect, even if it seems now both doubtful and distant, may perhaps give us who live within the free world an incentive to develop the best that is in it, and to show this best to others.

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MASSIVE ALTERNATION IN CANADIAN POLITICS

By Steven Muller

FOR the second time within a year the results of Canadian elections have occasioned general astonishment. In 1957 the victory of the Progressive Conservatives came as a surprise. And although in the election of last March a Conservative triumph had been forecast, it was wholly unexpected that the Diefenbaker administration would be returned to office with a landslide sweep of 208 of the 265 seats in the Canadian House of Commons. Moreover, the election of March 31 extinguished the Social Credit party in the federal parliament and pared the representation of the Coöperative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.) from 25 to eight. One obvious conclusion is that two-party politics in Canada has been revived

But it is not primarily the shattering of the two minority parties which heralds the return of two-party politics. The most significant result of the election is that for the first time since 1917 a party other than the Liberal party has received a genuine national mandate from the Canadian people. The emergence in federal politics of an effective, viable alternative to the dominance of the Liberal party is of the first importance.

Regret already has been voiced in several quarters at the size of the Conservative sweep, which leaves the Liberals with only 49 seats. It is said that Canada has gained nothing in trading the domination of one party for the even more massive domination of another. Unquestionably, serious problems do develop for parliamentary government when one party holds so overwhelming a majority as is now the case in Ottawa. But the emphatic and prolonged dominance of one of the two major parties has been the rule rather than the exception in Canadian politics. Canada's history since Confederation is usually summarized in terms of three great eras, each characterized by the reign of one party: the Conservative era under Sir John A. Macdonald, which lasted from 1867 to 1896; the Liberal era under Sir Wilfrid Laurier, which lasted from 1896 until 1911; and the second Liberal era, which began in 1921 and has now ended. Thus the results of the recent election are true to the tradition of Canadian politics in maintaining a two-party system on the basis

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of what may be termed massive alternation. The shift from a commanding Liberal majority to an overwhelming Conservative majority is characteristically Canadian. But it is a surprise and a relief that the shift took place at all, because history appeared to have tilted the balance permanently to the Liberal side.

II

For over 90 years, Canadians have been proving that a house divided against itself *can* stand. Although the number of Canadians whose origin is neither British nor French is increasing —it is now perhaps 20 percent of the total population—the great barrier that divides more than 7,000,000 Canadians of British extraction from almost 5,000,000 Canadians of French descent has not yet been eroded. This is a barrier of more than national origin. It is one also of religion, of language, of culture, of the old and bitter knowledge that French Canadians became part of British North America as the result of a French defeat in a war with Britain. The divided house has continued to stand partly because outside pressures were even greater than internal ones. It has stood also because the division has been bridged by one or the other of the political parties.

Political and economic nationalism has been the great unifying force in Canada's history as a Dominion. More than anything else, the stubborn will to forge a Canadian nationality held a divided people together. As one looks back to 1867, the odds against success were staggering. A tiny population, internally divided, began to string itself out along the southern fringe of a huge territory whose enormous northern bulk appeared to defy the mastery of man. Self-government was demanded, even though the path away from British sovereignty threatened always to become the road toward integration with the United States. To surmount a challenge of these dimensions could and did become a national obsession. Once Confederation had created the constitutional framework for national autonomy, the greatest need was to mobilize the entire resources of the would-be community for the creation of an autonomous economy. The Canadian party system became the means to effect such mobilization.

"The difficulty is that there is no great party interested in fighting the battle of the Dominion," Macdonald complained in 1868. But even as he wrote this he was building just such a party. His Conservative party formed across the nationality barrier

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that divided the Canadian people. It entered into partnership with what there was of Canadian capital and industrial-commercial enterprise. To the point of corruption, Macdonald smothered sectional interests with money and with patronage. His Conservative party deliberately included the widest variety of diverse viewpoints, in order to subordinate them to the paramount national purpose. Thus Macdonald developed the model of a party which gave practical expression to the one purpose on which consensus existed among Canadians. This party lacked an ideology almost completely. But in representing the goal of national autonomy it furnished that vital central ground on which all Canadians found it possible to meet.

As an opposition emerged, it developed in the image of the governing party. It, too, cut across the nationality barrier and deëmphasized ideology. It opposed not the ends to which the majority party was dedicated but the means proposed to achieve those ends. The opposition had not yet matured when Macdonald's Conservatives were briefly driven from office in 1874. But when the vigor of the Conservative administration had spent itself, the Liberals under Laurier took over in 1896. They adopted virtually the same national policy which Macdonald had pursued, and they rallied to their banner a national majority almost as large and inclusive as the Conservatives had commanded. The rhythm of massive alternation had come into being.

In his recent Godkin Lectures at Harvard, Chester Bowles discussed American politics "in terms of a few relatively long periods, each dominated by a fairly stable coalition of . . . interests—a semi-permanent majority with a rough consensus on immediate public questions."[1] A more radical version of this formula correctly describes Canadian politics. The size and diversity of American politics put a premium on the achievement of a stable national consensus, but several versions of it have succeeded one another in American history. It has been above all the more drastic lack of social homogeneity of the Canadian people which has imposed on their politics the need for a single, continuing consensus. This must be represented by the ruling party, and the rhythm of massive alternation provides that when one party has lost its vitality the other will take up a similar course in pursuit of an expanded autonomy.

[1] "American Politics in a Revolutionary World" (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 9.

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III

It is improbable that Canada could survive as a nation if the major parties were based on linguistic and religious differences. Yet just when a party system avoiding this danger had come to life, disruption threatened. A series of events so alienated French Canadians from the Conservative party that it appeared unlikely the Conservatives would ever again attain a national majority. Only two choices still seemed open: a permanent Liberal hegemony, or a partisan majority, excluding French Canadians, which would endanger national unity. Canadian politics emerged from this dilemma only in the last election.

When Laurier's Liberal administration had become moribund in 1911, Sir Robert Borden attempted to achieve a majority under Conservative auspices. But at this time Canada's national purpose was obscured in controversy regarding the rôle the Dominion was to play in the mobilization of the British Empire for world war. Such controversy could not help but accentuate the differences between British and French Canadians. Borden's Conservative party governed only with an uneasy coalition of French and British Canadians, who now doubted that a common national purpose existed for them to cling to. The stage was set for the traumatic events of 1917.

In that tragic year, the Borden government felt itself compelled to impose compulsory military service, despite the adamant objections of the French Canadians. To accomplish this, Borden joined forces with most of the Liberals of British descent. In the conscription election of 1917 the Liberal party was deserted by the bulk of its supporters of British origin and was reduced to little more than a French Canadian sectional party. A legacy of bitterness beyond the comprehension of most non-Canadians emanates from this controversy. For a terrible moment the political bridge across the social barrier was blocked, and the party cleavage reinforced nationality differences.

The worst of the inherent threat to Canadian unity seemed past when a national political majority was reborn in 1921. Enough supporters of British origin returned to the Liberal fold to give that party primacy again in federal politics. A new era of Liberal leadership opened and a national consensus was restored. The difficulty was that the acid memory of conscription seemed to demand that this era last forever. Except for a few uncertain

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days in 1926 and the parliamentary election in the confused despair of the depression in 1930, the Liberal party dominated federal politics from 1921 onward. Ironically, the imposition of conscription for overseas military service by the Liberal government late in World War II only confirmed the bitterness between French Canadians and the Conservative party. Under Mackenzie King's leadership, the Liberal administration delayed this step so long that when at last it was taken a majority of French Canadians were convinced of its genuine necessity. The Conservative opposition, on the other hand, had begun to advocate all-out conscription almost at once after the outbreak of war and had thereby revived virtually the full measure of bitterness of 1917.

Massive alternation was stymied for want of an alternative. The Liberal party aged in office. For a time the war effort furnished a new vitality. The leadership of the party was rejuvenated when Mackenzie King was succeeded by Louis St. Laurent. Yet, inevitably, habitual and apparently certain tenure in office began to breed arrogance. The danger grew that, though French Canadians might not consider an alternative to the Liberal party, the rest of Canada might finally agree on such an alternative as a desperate necessity. Then the Liberal party might be reduced once more to a French Canadian rump, and the party system would again threaten to become a divisive factor. With each year of Liberal hegemony the possibility of this development increased. The approach of a crisis was heralded in 1956 by the pipeline debate in the Canadian parliament.

In this debate the Liberal government treated parliament with obvious contempt. The issue was a government proposal to create a Crown corporation empowered to build a natural gas pipeline from the Manitoba-Ontario border east across Ontario, at a cost of about $118,000,000, and to lend to Trans-Canada Pipe Line 90 percent of the cost of building another line from the Alberta-Saskatchewan border to Winnipeg. This was an important proposal, and a controversial one. Critics contended that the whole trans-Canada line ought to be publicly owned, that Trans-Canada was controlled by American companies, that the government had negotiated the proposal without adequately informing parliament, and so on. Despite the importance of the proposal and the known degree of opposition, the Liberal government determined to rush this measure through parliament so that im-

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mediate construction could begin. To accomplish its purpose, the government carried its bill through all stages in parliament—resolution, second reading, committee, and third reading—under closure. This had never occurred before in Canadian parliamentary history. It outraged the opposition and provoked it to obstruction. The government ruthlessly used its control of the Speaker in the Canadian House of Commons to over-ride the obstruction. Of course the pipeline legislation passed. But the Liberal administration appeared to Canadians as an arrogant violator of the prerogatives of parliament. The moment had come when a great many people seemed to realize that an indefinite extension of the Liberal control might be intolerable.

The danger of ending Liberal domination without a massive alternative materialized in the election of 1957. The vote brought the Conservatives to power, but their total of 113 seats denied them a workable majority. Their capture of only eight of the 75 seats from the province of Quebec made it clear that they lacked significant French Canadian support. The election plainly revealed the degree of disillusionment with the Liberals but it failed to produce a national consensus. This was achieved, however, ten months later. The landslide majority accorded the Conservatives last March includes 50 seats from the French Canadian heartland of Quebec. The immediate crisis is over.

However, the election returns reveal the gravity of the crisis which has been averted. The fact is that the Diefenbaker administration would now have a solid majority of 158 even if all its Quebec seats were subtracted. Had a sizable segment of French Canadian opinion failed to rise above the memory of conscription, Canada might today have a Conservative government leagued against an almost purely French Canadian Liberal party. It is hard to overestimate the bitter consequences that would have followed. And it is difficult, from this standpoint, to be despondent about the extent of the Progressive Conservative dominance.

IV

The election of March 31 also appears to have ended a series of experiments to provide an alternative to Liberal hegemony through the introduction of new parties into federal politics. Political remedies based on new parties might have taken two forms—either a third force, in which the national consensus

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might have been represented by a coalition government; or the replacement of one of the traditional parties by a new party. It seems unlikely that the first would have provided the political bridge which Canada so badly needs in its party system. The success of the second possibility appeared more likely in principle, but great practical difficulties stood in the way. As we have seen, the Liberal party represented agreement only on the broad objective of greater autonomy, while the Conservatives opposed not the goal but only the means for attaining it. Third parties therefore saw a need to offer something different—to attract support by basing their program on ideological foundations. This gave them individuality but made it singularly difficult to attract a national majority. A strong basic ideology and a consensus proved to be incompatible. In fact, experiments with both forms of new-party cures for the imbalance of Canadian politics were made and turned out to be abortive.

The attempt to introduce a third force into Canadian federal politics originated in the prairie provinces after World War I. The settlement of the Canadian prairies had begun in earnest in the early years of this century. Economic conflict soon developed between the agrarian interests of the growing prairie population and the commercial interests that dominated eastern Canada. An agrarian political movement erupted. It made its appearance in national politics at the end of the war when the Liberals had been weakened by the conscription issue and the Conservative coalition had lost its wartime *raisons d'être*. In the election of 1921 the Liberals regained a plurality, but 64 members of the new agrarian movements were elected to the parliament at Ottawa and constituted the Progressive party.

No logical way was found to ameliorate tensions between Canadians of British and French origin by institutionalizing tensions between the agrarian and commercial sections of Canada. Under the guidance of Mackenzie King the Liberal party revived the traditional and inclusive consensus. Accordingly the party became the champion of national economic expansion, agrarian interests came to terms with it, and in a short time the Liberal party absorbed the bulk of what had been the agrarian protest movement. Before the end of the 1920s the Progressive party had disappeared from federal politics.

Two new parties came on the scene in the next decade, each ambitious to replace one of the traditional parties. In 1932, in

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the depths of the great depression, the Coöperative Commonwealth Federation was created. It also was spawned on the prairies, but it transcended the rôle of an agrarian movement by adopting a socialist ideology. When the Liberals returned to power after the mirage of 1930, Mackenzie King gradually edged the program of the party leftward, sponging up the great bulk of the potential electoral support of the C.C.F. Only a small socialist element continues to survive on the left flank of Canadian politics.

Later in the 1930s the Social Credit party entered the federal arena. It too grew up in the prairies and espoused an ideology, but unlike the C.C.F., its ideology was not even respectable. From a position on the right wing of Canadian politics, the Social Credit movement defied absorption by the Liberal party and attempted to replace the Conservative party as an alternative to the Liberals. There was some talk that Social Credit might make common cause with the *Union Nationale,* the ultra-conservative French Canadian party which dominates provincial politics in Quebec. Nothing came of this, and it does not seem likely that, even if such an alliance had been possible, it could have ever attracted a national majority. Now the Conservative party appears to have absorbed the remnants of Social Credit, at the federal level. For the present it must be concluded that new parties based on ideological foundations cannot attain that consensus which the circumstances of Canadian politics require.

V

The rhythm of massive alternation now seems to have been restored to Canada. The Conservative landslide accordingly appears to introduce the fourth major era of political consensus in the history of Canadian confederation. Of necessity, it must share with the three great eras of the past a fundamental nationalism. It will aim, as its predecessors did, at the maximum expansion of Canadian political and economic autonomy. Yet each of the eras of the past had its own unique character, which gave a particular direction to the nationalism it represented. The drift of Canada's new era is already evident and can be clarified by a comparison with its precursors.

The original Conservative régime was infused with Macdonald's fear of Canadian immersion in the United States. As Professor Donald Creighton's brilliant biography has recently

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reminded us, Macdonald disliked and distrusted Yankee ways, and he did not hesitate to say so. The heart of his national policy was a tariff, designed above all to protect nascent Canadian enterprise from American encroachment, and its great symbol was the Canadian Pacific Railway. The federal treasury was nearly bankrupted to forge this transcontinental link across a sea of mountains. But Macdonald succeeded in his prime goal: to build the railway entirely on Canadian soil and independently of American investment; and his last triumphant campaign in 1891 was based on a passionate denunciation of reciprocal trade with the United States.

A contemporary Canadian pun asserted: "Canada knows enough to keep out of the Hail Columbia; Canada doesn't know enough to keep out of the Reign Britannica." When the Liberals came to power in 1896 there was no pronounced desire to move closer to the United States. However, the most characteristic feature of the new Liberal consensus was Laurier's cool aloofness toward the imperialism then radiating from London. During the Laurier era the federal government made it a primary goal to populate the Canadian prairies; significantly, immigration from many countries was encouraged, not from Britain alone. And while Alberta and Saskatchewan became provinces, while work progressed on a second transcontinental railway, Laurier negotiated to prevent Canadian entanglement in any scheme of Imperial federation. At a series of Imperial conferences, Canada's prime minister effectively dragged his feet. Canada's contribution to the Boer War was kept to a minimum, and the Laurier era ended in 1911 largely as a result of the prime minister's refusal to sponsor a major Canadian contribution to an Imperial fleet. His attempt to balance this policy at the last moment by advocating reciprocal trade with the United States proved disastrous.

Although Borden commanded no stable national consensus in peacetime, he spoke with brief authority as the representative of a win-the-war majority. Canada's energetic participation in the First World War permitted Borden to press her rights to consultation. Due deference to Canadian political autonomy was paid in return for the intensity of her war effort. The transformation from British Empire to Commonwealth was already apparent in the distinctive rôles played by the Dominions at Versailles. Eventually Mackenzie King was able to consolidate the

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position staked out by Borden. This position was formally embraced in the Statute of Westminster and was finally capped by Canadian acquisition of the full power of constitutional amendment, and by the appointment of a Canadian as Governor-General.

However, the Liberal era which Mackenzie King inaugurated in 1921 was less cool to Britain or America than any of its predecessors. Political and economic autonomy had been essentially achieved, though it had still to be digested. The task of civilizing the enormous area which Canadians could now call theirs without dispute had barely begun. Therefore Canada concentrated on internal consolidation, withdrawing as much as possible from concerns that lay beyond her territory, until World War II shattered the isolationism of the whole continent.

Common problems of defense within the framework of the grand alliance produced a Canadian-American partnership much closer than any the two nations had shared before. The mobilization of North America seemed to ignore national borders. Like the United States, Canada experienced a tremendous war-driven spurt of productive capacity.

After war's end, the close coöperation with the United States continued. Canadians could look at the war-hardened muscles of their country and at last *feel* the autonomy which already belonged to them in law and fact. At the same time, the world which Canada now faced on her own seemed to make pure neutrality impossible. The Liberal administration survived the retirement of Mackenzie King and preserved the American partnership. Common problems of defense remained. Economies that had mobilized together expanded together into prosperity, which seemed to leap the border as easily as mobilization had done. Canada's close coöperation with America in the community of nations seemed natural and inevitable. And the era of consolidation, which had seen a mature national economy flower into continental prosperity, acquired after World War II a definitely pro-American flavor.

VI

Canada's current consensus seems to be based on a reaction to the closeness of Canadian-American coöperation in the recent past. Canadians have been wondering whether that closeness does not threaten their autonomy anew. Does continental pros-

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perity mean a continental economy? Can Canada survive without an autonomous economy? After all, Canadians have been reflecting, the continental prosperity they have been enjoying might perhaps have been theirs much earlier had they been willing to sacrifice their autonomy in previous eras. As Canadians once struggled to develop their western provinces, so they look today to the northern territories, whose unmeasured riches, and the challenge to exploit them, are part of the Canadian birthright. What degree of American help can Canadians safely accept in meeting this challenge?

For some time these questions have been sharpened by a degree of disillusionment with American policies and attitudes. Canadians have been no happier than the rest of America's allies with what they feel is the growing rigidity of American foreign policy. Also, there was the Norman case and the American policy with regard to wheat and oil. There was the American recession, which proved to be continental no less than prosperity had been.

In this mood, the campaign oratory of John Diefenbaker became the rallying cry for a new expression of the national consensus. The focus is, inevitably, on the strengthening of autonomy and lessened dependence on the United States. Mr. Diefenbaker has been reminding Canadians of all the implications of the fact that Canada sends to the United States 60 percent of her exports and receives from this country 73 percent of her imports. "Canadians," he says, "do not wish to have their economic, any more than their political, affairs determined outside Canada." He has talked of positive Canadianism, of a Canada with a population of 40,000,000, of the economic development of the north, and he has at least suggested that the time has come for Canadian foreign policy to be more openly independent of the United States.

The future of the new Conservative era is beset with difficulties. The American reaction to the change under way in Canada will have far-reaching consequences. If the U.S. recession deepens, the new era may be shipwrecked before it has even set full sail. Canada's present leadership must still prove itself. Each of the three great eras of the past has been identified above all with a great prime minister. Will Mr. Diefenbaker fill this rôle? One handicap may be his age; he is now 62. When Macdonald became prime minister in 1867 he was 52; in 1896 Laurier was 54; Mackenzie King was only 47 in 1921. If a portion of Canada's trade

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is to be oriented away from the United States, new trading partners will have to be found. Mr. Diefenbaker has thought out loud about diverting as much as 15 percent of Canada's trade to Britain. The feasibility of this notion and the availability of other Canadian trading partners will be much clearer after the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference which will convene in Montreal in September.

A fascinating riddle is posed by the future rôle of Quebec. Were the Conservative votes cast in March auguries of genuine future coöperation or mere testimony to political opportunism? If the rapprochement of a large part of French Canadian opinion with the Conservative party is real, will it help to keep the Quebec vote severely split in future national elections? If so, this could do much to liberalize the internal politics of the province, and would contribute greatly to the erosion of Canada's nationality problem.

In any event, Quebec has at last been jarred loose from the politically sterile position to which bitterness had rooted it. The characteristically Canadian rhythm of massive alternation has reëmerged in the party system. The new government has an overwhelming mandate to lead on toward the new Canadianism which, though ill-defined, is warmly sought by the new consensus. And despite its reduced numbers, the Liberal opposition led by Lester Pearson will present the government with a challenge that should stimulate it to maximum constructive effort.

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TOWARD A POLICY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

By Richard H. Nolte and William R. Polk

IF THE United States is to pursue its objectives successfully in the Middle East it must understand that the decisive social and political force at work there is Arab nationalism, and must come to terms with it; and it must also accept realistically the fact that the Soviet Union now plays an important rôle in Arab affairs.

The strategic importance of the Middle East as a route to Asia and as an area of contention between Russia and Western Europe is not new. The Eastern Question preoccupied the Powers throughout the nineteenth century. Today, with the protagonists infinitely more powerful, the competition continues; and to the stakes have been added three-quarters of the world's proven oil reserves. What may be even more significant is that rival philosophies and ways of life are competing in the Middle East also, and the outcome there will have a profound influence on the still uncommitted peoples of Africa and Asia.

II

A necessary first step in formulating an American policy for the Middle East is to identify the basic American objectives there. In doing so, a clear distinction should be made between objectives and the means to achieve them and between essential objectives and those that are merely desirable. The importance of this is emphasized by Western experience in recent years. A concept of "vital interests" has always underlain British policy: for example, the use or usufruct of such facilities as the Suez Canal and the refinery at Abadan were regarded as of vital importance. But in practice the vital interest itself has often been understood to include the ownership, control or even military occupation thought necessary to secure it. Particular means have tended to become ends, and rigid adherence to them has in the long run often jeopardized rather than safeguarded the interest itself. Thus, we have seen that the means which Britain used to assure navigation in the Suez Canal and a continuing flow of petroleum to Europe worked against those vital interests.

In dealing with the Middle East, the United States has not been embarrassed by imperial legacies and has been free to utilize

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less stereotyped methods in pursuing its objectives. Initially at least, its programs of technical and economic assistance were an imaginative new departure; even so, it has sometimes confused ends and means. Treaties, pacts and aid agreements have seemed almost to become ends in themselves, to be sought even to the point of damaging the relationships they were designed to support. The Eisenhower Doctrine is a recent example. It was presented in a way ("Stand up and be counted; we will make it worth your while") which made it seem to confirm Radio Moscow's daily portrayal of it as nefarious "new imperialism." As a result, fearing popular outcry, no Arab government except that of Lebanon—a small, half-Christian state with a Western orientation—dared to endorse it, and the over-all position of the United States in the Middle East was weakened rather than strengthened.

Even more noticeable is the American tendency to frame policy with reference to the maximum which it would be desirable to achieve instead of the minimum which is essential. One result is that every shortfall from the maximum objective is interpreted as a failure or defeat. The result may then be "panic" reactions and hasty improvisations.

The Syrian crisis of last fall is a case in point. The Soviet agreement of August 6 to provide massive aid for Syrian economic development and Syria's appointment of a pro-Soviet chief-of-staff on August 15 were interpreted as serious defeats for United States policy. Washington was prompted to take a series of actions: the expulsion of the Syrian Ambassador in retaliation for Syria's expulsion of three American Embassy officials for allegedly plotting a coup; the flying trip (beginning August 22) of Deputy Under Secretary of State Henderson, during which he avoided contact with Syrian and Egyptian leaders; the airlift of arms to Jordan (announced September 5) and stepped up arms shipments to Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia; Sixth Fleet manœuvres off the Syrian coast; and Secretary Dulles' statement (September 19) in the United Nations General Assembly, following the concentration of Turkish troops (with American officers present) along the Syrian frontier. Mr. Dulles' remark that "Turkey now faces growing military danger from the major build-up of Soviet arms in Syria" was not taken by Middle Easterners at face value. The Syrian army was small (about 50,000 men), newly-equipped, lacking in battle experience and in large

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part tied down on the Israeli frontier, whereas the Turkish army was the largest field force in NATO (half a million men), armed and in part trained by the United States for a decade, and presumably able to deploy a major part of its force on the Syrian frontier. It may be that American actions were designed not only to reassure the Turks but to warn Soviet Russia; but it is open to question whether they were the best means, especially since they seemed to lend substance to Russian and Syrian charges that the United States was planning a coup in Syria. When no coup materialized, the Soviet Union with its well-publicized "threat" to use nuclear force gained wide credit as the "protector of Syrian independence" against American "aggression." The United States, criticized both for allegedly planning to interfere in Syria and equally for then backing down, gained only discredit.

It is now clear that the United States was not prepared to insist on the withdrawal of the Soviet aid program for Syria; while this would be desirable, it was not in fact a vital requirement of American policy. Had policy with respect to the Syrian-Russian aid agreement been formulated with this fact in mind, the United States would have been prepared in advance to accept it and might have avoided both the "defeat" and the consequences of haste.

Greater flexibility is another advantage that might be derived from a policy based on essential minimums instead of desirable maximums. The confidence and respect which the United States once enjoyed in the Middle East has tempted it to adopt a policy of trying to "hang on" to every advantage, to maintain the status quo intact. This has made American policy rigid. Moreover, it is self-defeating to oppose change in an area where reform is a popular ideal and rapid and fundamental change is inescapable. If policy objectives were set in minimum terms, on the other hand, there would be scope for initiative in promoting desirable change and even for profiting from the initiative of others. For instance, by endorsing the objective of Syrian economic development set out in the Soviet aid agreement, and by establishing a high level of expectation against which Syrians could measure the actual performance, the United States might have benefited from the Soviet initiative—which in any case it could not prevent.

Objectives should be evaluated and reëvaluated constantly. They need not be assumed *necessarily* to include any particular

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treaty, pact or aid relationship, or the use of particular bases, or freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal, or even continuing American participation in Middle Eastern oil activities. At the present time, the primary American objectives would seem to be maintenance of a sufficient degree of peace in the area to prevent events which might lead to a nuclear war and the continuance of a sufficient flow of oil to maintain the European economy. Europe now depends upon Middle Eastern oil for 80 percent of its needs and as those needs double or triple in the coming decade the Middle East will probably have to supply most or all of the increment. In view of this, an essential American policy would seem to be one which accommodated itself to political developments in the area—even seemingly undesirable ones, *e.g.* a general drift toward neutralism—so long as they permitted the steady flow of oil to its European markets.

None of this is to say that desirable secondary objectives ought to be abandoned, merely that these should be sought only to the extent, and only in such ways, that the essentials are not jeopardized. Continued American and Western participation in Middle Eastern oil operations, for example, is surely desirable and should be supported; but not to the point of endangering the economy of Europe.

When we measure the current situation in the Middle East in terms of our essential objectives, we find that the United States is fairly well off. Our assets include: a 56-percent share in Middle Eastern oil production; a certain residue of Arab sentiment for the America of Washington, Lincoln, Wilson and Roosevelt; use of the airfield at Dhahran; the military association with Iraq through the Baghdad Pact; and freedom to use the Suez Canal. Accordingly, there is no current need for "crash programs." There is time in which to plan. And there exists a considerable margin of negotiable assets, as it were—interests and positions of advantage which might be relinquished, should need arise, to forestall a threat to the essential objectives. This situation might be used to add flexibility to United States policy. For example, after it was understood that the United States would not insist on retaining rights to the Dhahran airfield in the face of a Saudi refusal, Soviet charges of "imperialist exploitation" lost much of their force on this issue. The base is not therefore a serious political liability for the Saudi Arabian government; meanwhile, the United States retains the use of it.

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III

In the long run, foreign policy in a given area cannot be successful unless it takes account of the dominant desires and fears of the people who live there. The necessary second step in formulating an American policy for the Middle East, then, is to ascertain these attitudes. Here the United States encounters great difficulty, however, because the Middle East presents a picture of internal squabbling, dynastic rivalry, tribal and class feuding, religious and sectarian intolerance, violence and reprisal —in general, that is, disunity, disagreement and dissent. Is there in the Middle East any significant body of shared views and feelings?

The turmoil there results from the profound and accelerating social revolution which is taking place as a result of contact with the West—with Western goods and machines, economic and military techniques, political and social institutions, and above all cultural values. This social transformation has many dimensions. Separate nation states have been created from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, and these have taken on at least the outward forms of their Western counterparts. Though the results have satisfied few, the idea that government represents and should serve the people has definitely taken hold. Subsistence farming and cottage industry are in process of being replaced by large-scale cash-crop agriculture, increasingly mechanized, and the beginnings of industrialization. Rapid urbanization, the growth of a middle class and a sharp rise of population resulting from the introduction of modern medicine and public health measures are among the social aspects of the revolution. A cultural aspect is the gradual replacement of the static, tradition-bound assumptions of the Islamic past by those of the secular, progressive West.

These are obvious aspects of the social revolution in the Middle East. Perhaps less obviously, the psychological effect has been to rob increasingly large numbers of people of their sense of security and to diminish their self-respect by dissolving the old social mosaic in which each man and each group had a recognized place and function and by revealing the seeming a-to-z inferiority of their traditional pattern of life in comparison to the new Western model. This revelation has been driven home by the use of military force to support Western political domination, and it has

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been emphasized by the Western habit of pinning such labels on them as "backward" and "underdeveloped." They have felt a compelling need, in consequence, for a new allegiance, a new ordering of society adequate to deal with internal insecurity and external threat. The response, at once creative and imitative, is nationalism.

Nationalism is not, of course, a recent development in the Middle East, but for each succeeding generation it has acquired a new depth of meaning. Fifty years ago it involved little more than the desire for independence. To this was then added an Arab desire for unity, and for the power and prestige necessary to secure it. There gradually came into existence, too, a craving for social justice, economic development, industrialization and internal reforms. Most recently we have seen the growth of a desire among Arabs not only to be independent and united but to remain outside the great spheres of power conflict. The nationalists of this present generation who are drawn mainly from the urban educated and semi-educated middle classes—the same classes, that is, which are most affected by the impact of the West—are the creative minority. With the swift spread of education and the multiplication of mass communications media, they are increasing rapidly in numbers and influence. They look with critical westernized eyes at their surroundings and are bitterly aware of disunity, weakness, corruption, injustice, backwardness, poverty and ignorance—all the stigmata of inferiority. They can see only one way out: to reform and reconstruct their society in the pattern of modern industrialized respectability.

Nationalism in the Middle East is thus, basically, a constructive force. This remains true in spite of its well-publicized destructive aspects. Street demonstrations, propaganda invective and the nationalization of foreign enterprises are the negative and violent expressions of too-long-thwarted positive aspirations. Much as we may deplore these activities, our own political traditions forbid us to say that force is never a patriotic last resort. Even granting that the outbreaks of nationalist violence have been to some extent habit-forming, and that they have occurred in situations in which we would judge them inappropriate, they evidence not so much the absence of constructive objectives as the strength of the frustrated feelings behind them. The distinction sometimes made between nationalists who are "constructive" and those who are "destructive" reflects a difference in their

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methods more than a difference in their ultimate objectives. It is apparent that when moderation fails in the Arab world, extremism takes over, and that whether or not this degeneration takes place depends in no small degree on policies followed by the West.

What, specifically, do the Arab nationalists stand for? Above all, they want to secure and maintain Arab unity and independence. Internally, they want to coalesce all the divergent social groups from peasant to pasha into a citizenry loyal to the nation; externally they want to merge the individual Arab states into a larger Arab union. We have seen a start made toward this objective in recent months. They want military strength as a bulwark for their own programs, as a means of defense against external threats, and—not least—for reasons of prestige. In foreign policy, they would like to be neutral, to avoid entanglements, and to profit from Soviet-American competition in order to devote their undivided energies to the advancement of their own affairs. They want honest and impartial government. And ultimately, they want to secure the full schedule of rights, privileges and protections promised by the Western democratic ideal.

The nationalists want economic development not only to build up national power but to employ and feed surplus population and to raise standards of living. In the social field, they want to develop universal free education from kindergarten through college in order to create a responsible citizenry and to train sufficient officials, technicians and professionals for the growing needs of their society. With equal urgency they want nation-wide programs of medical care. In the name of social justice they stand for the elimination of the "feudal" system of land tenure and for the fair treatment of labor.

The nationalists vary in political color from black to red, but they all serve or claim to serve the same over-all objectives. On the extreme of religious reaction, the Moslem Brothers cite the assumed "original" principles of Islam and call for a reconstruction of society on that basis. But in going back to early Islam as their source, they know in advance what it is they are looking for and occasionally they may be said to look with a formative eye; as a result we are told that independence, economic development and social justice are old Islamic principles deriving from the Quran and the Tradition of the Prophet. These are principles to which the Communists on the other extreme must also cater,

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however insincerely, if they are to gain a following. For all political parties and factions, the difference does not lie in what is to be sought but how and by whom.

By all odds the man most widely regarded as a successful seeker of these ends is President Nasser of Egypt. In the West he has often been represented as a tinpot dictator, a Middle Eastern Hitler, a breaker of treaties, an oppressor of minorities and a saboteur of international commerce. There is a certain amount of truth as well as exaggeration in these charges. But for Arabs, his shortcomings are nothing compared with the stature he has acquired. As the man who forced "imperialist" Britain out of the Canal Zone, who successfully defied the West with his Czech arms deal, who topped Secretary Dulles' insulting withdrawal of the High Dam offer with a resounding slap at Britain and France and their Suez Canal Company, who triumphantly survived the tripartite aggression late in 1956, Nasser has become in the eyes of most Arabs a modern Saladin. More than any other man, in a favorite phrase, he has "restored Arab independence and dignity."

To them, in addition, Nasser represents honesty in government, devotion to economic development (of which the High Dam was the major symbol), and the determination to educate and unify, to provide jobs, social security and a rising standard of living for the masses. He led the way to land reform and, after a decade of talk by others, implemented the dream of Arab union. Some Arab nationalists have private reservations about Nasser for his gross abuse of press and radio, his imprisonments and oppressions, his discrimination against foreign private enterprise, his un-neutral involvement with the U.S.S.R., and the unimpressive showing of his armed forces against Israel. But most will hear no evil of him and those who do can offer no better replacement. Nasser remains the towering hero of Arab nationalism.

It cannot be stated too strongly that nationalism is the decisive political and social force at work in the Arab Middle East, and that this remains true in spite of the many evidences of discord and division. The nationalists may be a long time in realizing their objectives and, despite the extraordinary progress of the past few years, they may never realize them all. But a fundamental lesson of modern Middle Eastern history is that foreign—or domestic—attempts to secure or to preserve special privileges and interests in opposition to the ground-swell of na-

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tionalism lead ultimately to failure. Britain failed in Egypt, Palestine and Jordan (who can tell what five years will bring in Iraq?), and France in Syria, Lebanon and North Africa. In the long run, if American policy in the Middle East is not also to fail, it must not seem to oppose and obstruct the constructive purposes of Arab nationalism.

IV

But this is to state the situation in negative terms. Simply to render the policy of the United States harmless in Arab eyes would not automatically gain it favor. To be effective, American policy must have nationalist support and this can be won by a clear and steady endorsement of their own constructive purposes. Thus, the third step in formulating an American Middle Eastern policy is to jettison the sterile approach based mainly on rigid opposition to the Soviet Union and to work out a new and more positive approach alive to the desires and needs of the Middle Easterners themselves.

The minimum American objectives in the Middle East as stated earlier in this article do not inherently conflict with the nationalist desires for independence, unity, neutrality, economic development and social reform. Indeed, with the moral and material backing of the United States, Arab progress toward achieving these things could also become progress toward securing American objectives. Moreover, the present nationalist hostility toward the whole range of other American interests in the Middle East would tend to fade away.

Many of the constructive aspirations of Arab nationalism are expressed in phrases that come from the lexicon of Western and particularly American experience: "all men are created equal," "toward a more perfect union," "avoid foreign entanglements." These slogans ring just as true to Arab nationalists as they did to our ancestors or as they do to us. The fact that they are being used against us is an indication that the United States seems no longer to represent these ideals in its dealing with the Arabs. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, adopting the familiar language of liberal democracy without embarrassment and in all seeming sincerity, has been able during the past two or three years to represent itself as the unselfish champion of Arab nationalist aspirations. The result has been a glacial eastward shift of Arab opinion.

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While the Russians have been adopting our mottoes—and finding them keys of success—we have often acted in ways which have cut right to the nerve of nationalist feeling. A mainspring of Arab nationalism is the terrible feeling of inferiority, and this feeling the United States has helped to compound.

The United States made its first major intervention in Middle Eastern affairs a decade ago when it lent wholehearted financial, diplomatic and moral support to the establishment of Israel. From an Arab point of view, this was a denial of the principles which the United States had proclaimed for "all men." Did the United States see no inequality, no injustice, no unwisdom, they ask, in supporting the forcible conversion of what to them was plainly an Arab land into a Jewish state or in accepting the permanent displacement of a million Arabs from their homes and property to make room for an equal number of people whom Europe had driven forth? Since this American action, a half-billion dollars of official United States assistance has been given to Israel, amounting to two or three times the sums contributed to all the Arab countries combined, and even private American gifts have been given a quasi-official nature by being made tax exempt. In these and other ways the Arabs have found goading evidence of their own inadequacy, lack of standing in our eyes, and inferiority. The result, in spite of the many millions of dollars in various forms of aid which we have given the Arabs, has been to lend great impetus to the negative features of Arab nationalism and to render it hostile to America.

Although the reservoir of Arab good will toward America began to drain away a decade ago, the rise of the Soviet Union in Arab esteem began following the Czech arms deal with Egypt; thus it is less than three years old. Initially, the Soviet Union had shared our attitude toward Israel-Arab relations. Indeed, the survival of Israel was due in no small degree to the arms supplied from Russian-dominated Czechoslovakia. (The Arabs bitterly remark that there was no Western uproar about *that* Czech arms deal.) The Czech arms deal with Egypt in the summer of 1955 led to a radical change in the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States. Previously, the United States had promised arms to Egypt contingent upon conclusion of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement about British troops in the Canal Zone. This agreement was reached in the summer of 1954. Then in early February 1955 came the first big Israeli military attack against

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Egyptian armed forces in the Gaza Strip. Arms became an urgent necessity for Nasser if he was to retain the loyalty of his Free Officers and the army upon whom his control of Egypt rested. The American Government maintained that under existing legislation it could provide arms only for cash in dollars (which Egypt lacked) or accompanied by a U.S. military mission, which Egyptian nationalism could not tolerate. Turning to the Soviet bloc, Nasser secured weapons in adequate amounts on very reasonable terms, payable in cotton, of which Egypt then had an unsold surplus.

The resulting surge of alarm in the West and the immediate arrival of Assistant Secretary of State Allen in Cairo, reportedly with a new arms offer, showed Egyptians the key to American policy in the Middle East: fear of the Soviet Union. The controlled Egyptian press accordingly printed a story asserting that the Soviets had offered to help build the High Dam, the huge $1.2 billion project that symbolized Egypt's drive for economic development and its major hope for winning the race against Malthusian starvation. The United States, joined by Britain and later by the World Bank, promptly made a counter-offer as a gesture of humanitarian generosity. However, the Soviet offer was an Egyptian invention; no real offer materialized. The Russians did, however, promise large-scale assistance for Egyptian industrial development (which resulted in a $175,000,000 aid agreement late in 1957). In May and June of 1956, Nasser tried to nail down the Western offer; but the United States, having discovered the Russian lack of interest, no longer felt any urgency about the High Dam. Nasser seemed to be right about our motivations, but had overplayed his hand. When Ambassador Hussein went to Washington to "put American good faith to the test," the offer was withdrawn, and in such a way as to be an inescapable insult to Nasser. It was stated that because of the arms purchases, the Egyptian economy would be unequal to the task of building the Dam. The inference was that the United States was unwilling to associate itself with a losing proposition, starving peasants or no.

Thus challenged, Nasser had to reply. His counter-stroke at the end of July was to nationalize the Suez Canal Company. During the tense four-month deadlock that followed, and despite the resignation (on September 15) of 100 of the 170 Canal pilots, Egypt proudly kept the Canal in operation, and the Soviet Union

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backed it. The United States tried to restrain Britain and France and asserted the principle of internationalization, or joint control by the user nations ("collective colonialism," according to the Egyptians), on the grounds—somewhat surprising for the United States—that control of a vital international waterway by one country imperiled free navigation. The Arabs were quick to point out not only the parallel to Panama but the similar issue that had arisen in 1946 when Russia wanted to "internationalize" the Turkish Straits and the United States had stoutly maintained the principle of one-nation control.

The inference drawn by the Arabs from these episodes was that an American promise about arms or a dam was not necessarily a promise when it was made to an Arab; that failure to secure arms from the United States did not give Arabs a right to try elsewhere; that in American eyes the only people who counted in the Middle East (apart from the Israelis) were the Russians; that the United States had no genuine interest in Arab economic development as such; and that the Arabs were considered incompetent to run their own economy or even their own canal. In short, the Arabs concluded that Americans did not look on them as being on the same level as other peoples or nations. By contrast, the actions of the Soviet Union seemed to shine with a pure white light.

For a brief period, the firm stand of President Eisenhower against the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt seemed to obliterate the record of the preceding months and to regain much of the ground lost by the United States. Contrary to what the Arabs had expected, the United States did not back its major European allies and its Middle Eastern protégé. President Eisenhower's action and his speech about "one law" for all reopened doors throughout the Arab world. But the opportunity thus gained for a fresh start in the Middle East was soon dissipated. Various acts, some of them comparatively petty, seemed to give the lie to the President's stand. For example, when the Egyptians requested release of $14,000 of their funds (the United States had frozen $40,000,000 of their funds when the Egyptians nationalized the Suez Canal Company) in order to purchase medicines for the victims of the Port Said invasion, they were refused. This occurred at a time when dramatic efforts were being made in the West to aid the refugees from Hungary, and the Arabs were quick to draw the comparison. Egypt's attempt to

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purchase surplus American wheat, when its own reserves were almost exhausted, was similarly turned down. The medicines and the wheat were supplied by the Soviet Union. Then the United States failed to renew the CARE program through which nearly 3,000,000 Egyptian children were receiving school lunches "as a gift from the children of America." Such actions as these made it easy for many Arabs to believe that it was not through our efforts but rather through the much-publicized Soviet "threat" to rocket bomb London and Paris that the Anglo-French invasion had been stopped. It was even suggested that the motivation for the American position had been a desire to get control of the Canal. In 1951, they recalled, in a somewhat parallel situation, the United States had discouraged impending British military action against Iran to recover the nationalized Anglo-Iranian Oil Company refinery at Abadan, and within three years American companies held a 40 percent share in Iranian oil. They knew little or nothing of just how that had come about; the result spoke sufficiently for itself.

V

Today Arab nationalists have come to see the United States as a major foe. Into the breaches which we either have made or have not known how to prevent, the Soviet Union has been invited. For capital, technical assistance, support and protection, Arabs are increasingly turning toward the Soviet Union. In the realm of ideas, also, this is increasingly the case. Our basic political assumptions are often seen in the harsh light of what Arabs regard as our non-performance, our institutions in the pale, reflected light of Mandate and Protectorate copies which often hindered rather than promoted the social well-being of the peoples concerned. In contrast, the Soviet ideas are new, untried, less complicated and, to many Asians, exciting; Soviet policies seem remarkably flexible and favorably-disposed; and the Soviet economy has so far seemed both able and willing to help.

We cannot and should not try to prevent the Arabs from profiting from the help of the Soviet Union. We should recognize the fact that the Soviet Union plays a part in the affairs of the Middle East and that, from an Arab point of view, Soviet offers of economic, technical and military assistance are no less legitimate than similar American offers. Instead of opposing Soviet aid for Arab economic development, and thereby seeming to

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oppose the development itself, American policy ought to encourage the Arabs to get all they can while urging a proper watchfulness and the setting of high standards of performance. This would range us on the side of those things which Arabs, like most Asians and Africans, demand of the future; it would also reduce the pressure on us to bid against the Soviet Union in a Nasser's game of "competitive exploitation."

It will be objected that backing the "constructive" objectives of Arab nationalists would mean, ultimately, that Israel would be "driven into the sea." But in fact by making clear its intent to maintain peace in the area to the point of using force against aggression, the United States would stand as a bulwark for a peaceful Israel no less than for any other peaceful state in the Middle East. This would be acceptable to Arab nationalists. The key is equal treatment, fairness, one law. Arabs will accept no less; offers of more they will not respect. Once assured on these points, their feeling about Israel and the Palestine refugees—now symbols of Western unfairness and lack of regard for Arabs—would lose much of their vengeful force. Indeed, this was a temporary result of our stand at Suez.

Lastly, we must realize that although our diplomatic contacts are with governments and states, these for historical reasons are rather different in the Middle East than in Europe. America ought to avoid excessive identification with any particular leader, party or social class except as he or it represents the positive aspirations of the population. In this, the Soviet Union has been far more astute than we, as, for example, in its willingness to work with Nasser although the latter has banned the Communist Party in Egypt. The Soviet Union has never suggested that Nasser is ideologically in accord with it, whereas we often seem to suggest that this is true of leaders who are equally far from our basic tenets. By maintaining a greater flexibility we can move with the changes of public opinion: we can recognize and even bless such moves as those now in train toward pan-Arab union. Failure of that dream to materialize because of apparent American opposition would leave the Arabs more hostile than ever and all the more dependent on the Soviet Union. This would diminish the likelihood that we could ever reach and maintain our basic objectives in the Middle East.

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SELF-CONFIDENCE AND SELF-CRITICISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

By Edwin S. Munger

THREE times since 1948 the National Party has won the parliamentary elections in South Africa, and each time by an increased margin. These successive victories reflect the dominant place which Afrikaners have secured within the White oligarchy. The elections of last April gave the Nationalists 103 seats in the new parliament, compared to 53 for the predominantly English-speaking United Party. A wave of satisfaction and self-confidence is sweeping through the Afrikaner community as a result. Yet now that their political opponents have been crushed, a new spirit of constructive criticism is emerging within Afrikanerdom.

The Nationalist victory was not primarily a triumph for White racism, which was not at issue; *apartheid* of some kind has the support of more than 90 percent of the voters. Race relations figured prominently in the campaign only in the final two weeks, when an unsuccessful strike against the pass laws and for higher wages became a political football for the major parties. Yet clearly the African National Congress, which called the strike, is becoming a significant factor on the White political scene. It appears that both Afrikaners and Africans will continue to strengthen their dominant positions in South African society, leading to further polarization of political thought.

The balloting on April 16 took place in a much calmer atmosphere than prevailed in the three previous parliamentary elections. The last campaign had been filled with hate and flailing bicycle chains, as the Nationalist *Jeugbond* and the Torch Commando broke up political meetings. The United Party attempted to make the issue Nazism versus democracy, castigating the anti-British sentiments of many Afrikaners during World War II, and their semi-military organizations. The United Party slogan, "Vote for the right to vote again," sincerely expressed the convictions of many English-speaking South Africans. But the National Party's loss of a good part of the English-speaking vote was more than compensated for by a new sense of Afrikaner unity which enabled it to maximize its support from the 60 percent Afrikaans-speaking majority in the voting population.

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In 1958, the calmer atmosphere was reflected in fewer speeches and fewer meetings broken up; it was typified by the replacement of the militant Torch Commando by the passive Black Sash women, who suspended activities during the election campaign. Votes were cast more firmly along linguistic lines than in any previous South African election. As still more Afrikaners returned to the Nationalist fold, Nationalist majorities increased in 66 constituencies and declined in only four. And although the National Party claims to have obtained English support, it is difficult to see where this occurred, unless possibly in Natal. The trek of Afrikaners to the cities, which underlay the Nationalist rise to power in 1948, continued.

The National Party is greatly aided by a South African law allowing the number of voters in a constituency to vary plus or minus 15 percent without redrawing districts. This has traditionally favored the rural areas, or *platteland,* but even General Smuts defended the principle when his primarily urban supporters wished to change it. The number of under-populated constituencies has increased in the last four delimitations, and all of these seats are held by the National Party. Conversely, the number of districts with an electorate considerably in excess of the national average has also increased, and most of these seats are held by the United Party.

Delimitation is determined every five years by a commission of judges appointed by the Government. Both parties make proposals on how population shifts should be taken into account. In a large majority of cases preceding the 1958 elections, the recommendations of the National Party were accepted. The United Party press cried—after the election—that their party was gerrymandered to death. But this game does have rules—and limits. The Nationalist proposals for Pretoria's Sunnyside seat were rejected, and the United Party won by 600 votes, compared with Nationalist majorities of 2,000 in nearby seats. In Durban no stretch of delimitation could group enough of the 25,000 Nationalist voters to form one winning constituency.

The twin factors of loading and delimitation help to explain why the National Party won almost twice as many seats as the United Party, although the two parties polled approximately the same number of votes. It is not possible to estimate the totals exactly because the National Party did not contest 31 seats and in 24 of these constituencies there was no opposition whatsoever

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to the United Party, which entered candidates in all 156 contests. The vote total would be purely academic if it were not generally accepted in South Africa as an indication of possible support for or against a republic. Although this issue was not pushed in the recent campaign, it is a major plank of the National Party platform. Since the election, South African newspapers have played an elaborate game of dividing the vote that would have been cast in the uncontested seats. The pro-United Party press "proves" a substantial majority for the U.P., and the Nationalist press, not surprisingly, comes out with a majority for their party. The most that can be said is that the total opposition vote against the Government (some of it also in opposition to the United Party) was greater than the vote for the Nationalists.

It is reasonably clear that, even without the help of the 1958 delimitation, the National Party would have retained all its seats and added at least three (it actually added six). The swing towards the National Party amounted to almost 1,000 votes per constituency or a total swing of about 8 percent. In 1948 and 1953, the Nationalists won many close contests which were considered marginal in this election. In 1958, the United Party scraped through more often than the National Party, and now holds more vulnerable seats. In general, the total number of seats within easy reach of either party is much reduced. There is a solid quality about most of the United Party and National Party majorities in individual constituencies.

The traditional argument that the English-speaking South African is not interested in politics and refuses to vote was belied by the extraordinarily high percentage of votes cast, running over 90 percent in a large number of seats, and reaching a phenomenal 96.2 percent in Queenstown, which the United Party retained by 13 votes. The removal of 48,000 Colored voters from the common roll certainly made a dent in the total vote of the United Party, but judging from the distribution of Colored votes in 1953, it did not in fact affect the number of seats obtained.

"Your key to prosperity" was the official United Party slogan. Emphasis was placed on the cost of living, and pots of South African gold were promised near and far, especially to schoolteachers and railway workers. United Party liberals were ingenious, if not ingenuous, in not letting their liberal slips show through their conservative party dress. In the urban areas the U.P. ideal was presented as "discrimination with justice."

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The strongest United Party argument outside the liberal urban constituencies was to accuse the Government of being *kaffir-boeties*—African-lovers. The lack of discussion of *apartheid* by National Party candidates, except for boasting of some past legislation, meant that the United Party candidates spoke perhaps as much in favor of *baasskap* or White supremacy as did the Nationalists. A prominent U.P. member of Parliament, P. A. Moore, boasted, "Give us a chance and we will show the country that we can deal as firmly with the Kaffirs as the Nationalists." The Government was attacked for spending too much money on African housing, pensions and education. In desperation, the National Party produced an Afrikaans pamphlet purporting to show that more money had been spent on White housing than on African housing, but it was an unconvincing case.

The National Party hammered hard and successfully on its theme, "There is no place for the Afrikaner in the United Party." The U.P. retorted that two-thirds of its candidates were Afrikaners, whereupon the Nationalist press demonstrated that half of the "renegade" Afrikaners spoke English at home and that most of them sent their children to English schools. The somewhat stilted Afrikaans accent of United Party leader Sir de Villiers Graaff was ridiculed. The National Party had its strident tones. Senator de Klerk, Minister of Labor, said it was "high treason" to vote for the United Party, and the election-day banner in a party paper presented voters with the choice—vote Nationalist or die.

There is no doubt that the *bloedsappe* (blood supporters) of the old South African Party of Generals Smuts and Botha (which evolved into the United Party) are dying off in the rural areas, and that the young people are voting Nationalist. Moreover, the higher Afrikaner birth rate, despite being slowed down by the trek to the cities, suggests greater and greater Nationalist voting strength. Prime Minister Strijdom has said that the vote for 18-year-olds is coming shortly. It will be needed by the Nationalists if a referendum is held on the republican issue. The plan to conduct the referendum by constituencies would also help enormously to achieve the two-thirds majority which the Nationalists seek.

The United Party is now reduced geographically to loyalist Natal and adjacent areas of the Cape Province, plus English-speaking urban pockets in Cape Town and Johannesburg. No

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political party has ever come back to power in South Africa without combining or fusing with some other group. The United Party does not know with whom to unite, and is gravely disunited within itself; either its liberal or conservative wing might fly off before the next election. In South Africa, as in baseball, three strikes is out, even though the batter protested a foul tip on his last swing.

This is the first South African parliament in which the White electorate returned only two parties. The Labor Party was completely crushed. Its parliamentary leader, Alex Hepple, had the most favorable press build-up of any South African politician in parliament, yet his showing was so poor that he lost his electoral deposit. His supporters actually hauled more voters to the polls than their candidate received! In Benoni, which had never returned other than a Labor candidate in the 43 years it has been a seat, the United Party won easily, with the National Party as runner-up.

Opinion is mixed on the results of the Liberal Party's showing in the three constituencies which it contested. The Liberals avoided triangular fights with the major parties and concentrated on safe United Party seats. These were not the Liberals' most favorable constituencies. In Natal and Johannesburg, the candidates lost their deposits. In Orange Grove, Johannesburg, they had their best organization and were opposing a right-wing United Party candidate; but their meager support dwindled when an African member of the Liberal Party appeared on the platform at a rally.

In the predominantly Jewish constituency of Sea Point, an upper-middle-class suburb of Cape Town, a personally popular, local Jewish lawyer stood against an Afrikaner imported from the hinterland over the objections of the local United Party committee. The Liberals polled 1,642 votes, their best showing, but were overwhelmed by 7,267 U.P. votes. The argument in favor of one strong opposition against the Nationalists cut into widespread Liberal sentiment.

The Liberals, recognizing the difficulty of being an inter-racial party in a racial society, were disappointed with the results, but consoled themselves with the educational value of the campaign. Labor is probably dead, but the Liberals are confidently alive.

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II

Africans have been extremely successful in the past with economically-based political protests. They succeeded in Johannesburg with a bus boycott in 1944 and won their demands with another boycott last year that caught the European community by surprise. A one-day strike last June was moderately successful. Ex-Chief Luthuli, President of the African National Congress, and other African leaders planned months ago to hold a protest at election time which would demonstrate to South Africa and the world their lack of voice in choosing their government. Some Africans naïvely believed that a successful protest would prove that the Government had failed in its race relations and that a strike would therefore redound to the benefit of the United Party.

The African National Congress chose to conduct a strike for a minimum wage of £1 a day. It was to have started on Monday morning and run through the Wednesday election, but was officially called off by Tuesday. The Pound-a-Day Strike failed abysmally in the African National Congress strongholds of Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg, and was scarcely attempted elsewhere in the Union. Attendance in many Johannesburg factories and offices was 10 percent above normal for a Monday.

The strike failed for a variety of reasons. In the first place, it was wrongly conceived. Africans were and are prepared to strike over a penny increase in bus fares, but the large sum (by present standards) of £1 a day was beyond the imagination of many. Further, in the bus boycott Africans were contributing their time and their strength to trudge the weary 10 or 15 miles a day to and from work. In the election strike they were asked to stay at home and lose their meager wages on which the whole family depended. Moreover, African leadership was divided on the advisability of the strike. The White Congress of Democrats, far left of the political center, helped promote the strike and apparently hoped it would lead to serious trouble, ensuring a Nationalist victory. Some Africans resent any White interference; others are democratically inclined and resent anything which appears tinged with Communistic influence. Both these groups were ambivalent in their support of the boycott. Even President Luthuli played a vacillating rôle.

Leaders of the White business community in Johannesburg worked hard for better wages in the months following the last

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successful strike in June 1956. As a result, wages for Africans are up, yet the president of the Chamber of Commerce said publicly in March that African wages are still too low and that too many Africans live below the subsistence level. Also, despite the marked reduction in inter-racial contact in recent years, the Chambers of Industry and Commerce made strenuous efforts to have all employers talk with their African workers. Some employers listened to grievances for the first time.

Finally, although there were isolated incidents in Sophiatown, the South African police were less aggressive than they had been in previous strikes. There were more police but a noticeable absence of threats, which had conspicuously failed to break the bus boycott. Most employers did not threaten workers with loss of their jobs.

Civil disturbances, including strikes, are often helped along by organized criminal activities, and intimidation by African *tsotsis,* or gangsters, contributed to the success of earlier strikes. Johannesburg, the main strike center, has seen a substantial improvement in African housing in the last few years. The few areas where the strike met with success were in such slums as the undemolished parts of Sophiatown. The crime rate generally is much lower than at the time of the last successful strike, and in Alexandra Native Township, for example, personal assaults have dropped more than 60 percent.

Neither police officials nor business leaders are under any illusion that future strikes will be equally unsuccessful. The special circumstances, already described, made for a special result. In fact, the President of the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce said privately that if a year from now African wages were not substantially bettered, and if the political restraints on the leadership were removed, he expected a strike would be 90 percent successful.

The African National Congress succeeded in its objective to the extent that the European population in the largest cities had their attention diverted from their internal political divisions to the broader racial divisions of South Africa.

III

To the winners have gone the problems of unity within their swollen ranks. The National Party has now won the battle of Afrikanerdom. A republic—almost certainly within the Com-

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monwealth—is promised by Prime Minister Strijdom, "sooner than the United Party expects." It will probably mark the emotional end of the Anglo-Boer War. It will also unloose some of the bonds that have bound the *Boers nasie* together. With a republic achieved, what will symbolize the common goal of Afrikanerdom?

Afrikaners did vote for the *volk* more than they reacted to the *swart gevaar* (black danger), but the Government was elected as a White Government with the understanding that it will take whatever steps are necessary to keep power in White hands. This mandate is, however, extraordinarily general and unspecific. The Nationalist voting public is not aroused on any issue of *apartheid* it is anxious to see implemented. The most recent legislation on African church attendance and the proposals for *apartheid* in the universities were not discussed by either party during the campaign, and they are not popular issues.

Effective legislative opposition now rests inside the National Party caucus. The influence of parliamentary debate on legislation has dwindled over the past decade to its lowest ebb in South African history. Occasionally, a bill will be modified or changed if some technical flaw is pointed out by the opposition, but the practical debate will now, more than ever, lie within the governing party.

The Afrikaans-speaking people have matured and found themselves in the past decade, casting off their long-standing bitterness and sense of inferiority. The traditional and usually justified complaints against language discrimination have been mostly resolved in favor of Afrikaans. Bars against Afrikaners in the civil service and business have been eliminated or lowered. The political landslide at the polls solidly confirms the new position of the Afrikaner.

In the course of any long and hard struggle, dissident voices within a group tend to be silenced voluntarily or with the crude slap of the hand. Afrikaners are a devout people who cherish their individual liberty and have a greater respect for law and order than, say, Americans. This picture is not consistent with most images of Afrikanerdom presented outside South Africa in recent years. The test of which evaluation is accurate may come during the life of the present parliament.

Some indication of what may lie ahead, however, is afforded by the meeting of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs

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(SABRA), which held its Ninth Annual Congress within the first fortnight following the 1958 election. Important Afrikaner Nationalist intellectuals created a national sensation by speaking forcibly and freely on racial affairs.[1] An education professor attacked "the traditional color prejudice which identified a dark skin with a lack of civilization" and the idea that "a white skin was necessarily superior to the man with a dark skin." An anthropologist said that Afrikaner racial thinking must be predicated on the acceptance of "equal potentialities for all men." A theologian denied any Biblical basis for *apartheid.* These and other comments were widely disseminated in reports and editorials in the Afrikaans and English papers throughout South Africa.

J. du P. Basson, a Nationalist M.P., sharply criticized the doctrine of White supremacy and blamed worsening race relations on the White politicians. He added, "No racial policy can succeed in the long run in a country like South Africa unless it is made acceptable also to the non-Whites." He praised the efforts of the Minister of External Affairs, Eric Louw, toward developing better relations with the rest of Africa, but pointed out the difficult task for South Africa of gaining coöperation from emerging African states while preaching White supremacy at home.

The National Vice-Chairman of SABRA, Professor N. J. J. Olivier of Stellenbosch University, demanded a rapid increase in the tempo of development of the African territories inside South Africa and insisted, "the Bantu must be given an opportunity of testing us and our sincerity." Behind such statements —and others equally strong—was clearly implied criticism of present Government policies. But the criticism lay within the framework of Afrikanerdom and the National Party. The leaders of SABRA do not seek to split Afrikanerdom; rather, they want to save it from the disastrous results of a policy of White supremacy.

The Congress called for better personal relations between White and non-White and decided to hold a multi-racial confer-

[1] The intellectual yeast is also at work in the arts. Although Afrikaans prose has long been shackled by restrictions against discussing religion, sex, color and politics, in recent years it has begun to emerge from the cocoon of community censorship. Afrikaans poetry, on the other hand, has consistently been of a high order because it is free; it is free because it has not been widely read and not subject to pressure by society. One example of the freedom of poetic expression is Dirk Opperman's "The Christmas Story," in which Hottentot wise men bring gifts of eggs, sheepfat and dried beef to a Colored Christ Child born amidst "*die sink en die sak van distrik ses*"—the corrugated iron roof and burlap sacking of the District Six slum of Cape Town. The poem poses a deep challenge to White Christians in South Africa.

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ence later in 1958. SABRA certainly does not represent more than a fraction of Nationalist-voting Afrikaners. But it does have strong backing from the church—over 10 percent of the Congress delegates and observers were ministers—and Afrikaner social scientists. Its significance cannot be measured by its size.

The division on racial attitudes between the traditionally tolerant south, where all shades of color are found, and the harsh north, where stark white and black relationships exist, is deepened by the SABRA stand. The organization has many individual members in the Transvaal, which dominates the National Party, but its main strength is in the Cape. The long-standing north-south dichotomy could make headlines when the time comes for the Nationalist caucus to elect a new Prime Minister.

But SABRA is not alone in its independent attitude. Afrikaans editors spoke out strongly in support of press freedom before the Government's Press Commission. Professor and poet N. P. Van Wyk Louw condemned the proposed internal censorship in these terms: "If the enemies of Afrikaans in South Africa had to think out a plan to enervate the language, to take away all attractiveness from it, they could scarcely have thought of a more suitable means than the principles for which our advocates of censorship and our purifiers of foreign taints are striving. . . ."

Opposition to the proposed standards and methods of control of African universities has not come alone from Afrikaans and English-speaking professors in the "mixed universities." Strenuous protests have been made by such staunch Nationalists as the heads of Pretoria University and devoutly Calvinistic Potchefstroom University. Finally, the Christian conscience of the Afrikaans people is troubled by the legal gymnastics of the Senate Act, by which a simple majority legislated itself into a required two-thirds majority in order to pass contentious legislation. Many Nationalists feel the Senate Act is a blot upon Afrikaner integrity.

Afrikaners won the 1958 election. Africans will have a voice in future elections. They will vote, if only with their feet, as they did in the bus strike. "Those who think we can wait 50 or 100 years for a solution are living in a dream world," Professor Olivier told the SABRA delegates. "When politicians say we have 100 years ahead of us in which to find an answer, it fills me with the utmost frustration that sincere people can continue to believe this."

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THE TRIUMPH AND DISASTER OF EDUARD BENES

By Edward Taborsky

THIS year marks the tenth anniversary of the political fall and subsequent death of the co-founder of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Eduard Benes, champion of democracy and international coöperation. Twice he had regained freedom for his beloved country, each time against fantastically superior forces. He lived just long enough to see his life's work reduced to rubble and his cherished hopes of honest and peaceful East-West coexistence smashed. Fortunately, his timely death relieved him of his agonizing doubts as to the correctness of the course which he had followed. These doubts had never ceased to torture him in that desolate six-month interval between his final departure from Hradcany Castle in Prague on February 27, 1948, and the fatal stroke which he suffered on September 3 of the same year.

The controversy concerning the character and policy of Dr. Benes is far from resolved. Judgments of his behavior and appraisals of his political acumen range from scathing condemnation to unconditional exoneration. Some see in him little more than an opportunistic fellow-travelling "quartermaster of Communism in Central Europe."[1] Others portray him as a sort of Micawberish optimist obsessed with a naïve belief in Stalin's promises and unrealistic dreams of lasting Soviet-Western collaboration. Still others claim he was the unfortunate victim of an exceptionally adverse confluence of circumstances and blame his fall mainly on the absence of proper Western support when it was most needed.

Where is the truth? As one who was closely associated with Dr. Benes during the last ten years of his life, I should like to offer my own analysis of his actions and their motivations.

II

What kind of a man was Benes as he stood on the threshold of the last decade of his life, unaware of the crushing burden which would be placed upon him in his remaining years?

If I were to describe his political personality in a single phrase, I would call him the Grand Master of Compromise. Compromise is, of course, an essential of democratic politics, but to Benes it was his daily fare. When, in his early thirties, he was charged with the responsibility for Czechoslovak foreign policy, all the weighty international problems confronting a renascent state in the chaotic postwar era were thrown into his lap. In the circumstances, he had to practise compromise to such an extent that it became an integral part of his personality. He would negotiate with the patience of an angel, for hours, weeks or months, never tiring in the rich flow of his rhetoric. Using his notorious enumerative method of "firstly-secondly-thirdly," re-

[1] Jan Ciechanowski, "Defeat in Victory" (Garden City: Doubleday, 1947); Vaclav E. Mares, "Could the Czechs Have Remained Free?" *Current History*, September 1950, pp. 150 ff.

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quiring often the fingers of both hands to list all the points, he would endeavor to wear down and overwhelm his opponent by a steady avalanche of logical argument. He would have in readiness, however, elaborate plans for various alternatives. He would never close the door to further discussion and was always willing to settle eventually for far less than he had asked for if the better bargain proved to be unattainable. He thus combined in a unique fashion the methodical Cartesian rationalism, by which he had been trained in his adolescent years, with the practical approach of a hard-bargaining, down-to-earth Czech peasant, a method which he had inherited from his parents.

His long Geneva apprenticeship in the League's peculiar atmosphere of wordy legalism, in which disagreeable problems were disposed of by well-polished but ineffective resolutions, also left an indelible mark on his ways of doing things. He acquired quite a knack, and indeed renown, for producing suitable formulas for resolving diplomatic deadlocks. He was proud of this ability, and the warm caressing expression of his eyes and face whenever he reminisced about his Geneva days showed unmistakably that those had been among his happiest moments.

These years of negotiating compromises and devising political formulas dulled his power of moral indignation and especially the capacity to use it against those who deserved excoriation. Benes himself was a man of impeccable moral purity. But he was much too forbearing toward evil and wickedness in others. In that respect he definitely lacked the moral intransigence which had been so characteristic of his great teacher and predecessor, Thomas Masaryk, and he was well aware of it. "When Masaryk came to the conclusion that a man was a scoundrel, he refused to deal with him and even to talk to him," Benes used to tell me. "But if the scoundrel was politically important, *someone* had to deal with him, and so it was left for me to do it." And he did, unwittingly giving them undeserved respectability. These methods lessened his troubles only temporarily. Just as any successful blackmailer invariably returns for more, many of Benes's antagonists believed that they could "shake him down" again and again. Thus his gentleness of heart and his known addiction to compromise became serious weaknesses. There are occasions when righteous anger and brutal frankness serve one's cause better than tolerance. Once in a while the need may even arise to burn all one's bridges and make a last win-or-die stand. Such behavior was utterly alien to Benes; he would have considered it foolhardy, an unwarranted gamble which no responsible statesman could afford.

Such was the man who was about to be subjected, at the seasoned age of 54, to an ordeal which few other men in modern history have had to endure.

III

The sad story of Munich need not be retold here. Benes's surrender without firing a shot ran contrary to the strong emotional call of the Czech people for an armed stand against Hitler's demands, with or without Anglo-French support. This decision has since been challenged from various quarters. Many Czechs, some of them guided by the hindsight acquired after 1948, still believe that the nation should have put up a fight in 1938, no matter what.

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The Communists assail the capitulation, distorting the picture, as usual, to fit their line of propaganda. But the weightiest criticism, though polite and sympathetic, comes from one of Benes's closest foreign friends, Winston Churchill, who restates in his war memoirs his conviction that Benes should not have yielded in 1938: "Once fighting had begun, in my opinion at that time, France would have moved to his aid in a surge of national passion, and Britain would have rallied to France almost immediately."[2] Just what Churchill hoped for at that time is more clearly discernible from a message received on October 1, 1938, from Jan Masaryk, who then served as Czechoslovak envoy to Britain: "After consultation with many others Churchill is conjuring us not to surrender our vital fortifications for another 48 hours. He is convinced that a great reaction is growing here against the betrayal committed upon us."

However, there is not a shred of evidence suggesting the possibility, let alone probability, of a decisive change in France or Britain in 1938. What Churchill calls the betrayal of Czechoslovakia was approved subsequently by a crushing majority in both the French and the British parliaments. Chamberlain was acclaimed as a hero upon his return from Munich and such was his popularity that the Conservative Central Office urged him to go to the country in a general election on the Munich issue.[3] Even after Britain and France had again ignored their treaty commitments by letting Hitler seize the remainder of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, Chamberlain and Daladier not only managed quite comfortably to stay in office, but continued to appease Hitler until the very outbreak of the war. It would thus seem that Churchill's assumption of an impending change in Britain and France in 1938 was a result of his wishful thought, inspired by his ardent and highly commendable desire to see the West wake up from its impotent slumber, much more than a sober estimate of realities during the fall of 1938.

To expose a whole nation to slaughter because of a vague and desperate hope could not be expected from a man of Benes's overcautious character. It must not be forgotten that he was confronted not only with an imminent attack by Hitler's *Wehrmacht* but with the possibility of simultaneous invasions by Poland and Hungary.

But what about the promised aid of the Soviet Union? Much confusion has been caused concerning this important issue by the fact that Benes, and those around him who knew the whole truth, consistently shrank from talking or writing about it in the early postwar years for fear of making Czechoslovakia's relations with Russia even more difficult. That was also why Benes refrained from releasing the extensive Munich report, the rough draft of which he had prepared before returning to Czechoslovakia in 1945. He intended originally to publish it as the first part of his "War Memoirs," for he was anxious to present the people with an authoritative account in order to forestall the expected Communist efforts to distort the truth. But when he came home he felt that the situation was not "ripe" for a disclosure.

The whole truth about the Soviet Union's readiness to help Benes against Hitler in 1938 is that the Soviet promise was riddled with such "ifs" that it

[2] "The Gathering Storm" (Boston: Houghton, 1948), p. 302.

[3] John W. Wheeler-Bennett, "Munich: Prologue to Tragedy" (New York: Duell, 1948), p. 181.

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was practically worthless. Upon learning the unbelievable news that France was reneging on her solemn treaty obligations, Benes sent an urgent message to the Soviet Government asking what kind of assistance he could expect. Moscow's reply, delivered on September 21 by the Soviet envoy in Prague, was a masterpiece of equivocation. "The Soviet Union is ready to fulfill its obligations arising from the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of alliance to the last letter," the message read. "It would help, immediately and effectively, if France too remained faithful to her obligations." Also, "the Soviet Union was prepared to fulfill all its obligations as stipulated in Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant of the League of Nations."[4]

Never was emptiness dressed in a nobler garb. The Soviet-Czechoslovak Alliance Treaty made the assistance conditional upon French help, and Stalin knew this was not to be forthcoming. By August 1938, the Soviet Government had already reached the conclusion that France would not honor her obligation toward Czechoslovakia.[5] As for the League, Soviet Russia was well aware of the fact that by this time the Geneva institution lay in a deep coma. And so the Soviet *da* equaled in fact a double *nyet*. Although Benes was grateful even for this gesture in the light of Czechoslovakia's treatment at the hands of Chamberlain and Daladier, it was not a basis on which he could issue a call to war.

Yet, even if Benes could have counted on the timely and substantial military aid of the Soviet Union, I doubt that he would have decided for war. When he talked about these matters to me in the years of his London exile he always argued that, as the situation was in 1938, to go to war with the support of no one other than Soviet Russia would have been to play into the hands of Nazi propaganda which described Czechoslovakia as an outpost of Bolshevism. It might have converted the Nazi war into an anti-Bolshevist crusade, a crusade in which Czechoslovakia would have been the greatest loser. He also feared that Czechoslovakia might become another Spain, ravaged and bled white by foreign intervention and a foreign-instigated civil war. Some of Dr. Benes's sterner critics would perhaps suggest that this was an *ex post facto* self-justification and that it does not square with his subsequent advocacy of East-West coöperation. But in 1938 and the first war years, Benes was far from putting the kind of trust in Stalin's reasonableness that he developed after his visit to Moscow in 1943.

However, the basic key for understanding Benes's behavior in 1938 was his awe before the specter of war and its consequences for his country. The supreme aim of his foreign policy was to prevent war from ever involving his country. He felt that with France, Britain, Poland and the countries of the Little Entente directly or indirectly committed to a united front against aggression, the real danger for Czechoslovakia had been successfully checked. Would not even such a rabid fanatic as Hitler shrink from going to war against such overwhelming odds? Although he did receive occasional disconcerting reports of French and British hesitancy, it never entered his mind that the French and the British would be so oblivious to their own

[4] *Cf.* Edward Taborsky, "Benes and the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1949, pp. 302 ff.

[5] The Czechoslovak envoy in Moscow, Zdenek Fierlinger, reported to Prague as early as the end of August 1938 that the Soviets did not believe that France would fulfill her treaty obligations.

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security as to give up an important bastion like Czechoslovakia, when all that they needed to do to stop Hitler was to display their unity and readiness to fight.

Then in the small hours of the morning of September 21, 1938, the envoys of France and Britain served their ultimatum on Benes—surrender or fight alone. This was an alternative he had never thought he would have to face. It was not that he feared war as such. He was no pacifist and, like Masaryk, was definitely opposed to the Tolstoyan teaching that goodness alone can conquer evil. But he dreaded a life-or-death war against such terrific odds. Subjection to Nazi rule following the inevitable Czech defeat might have paved the way for the national extinction of his people. Even before the plans were confirmed by captured Nazis, Benes suspected the German design for the eventual liquidation of the Czechs as a nation, and he felt that a desperate last-ditch battle would only play into Hitler's hands.

It was this concern for the preservation of the physical substance of the Czech nation that played by far the chief rôle in his decision to allow the Republic to be mutilated rather than fight. More than once in discussing this matter he told me: "A statesman must consider such matters *sub specie æternitatis* [from the standpoint of eternity], as Masaryk used to say. We are a small nation. One cannot be concerned with the happiness of just one generation. One must think of the generations of the future, and of how to assure them the chance to be born and to be able to live in the land of their forefathers."

IV

In submitting to the Munich *Diktat* Benes did not anticipate that within six months Hitler's "Reich's Protektor" would sit in Hradcany Castle. Since Hitler had gained such a tremendous victory on the pretense that he wanted only to unify the Germans in one Reich and did not care to acquire any Czechs, why would he want to explode the myth which could still serve him well in the case of Poland? Why would he throw a monkey wrench into his own smoothly operating scheme of conquest through deceit by prematurely insulting and alerting the British statesman who had declared that his deal at Munich had assured "peace in our time"? With the strict Cartesian logic which dominated Benes's way of thinking, he assumed that Hitler would leave the crippled and helpless torso of Czechoslovakia alone and turn to his next victim. He hoped that his hapless country would thus be able to cling to its imposed neutrality until war at last broke out between Germany and the West and gave Czechoslovakia a new chance.

Hitler's destruction of what was left of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 came therefore as a terrible shock. Literally overnight, the basic assumption upon which Benes had founded his surrender in the previous year was destroyed. The physical existence of his people, which he had paid such a high price to preserve, was now in mortal danger. "What will happen if Hitler delays his next blow against Poland, and we have to wait several more years for a war against Germany?" he asked himself. "Will our people survive that hell? Will they remain firm in their resistance and morally untouched?"[6] By a

[6] "Pameti" (Prague: Orbis, 1947), p. 97.

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strange stroke of fate the man who had dedicated the best 20 years of his life to the preservation of peace began to pray for war, anxiously scanning the political horizon every morning for the promising signs of gathering war clouds. After March 1939, all his boundless energy was concentrated on the destruction of Hitler's Reich and the undoing of Munich and its consequences.

V

In his estimates of future developments, Dr. Benes counted on the eventual participation of both the United States and Soviet Russia in the coming war against Nazi Germany; indeed he expressed a strong conviction to this effect to President Roosevelt as early as May 1939. His belief in the inevitability of an armed conflict between Nazi Germany and Communist Russia was not mere wishful thinking, but was based on a cool analysis of the aggressive nature of the Nazi and Communist ideologies, the diametrically opposed power interests of the two countries, and the mentality and insatiable ambitions of Hitler.

Benes felt certain that the Führer's main objective in Europe was the conquest of the Ukraine; and such an expansion of the German *Lebensraum* could, of course, be attained only through a military defeat of Russia. Nor was he shaken in this belief by the Nazi-Soviet honeymoon initiated by the Non-Aggression Pact of August 24, 1939. "Poland will succumb quickly, and the Nazis will achieve their objective of avoiding war on two fronts," he told me on the following morning. "But this will be only temporary. Hitler and Stalin can never trust each other, and any deal between them is dictated solely by opportunistic reasons of a transitional character. Russia cannot afford to stand aside. She is bound to become involved sooner or later, and so Germany will end by fighting on two fronts after all." He spoke in the same vein to his British friends as well as in his frequent messages to the Czechoslovak underground. At first, he was inclined to think that Russia, rather than Germany, would be the first to break the non-aggression pact. "The Soviets wanted the war to break out first between the West and Germany so that they could stand aside for a while and could then intervene at a moment most suitable for their own purposes," he wrote to the Czechoslovak underground on the very day of the German invasion of Poland. It was only after the French collapse that he changed his opinion; a few months later, intelligence reports told of Hitler's orders to prepare for an invasion of Russia.

Since the Western nations in the end reaped such a poor harvest from their war partnership with the Soviet Union one understands why Benes is criticized for having contributed to their rapprochement. Did he not argue and write that Communism and Western democracy could live peacefully side by side? Did he not, by seeking to persuade Churchill and Roosevelt of the necessity of East-West collaboration, foster a shortsighted scheme which was bound to backfire and spell catastrophe for the cause of freedom? These criticisms are not made solely with the benefit of hindsight. There were those who warned him against such a policy from the outset. I recall, for instance, a most dramatic interview which Benes had with General Sikorski in January of 1941. As Benes unfolded his thoughts on the expected

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Soviet participation in the war, the Polish Premier began to pace nervously across the study, then took a stiff military posture in front of Benes and declared earnestly: "What you say would mean a catastrophe for all of us."[7]

Though Benes opposed Sikorski's skepticism, it would be utterly wrong to believe that he was blind to the grave risks involved in collaboration with the Soviets. Repeatedly he warned his collaborators in Czechoslovakia against the dangers of Communist subversion. "It is evident that the Soviets are expecting a social revolution to take place, in accordance with the spirit of their policy," he wrote on September 1, 1939. *"Therefore we shall have to be careful concerning this."*[8] "Russia will want to join in against Germany at a given moment with the thought of preparing revolutions and insurrections," said another message, sent October 4, 1939. "It is necessary to resist the exaggerated Sovietophile feelings and Communist propaganda," he cautioned again on August 2, 1940, in an attempt to counter the Soviet efforts to exploit the wave of depression which swept Czechoslovakia following the French collapse. "The Soviets will adopt a brutally egoistic policy and will change it whenever it suits their purposes. The aim of their policy will always be dual: primarily, the defense of their own territory and their own interests by using other states and nations, including Czechoslovakia; secondly, their ultimate revolutionary social aims. . . . Our coöperation with them . . . remains and must continue. But always remember these facts and be careful."

I could cite many more such warnings culled from other messages dated both before and after the German invasion of Russia in June of 1941. They all prove beyond doubt that, while pleading for East-West collaboration against the Nazis, Benes harbored no naïve illusions concerning Communist aims and strategy. Like Sikorski, he would have preferred that the war against Germany be won without Soviet Russia. But assuming that this was hardly possible under the circumstances, he chose to gain the best possible advantage from a difficult situation. It was dire necessity, not starry-eyed reliance on Communist good faith, that made him the zealous sponsor of East-West rapprochement that he was.

VI

If ever Benes went overboard in his confidence in Stalin, it was after his visit to Moscow in December 1943. Those three short weeks played a fateful rôle in Benes's subsequent attitudes toward things Russian and definitely tinted his glasses with rose.

The timing was perfect for creating a favorable impression. Our arrival coincided with the conclusion of the Tehran Conference which seemed then to have laid a promising foundation for harmonious East-West coöperation. While we were in Moscow, the Soviet Government announced that a new patriotic anthem would replace the *Internationale,* as it no longer expressed the fundamental changes which the Soviet lands had undergone."[9] A few months previously the Comintern had been disbanded. We entered the

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 226.
[8] Italics are Benes's.
[9] *Izvestia,* December 21, 1943.

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country through Baku, the bustling capital of oil-rich Azerbaijan, poised impressively beside the blue waters of the Caspian Sea and studded with thousands of derricks in hectic operation. For four days and nights we travelled by train through towns and villages which had only recently been the scenes of terrific battles. We passed by veritable mountains of German armor half buried in snow, truly impressive monuments in commemoration of the Russian victories over the Nazi hordes. We paid a dramatic moonlight visit to Stalingrad. We were taken to factories in all of which we saw a feverish effort and a high degree of efficiency. Benes kept comparing what he saw then with what he had encountered during his previous visit in 1935, and he was amazed at the tremendous progress which he found. Wherever he went, and no matter with whom he talked, he found what he believed to be warm sympathy, an avid curiosity about the outside world, a genuine desire for friendship with the West, a profound respect and admiration for Roosevelt and Churchill. Ideological orthodoxy seemed to have melted under the warmth of surging patriotism; the petulant dogmatism of earlier days seemed to be fighting a losing battle with the sobering necessity of practical realism. But his deepest satisfaction was that he believed he found these same attitudes in Stalin and other Soviet leaders.

The gala performance—or, as we ought to call it now, Operation Grand Deceit—started the very moment we landed on the R.A.F. base at Habbanyiah near Baghdad, on the first leg of the fateful journey. Meeting us there as Stalin's emissary was the suave and versatile Ukrainian writer, Alexander Korneychuk, then Soviet Deputy Foreign Commissar. No man could have been better suited for the job. Unlike most Soviet diplomats of the Stalinist era, Korneychuk had a pleasant personality and most affable manners. As our constant companion for the rest of our journey to Moscow, this bright, well-educated debater with an ingratiating smile amazed Benes by his fresh and extremely undogmatic attitudes. He spoke with contempt for the "old ideology of leftist trends and deviations which were often abstractly international and had nothing in common with the traditions of the Russian and Ukrainian people." He pleaded with enthusiasm for brotherly coöperation among the Slav nations, in which each would have full equality and independence. He admitted that among the Russian Communists there were still some specimens of "the old extremist type," but he assured us that the present leaders, including Stalin himself, evinced the attitudes he was describing. He confided that he was an ardent admirer of Dostoevsky, then officially on the Soviet index, and in a private talk with me he even opined that some day there might be more than one party in the Soviet Union.

But the most decisive impression was made on Benes by Joseph Stalin himself. He trotted with an old man's short steps across the reception hall to greet us after our arrival in the Kremlin on December 11, 1943. A jovial smile lighted his wrinkled face, a humorous twinkle lighted his kindly eyes. There was indeed nothing about him to suggest to Benes that he stood face to face with a ruthless oriental despot. With that roguish grin above the greyish moustache he looked rather like a good-natured Dutch uncle. This first favorable impression was further enhanced by subsequent talks which

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Benes had with Stalin during our sojourn in Moscow. Seemingly unencumbered by any doctrinal inhibitions, the Generalissimo displayed a straightforward, matter-of-course approach; devoid as it was of diplomatic "finesse" and tinged with a certain crudeness, it could not but impress one with its apparent sincerity.

Whenever Benes began to talk about what he planned to do in Czechoslovakia after the war, Stalin virtually refused to listen; such internal affairs, he stressed, were absolutely no concern of his. With regard to Benes's several requests he acted as a most generous Santa Claus. Whatever Benes asked for, Stalin promptly granted with no reservations. He complied readily with a request for military equipment for the Czechoslovak Army which was to be set up after the first regions of Czechoslovakia had been liberated. He promised to place any freed portion of the country under the administration of Czechoslovak civil authorities without delay. He pledged full support to Benes's plan to transfer the majority of the Sudeten Germans to Germany. He solemnly reaffirmed the Soviet recognition of the pre-Munich boundaries of Czechoslovakia, including Ruthenia (the province which Stalin grabbed in 1945). He even invited Benes to state what part of Germany he would like to have and shook his head in disbelief when Benes said that he did not want anything except possibly a straightening of boundaries at a few points. As they were standing in front of a huge map in Stalin's study, Benes pointed to the Glatz region as an example of an area needing boundary rectification. With a red pencil which he held ready in his hand, Stalin promptly marked off the region for Czechoslovakia (he gave it to Poland in 1945).

Only a saint or an inveterate skeptic would have remained unimpressed by such a treatment, and Benes was neither. "We came to a complete agreement, absolutely complete!" Dr. Benes exclaimed jubilantly after his final talk with Stalin. That was indeed what he then sincerely believed.[10] He expressed his convictions in that sense in a highly optimistic speech broadcast from Moscow to Czechoslovakia, as well as in his subsequent messages to the Czechoslovak underground. He reported in the same vein to Winston Churchill, who had asked Benes to see him at Marrakesh, the Moroccan capital, where the British Prime Minister was convalescing after an attack of pneumonia. From then until the late summer of 1944, when his faith in Stalin's word began to wither under the chilling exposure to the realities of Soviet duplicity, Benes became unwittingly one of Stalin's most effective propagandists. This was also the only time that I discovered in him, ordinarily a very modest and unassuming man, a slight touch of conceit. The Munich humiliation was wiped out; the Nazi Empire was about to collapse; Benes's consistent policy of East-West collaboration seemed to have been vindicated. *"Gouverner—c'est prévoir,"* he used to say. And, in fact, every one of his earlier warnings and major predictions appeared to have come true. Small wonder that he felt overconfident.

VII

Although the highly favorable impression which Stalin made upon Benes

[10] For his own account of the Moscow visit, *cf.* "Pameti," *op. cit.*, pp. 379 ff. Also Sir Compton MacKenzie, "Dr. Benes" (London: Harrap, 1946), pp. 307 ff.

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during his Moscow visit in 1943 contributed substantially to his faith in Soviet good behavior it was by no means decisive. To be so unscientific as to rely on anything as subjective and ambiguous as a mere personal impression, no matter how profound, would have been quite out of character for a man so dispassionate, scholarly and coolly rational. While he did not underestimate the usefulness of personal contacts, he never believed that they could bring about substantial change in the policies of any nation. That was why he scoffed at assertions made by some of his political opponents after Munich that he might have obtained a better deal had he established personal contacts with Hitler. And he always maintained that Neville Chamberlain's confidence in his ability to influence Hitler by pleading with him personally was extremely naïve.

No, Benes's hopes were based on something deeper than personal appeal. Having been a sociologist originally, he held that politics was the main element of sociology and that the primary work of a good politician was to discover the nature of social reality, to determine what was constant in society, to analyze and to define it.[11] "As a science," he wrote, "democratic politics must look at society and the world objectively, must search for truly objective reality, must analyze society thoroughly and widely, and must, so to speak, dissect it alive."[12] Having "dissected" and analyzed the Soviet system, as he saw it in 1943, he concluded that its revolutionary era was ended and that it was now passing through a stage of gradual transformation into what would eventually become socialist democracy. More and more the Soviet Union would move toward the Right, permitting progressively more and more political, cultural and personal freedoms. Simultaneously, Western democracies would move toward the Left, toward socialism, or at least toward social welfare, economic planning and economic regulation. As both systems were thus drawn toward the Center, the sharp edges of their ideological and political antagonisms would be dulled and genuine peaceful coexistence would ensue.[13]

The doctrinal thaw which Benes had observed in Russia, the wartime appeals to patriotism rather than to Communism, cultural relaxation and other hopeful signs of change—as he saw it, these were concessions which, once given the Russian people, could not be easily taken away. The war partnership with the United States and Britain appeared to have helped Russia to break out of her isolationist shell and converted the one-time international outcast into a highly respected Great Power. She would not wish to compromise this position by reverting to her lawless behavior of earlier days. Riding the crest of prestige resulting from Soviet military victories, International Communism would stand to lose much more than it could gain through Soviet misconduct. Last but not the least, the colossal task of reconstructing the huge areas devastated by war would necessitate major aid from abroad, especially from America, and this consideration in itself would induce Stalin to refrain from doing anything that would gravely antagonize the Western world. "Soviet Russia will be interested in retaining,

[11] "Democracy Today and Tomorrow" (New York: Macmillan, 1939), pp. 203–204.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 203.
[13] "Demokracie Dnes a Zítra" (London, 1944), pp. 184 ff.

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even after the war, the coöperation with the Anglo-Saxon democracies which is developing so promisingly," he wrote to his collaborators in Czechoslovakia as late as July 16, 1944. "She will need their aid in many respects. The suffering of Russia and her devastation defy imagination and the Soviet Union is guided by the effort to rebuild the country as soon as possible. That is also the guarantee which makes our treaty of alliance with the U.S.S.R. so real and so vitally important for us. That is why the Soviets will not interfere with our internal affairs more than in the case of other states. We shall decide by ourselves how we will want to arrange our new life and order."

Thus, the cornerstone of Dr. Benes's hope in Soviet good conduct was his belief that even after the defeat of Germany the Soviet Union would need the West so desperately that it would resist its natural Bolshevist urge to throw all its wartime promises to the winds and to install Communist rule in Central Europe by means of force. However, since the Soviet leaders in fact respect only force, the crucial question really was whether the United States and Great Britain would possess and present enough strength to prevent the Soviets from filling the power vacuum left in Central-Eastern Europe.

Although the less charitable of Benes's critics seek to portray him as a man who devoted most of his energy to building bridges for the Russians, the fact is that his primary purpose throughout World War II was to make the British and the Americans realize that their full involvement in East European affairs was a sine qua non of European and world peace. My diary and files from those days are replete with memoranda, accounts of Benes's talks with scores upon scores of Western statesmen and diplomats, and other documents bearing witness to Benes's incessant endeavors to persuade the Anglo-Saxon Powers that they could cut themselves off from the fate of Central Europe only at their own gravest peril. But although he obtained repeated assurances of interest and concern, no practical steps were in fact taken to undertake strong permanent commitments in Central Europe.

I might cite just a few samples of Benes's tireless efforts towards that end and of the negative Western responses. When he began in February 1944 to negotiate with the Soviets for an agreement on the rights and duties of the Red Army on Czechoslovak territory, Dr. Benes asked the British to conclude a similar agreement. Although they already had such agreements with Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway, the British Government declined these overtures on the ground that the British Army was unlikely to advance as far as Czechoslovakia. Benes's persistent endeavors to secure weapons from the British for the Czechoslovak underground were equally fruitless. Preparations were made in 1944 for the reception of these weapons; appropriate places where they could be landed and stored were carefully selected. Yet, at the end of protracted negotiations which had been in progress since the summer of 1943, the British finally rejected the request on the ground that Czechoslovakia was within the sphere of Soviet military operations, and suggested that we ask the Russians.

Nor did Benes have any better luck with the Americans. In August of 1944 we received reports from our collaborators in Slovakia that they were ready for an armed revolt. Dr. Benes approved the project, and by the end of August the revolt had broken out in the mountainous region of central Slovakia. To

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crush the uprising in this strategic area behind the German Carpathian defenses the Germans sent planes and armor; soon the ill-equipped Slovak troops were in dire need of outside help. When the promised Soviet aid was not forthcoming, Benes turned to the United States, with the result that American planes briefly supported the Slovak patriots from bases in southern Italy. After a few sorties, however, the operations were suddenly stopped "on higher orders," as Benes was told, presumably because Czechoslovakia was within the Soviet zone of operations.

But the bitterest disappointment came in the spring of 1945 when General Patton's armies were ordered to halt their potent eastward drive before they could free Prague. By then Benes, who had already established provisional headquarters on Czechoslovak territory, had shed all illusions concerning Soviet good intentions. The Soviet rape of Ruthenia, in flagrant disregard of Stalin's lofty assurances during the Moscow visit of 1943, and the ignoble techniques by which it was accomplished, demonstrated for Benes what might be in store for his unfortunate country should the Russians gain control over the whole of Czechoslovakia. So did the tragic stories of pillage and rape, of deportations of anti-Communists, of the forcible communization of local administrations, and of innumerable other lawless acts daily committed by the Red Army and N.K.V.D. agents against the helpless Slovak population in areas overrun by the advancing Soviet armies.

I shall never forget the deep emotion with which Benes, who always hated to bare his feelings, received the news of Patton's armies crossing the border into Czechoslovakia. "Thank God, thank God," he said when I rushed in to tell him that Patton was at long last on Czechoslovak soil. Unable to control his excitement he began to pace his study, and to judge by the expression in his eyes he was already visualizing the beneficial political consequences of this event. Then he rushed into the adjoining room to share the good news with his beloved wife. "Hanicko, Hanicko, the Americans have entered Czechoslovakia," I heard him say to Madame Benes in a voice still quivering with emotion, "Patton is across the border!" In a few minutes he was back, instructing me to send Patton a telegram of congratulations and welcome.

Had Patton continued to advance he could have liberated not only Prague but the whole of Bohemia and a substantial portion of Moravia. The Communists would have been denied the advantage conferred by the presence and active support of the Red Army and the N.K.V.D. in entrenching themselves in the most populous and most strategic areas of Czechoslovakia. It was from these positions of strength, in the police, army, central and local administration, workers militias, and the communications system, that they were able so successfully to sabotage Benes's efforts to restore democracy in Czechoslovakia. It is not mere accident that the present line separating the Communist from non-Communist countries in Europe coincides closely with the wartime apportionment of operational zones between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers.

The reluctance of the Anglo-Saxon Powers to assume adequate responsibility and to assert their proper influence in Central and Eastern Europe undermined the main foundation on which Benes built his belief in Soviet good behavior. By their refusal to supply weapons and to lend support to

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the Czechoslovak underground, America and Britain destroyed whatever chance Benes may have had of gaining control of the major part of his country prior to the arrival of the Red Army. By deliberately halting their drive to the east they allowed all but the narrow western slice of Czechoslovakia to fall under exclusive Soviet control and left Benes to battle it out alone against overwhelming odds.

VIII

Although his bitter experiences of late 1944 and 1945 dashed Dr. Benes's characteristic optimism, they did not destroy his hope that all would be well in the end. This hope he based on two beliefs which he adhered to with the typical stubbornness of a Czech peasant: trust in the sound judgment of his own people and the expectation that mounting evidence of Soviet duplicity would finally bring resolute Western action. Unfortunately, neither was fulfilled. A rising awareness of the true nature of the Communist menace did appear in the West in the early postwar years, as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan testify. But the Truman Doctrine, limited as it was to Greece and Turkey, showed all the more clearly the lack of American interest in Central-Eastern Europe. As for the generous Marshall offer, Czechoslovakia's original acceptance of an invitation to negotiate in Paris was revoked under Soviet duress.[14] Thus by the time Benes was confronted with the Gottwald ultimatum in February 1948, he knew that, for a second time within one decade, he and his country stood alone.

Benes's faith in his people was also in vain. The disasters that have befallen the Czechs during recent centuries have injected into their national character a strong overdose of wariness and a reluctance to assume personal risk. The average Czech, confronted with what he believes to be superior power, prefers to bend and preserve his strength for a better opportunity, rather than to break in a gesture of bold defiance. The Munich betrayal, the twilight existence leading up to Hitler's *coup de grace* of March 1939, and the long ordeal of Nazi oppression had shattered the Czechoslovak people's morale more than Benes realized. Even under the most propitious circumstances it would have taken some time for them to reëstablish their confidence and spirit. When, instead of finding the freedom from fear which they had longed for, they were subjected to the Communist variety of intimidation and lawlessness, the shock was too much for them, and their civic courage slipped to an all-time low. As a consequence, the Communist Party ranks were grossly inflated by those who joined out of sheer opportunism. These "radishes," *i.e.* people only outwardly red, and the huge number of fence-sitters, made Benes's struggle against Communism all the more difficult. When Gottwald and Co. ordered their cohorts into the streets during the crucial days of the February crisis, the anti-Communist majority sat still, struck with fear and clinging desperately to the thin thread of hope that Benes, sick and exhausted, would somehow produce a miracle.

The total failure of the West and of the Czechoslovak anti-Communists to give Benes effective help when the struggle came to a head in February 1948 were the decisive factors which caused his defeat. That does not mean

[14] *Cf.* Hubert Ripka, "Le Coup de Prague" (Paris, 1949), pp. 49 ff.

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that Benes was without blame. His main mistake was that, upon his return to Czechoslovakia, he failed to give his people the kind of leadership that the situation demanded. All of us who stood close to him at that time held the view that he should have been much more forceful in the immediate postwar era than in prewar days. I personally felt that for a while he should act in an almost authoritarian fashion, capitalizing on his tremendous prestige with the Czechoslovak people and the absolute, almost mystical trust they had in him. "What will be needed in those chaotic days, Mr. President," I mentioned to him in one of the many discussions which we had on this topic, "is not a Head of State who will stay above the parties, a sort of umpire over the political game, but a strong man who will nip Communist trickery in the bud." "Yes, you are right," he answered. "This time I shall have to use all my authority and start stepping on Communist toes. People will be demoralized, their courage will be impaired, and I am afraid that there will be no strong democratic leaders. I shall have to take a much more active part in government than in normal times."

But he did not. Although the tremendous ovations with which he was received on his triumphant return across Czechoslovakia to Prague showed that the bulk of the people revered him more than ever, Benes quickly reverted to his old habit of negotiating, arguing and compromising, techniques that may be suited to a functioning democracy, but are not at all adequate to cope with the modern Machiavellis of Marxism-Leninism. Instead of taking drastic action at least against the worst abuses of power by the Communist leaders, he preferred patiently to plead, warn, admonish—biding his time and hoping that somehow the slow pressure of public opinion would induce the Communists to mend their ways.

There were at least two instances prior to 1948 in which Benes could have taken resolute action to avert Communism. The first such opportunity came after the parliamentary elections of April 1946. Despite the substantial Communist vote of 38 percent, those elections gave a clear majority to the democratic parties. By this time it was already crystal-clear that the Communist Minister of the Interior had grossly misused his powers in order to communize the police force. It was vitally important for the future of democracy to stop this malfeasance before it was too late. Consequently, Benes should have refused to appoint anyone but a staunch non-Party man to such a key position in the new cabinet. I believed then, and I still believe today, that it would have been a brilliant stroke to have chosen Jan Masaryk. To be sure, Masaryk was not well qualified for the office, for he was a poor administrator. But his tremendous popularity and strict non-partisanship would have made it difficult even for the Communists to oppose his appointment. Had Benes put his whole authority behind the idea, I do not see how he could have lost. As Masaryk was devoted to Benes and always followed his instructions, Benes would have become his own Minister of the Interior.

Another good opportunity to stand up to the Communists arose when Gottwald, fresh from his interview with Stalin, telephoned from Moscow to say that the Czechoslovak Government should rescind its previous decision to participate in the Marshall Plan talks in Paris. If Benes had refused to back down, the Czech Communist leaders would have been put in a most

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unpopular position, because all the people, even the Communist rank and file, were wholeheartedly in favor of accepting American aid. The Communist members of the cabinet would have had to offer their resignations and Benes would have thus had a chance to strengthen the Government at a very critical moment.

With the wisdom of hindsight it is, of course, easy to say that Benes should not have missed either of these opportunities. He would doubtless have taken advantage of them had he known, as we do now, what was to happen in 1948. But in 1946 and 1947 he had some powerful reasons why he did not want to create a crisis which would have been pregnant with so many grave risks for the Republic. He knew that the Communists, who were in full control of industry and transportation, would have struck back with a paralyzing strike which would have had most disastrous economic results and would have led to major riots and bloodshed. From what we have said about his mentality it is clear that Benes could not have been expected to take such drastic steps.

Furthermore, developments in the first half of 1947 actually strengthened Benes's confidence that all would be well in the end. Having failed by a solid 12 percent to gain the coveted majority in the 1946 elections, the Communists began to suffer their first setbacks. Their strength in local government began to recede. They had to give up at least one ministry which was of key importance for the realization of their aims, the Ministry of Education. To the chagrin of the Party and the pleasure of the non-Communists, the Ministry of Justice, headed by one of Benes's closest associates, Prokop Drtina, moved resolutely to prosecute the Communist-dominated police for various illegal practices. Non-Communist newspapers were more and more outspoken in their criticism of Communist abuses. The Social Democrats began at long last to shake off the hold of Fierlinger's fellow-travelling left wing and asserted themselves more strongly against Communist attacks on political freedoms. The people's morale was rising and civic courage began slowly to gather momentum. Benes's "elastic defense" seemed to be working.

"I am struggling for time," he told me in a long conversation in June of 1947. "We cannot be saved unless the Russian advance is checked by a tremendous show of power on the part of the West. Once the Russians see that any further step would mean a general war, they will stop, but not one moment earlier. The Russians will do everything possible to enlarge and strengthen their grip on Germany and the whole of Central and Eastern Europe in the coming months, before they are definitely checked. If we manage to hold out until next summer or fall, the highest danger point will by then have been passed."

In this same conversation of June 1947 he told me that, should the Communists attempt to seize power by violence, he was determined to fight them to the bitter end, and that he would call on the Sokols (a patriotic gymnastic organization), the Legionnaires, and even the Army if necessary. "The Communists think that I would try to avoid an open clash with them at any cost," the President continued with a smile. "I know that they are saying: 'If you succeed in pushing Benes into a tight corner and if you keep on pressing him hard enough, he will yield in the end.' But they are wrong. I

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wish to avoid trouble, that's right, but my patience and my willingness to make deals with them have their limits. I shall make no compromise which would destroy democracy in this country. The Communists could seize power in this country only over my dead body." Yet, seven months later, when the Communists managed to push him into that "tight corner," Benes did yield. In spite of his repeated assurances that the Communists could win only over his "dead body," he capitulated to their demands after five days of desperate opposition and appended his signature to the death warrant of Czechoslovak democracy.

Once Benes had come to the conclusion that the only alternative to surrender was a bloody civil war, with the strong likelihood of direct or indirect Soviet intervention, he was incapable of acting otherwise. Benes was persuaded by Gottwald's threats and actions that the Premier would order his Communist cohorts to fight and would use the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Alliance and Friendship to call upon the Russians to "restore order." The arrival in Prague of the Soviet emissary, Valerian Zorin, and his open intervention in favor of Gottwald, led Benes to believe that Stalin was firmly committed to a Communist victory. As at the time of Munich, the West was clearly unwilling to give any effective aid. The mass of Czechoslovak Democrats, including the famed Sokols and the legendary Legionnaires on whom Benes had pinned great hopes, seemed stricken with paralysis. He could, however, have ordered the Army to move against Gottwald's mob. Indeed, several generals came to see Benes at the peak of the crisis, promised support and asked for the President's order. "I understand and I am grateful for your words," Benes responded. "But this would mean that you would have to disarm the police. Logically, then, you would also have to arrest Gottwald. And this the Russians would not tolerate."

Once again, Benes considered the situation *"sub specie æternitatis,"* as Masaryk had taught him. He thought of the future rather than the present, and chose to sacrifice the happiness of the present generation to preserve intact the physical substance of his nation for the better days he was sure would come again. It was a decision made carefully and in full realization of its tragic significance. Some of Benes's apologists blame his surrender on his sickness. He was indeed seriously ill and his circulatory disease made him highly excitable and subject to sudden collapses. But it did not impair his mental capacities, his power of reasoning and of making responsible judgments. I am certain that his decision in February 1948 would have been exactly the same had he been in the prime of health.

Having made the most painful decision of his whole life, Benes left the Hradcany Castle never to return. He resigned the Presidency in June and a merciful death took him the following September. His fall virtually ended the hope of East-West rapprochement and coöperation. Yet Benes's basic assumption has not yet been proved wholly wrong. The Western world has been moving toward the Left, as he anticipated, while within the Communist system pressures for greater freedom have forced the Soviet rulers to make several notable departures from the harsh Stalinist pattern. When history has written the final chapter on the Czechoslovak President, it may prove that Benes's conception was more wishful in timing than in substance.

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By Henry L. Roberts

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In this book—an elaboration of lectures given at the Council on Foreign Relations in the autumn of 1957—the former Secretary of the Air Force sketches the changes in the complex of international affairs in the last several years, and then discusses the terms of a new policy to meet the new conditions of Soviet power, European uncertainty and Asian unrest. While stressing the need to maintain our deterrent capabilities, the chief emphasis is upon a "forward strategy" in the areas of politics, economics and world opinion.

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POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. By KARL W. DEUTSCH AND OTHERS. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 228 p. $4.75.

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the French surrender of June 1940, the Italian surrender of September 1943, the German surrender of 1945 and the Japanese surrender of August 1945. The discussion includes the question of unconditional surrender, and the relevance of surrender in a possible nuclear war.

DAS PROBLEM DES PRÄVENTIVKRIEGES IM EUROPÄISCHEN STAATENSYSTEM MIT BESONDEREM BLICK AUF DIE BISMARCK-ZEIT. By Karl-Ernst Jeismann. Munich: Alber, 1957, 200 p. DM. 12.50.

An analysis of theories of preventive war and their connection with *raison d'état*. The historical evidence is drawn from the Bismarck era.

STUDIES IN SECRET DIPLOMACY DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR. By W. W. Gottlieb. London: Allen and Unwin, 1957, 430 p. 35/. (Fair Lawn, N.J.: Essential Books, $6.30.)

Diplomacy during the First World War has been much less thoroughly studied than that of either the preceding or following years. Dr. Gottlieb's monographic study of two facets of wartime diplomacy—the issues relating to the entry of Turkey and of Italy into the conflict—are welcome additions to the field.

THE DECISION TO INTERVENE. By George F. Kennan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958, 513 p. $7.50.

In this second volume of Mr. Kennan's important history of Soviet-American relations from 1917 to 1920 the central theme is the progressive intervention of the Allied Powers in revolutionary Russia in the months after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. As with the first volume, an extraordinarily complex story is developed with great skill, scholarship and reflective analysis.

DAS MÜNCHENER ABKOMMEN 1938. By Boris Celovsky. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958, 518 p. DM. 26.

A massive, scholarly and richly documented study, by a Czech scholar now in exile, of the diplomatic events of 1938 leading up to the catastrophe of the Munich Conference.

THE EVE OF WAR, 1939. Edited by Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1958, 744 p. $14.40.

This volume in the valuable series of the Survey of International Affairs covering the war years deals with the five and a half months between the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia on March 15, 1939, and the outbreak of the Second World War. Making use of the postwar publication of the German and British Foreign Office documents, it provides a thorough and authoritative sequel to its predecessor in this series, "The World in March 1939."

THE AXIS ALLIANCE AND JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1941. By Paul W. Schroeder. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (for the American Historical Association), 1958, 246 p. $4.50.

In this new study of Japanese-American relations immediately preceding the outbreak of war in 1941 the author gives particular emphasis to the rôle played by the Tripartite Alliance. On the whole the author is critical of U.S. policy in the months between July and December 1941 though he definitely rejects the thesis that the United States was pressing for war.

THE UNITED STATES IN GERMANY, 1944–1955. By Harold Zink. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1957, 374 p. $7.50.

The former Chief Historian of the Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for

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Germany has written a valuable general account of the American rôle in the occupation of that country. The author does not refrain from criticism—especially of the military—when he feels it is due. But while finding shortcomings in our early policy relating to denazification and economic reconstruction, he finds the record as a whole a commendable one.

THE SEIZURE OF POLITICAL POWER IN A CENTURY OF REVOLUTIONS. By Feliks Gross. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958, 398 p. $6.00.

An analysis by a professor of sociology of the transfer of political power by violent means, with particular reference to the development of Russian and Communist revolutionary strategy and tactics since 1825. A final section deals with the opposition to such seizures, whether through an underground movement or political emigration.

THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS. By Gunnar Heckscher. New York: Macmillan, 1958, 172 p. $4.25.

An exploration, based on a round table conference, of the methodological problems involved in the study of comparative government and politics.

OUR NUCLEAR FUTURE. By Edward Teller and Albert L. Latter. New York: Criterion Books, 1958, 184 p. $3.50.

While this book is in part a popular survey for the layman, with particular emphasis on radiation and fall-out, it also presents Dr. Teller's views on such debated topics as the need for nuclear weapons tests, the problem of bomb concealment and the need for "clean" weapons.

VICTORY WITHOUT WAR, 1958–1961. By George Fielding Eliot. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1958, 126 p. $2.00.

A well-known military writer advocates mobility and concealment in our weaponry—this to be achieved through rapid development of aircraft carriers and atomic-powered submarines as "delivery vehicles." He discusses the means in some detail.

INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA. By L. John Martin. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958, 284 p. $5.75.

A study of the various means—legal and diplomatic—that have been developed in the attempt to bring international propaganda activities under some sort of control.

WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW. By Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, 540 p. $7.50.

In this ambitious book two lawyers undertake to develop a detailed plan for the maintenance of world peace by means of an extensive revision of the United Nations Charter. At the heart of their proposal is the establishment of a permanent "world police force" and complete disarmament of all the nations. While one may argue about both the details and the general premises, the study has the great merit of being a thoroughgoing and not merely suggestive development of a thesis.

AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER. By Julius Stone. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958, 226 p. $5.00.

A critical review of the various efforts made to develop theories or definitions of aggression from the League of Nations to the present.

THE UNITED NATIONS: THE FIRST TEN YEARS. Edited by B. A. Wortley. New York: Oceana Publications, 1957, 206 p. $5.00.

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Lectures by several speakers assessing the achievements of the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

BRITAIN AND THE UNITED NATIONS. By Geoffrey L. Goodwin. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for the Carnegie Endowment), 1957, 478 p. $3.00.
EGYPT AND THE UNITED NATIONS. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for the Carnegie Endowment), 1957, 197 p. $3.00.

Two further volumes in the series of national studies on international organizations initiated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The British report was prepared with the assistance of a study group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs; the Egyptian study by a group set up by the Egyptian Society of International Law.

SCRATCHES ON OUR MINDS. By Harold R. Isaacs. New York: Day, 1958, 416 p. $6.75.

An able analysis of American stereotypes of China and India and their inhabitants: images that carry an element of truth but also a stultifying element of distortion.

YONDER ONE WORLD. By Frank Moraes. New York: Macmillan, 1958, 209 p. $3.75.

A leading Indian editor and journalist discusses briefly but shrewdly Asia, Western Europe and the United States, their common and differing problems.

JOURNEY OF AN AMERICAN. By Albion Ross. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957, 346 p. $4.50.

Mr. Ross, for many years on the staff of *The New York Times*, reports on his travels in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America over the last quarter-century.

AN ATLAS OF WORLD AFFAIRS. By Andrew Boyd. New York: Praeger, 1958, 159 p. $3.00.

Seventy maps, useful for general impressions of major world issues, but lacking in detail.

POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE AIR. By H. A. Wassenbergh. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1957, 180 p. Guilders 11.50.

An attempt "to throw some light on the problems that arise in the field of force between politics and law in connection with the regulation of civil aviation throughout the world."

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1957. By Richard P. Stebbins. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1958, 411 p. $5.50.

Another solid, timely and eminently readable installment in the Council on Foreign Relations' continuing history of American foreign relations. Highlights of this volume, in which the author displays his usual coolness in disentangling explosive issues, are the inclusion of the Middle East in the sphere of American defense commitments and the projection of the East-West rivalry into outer space through the agency of the Soviet sputniks.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1957. Edited by Paul E. Zinner. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1958, 463 p. $6.00.

The nineteenth volume of selected documents in the series originated by the

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World Peace Foundation and now prepared by the Council on Foreign Relations.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY. By W. M. Scammell. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957, 402 p. $9.00.

An analysis and appraisal of international monetary policy since 1945 with special reference to efforts at international monetary coöperation. The author is Lecturer in Economics at the University College of North Wales.

AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN MANAGERIAL SKILLS. By J. S. Fforde. Oxford: Blackwell, 1957, 153 p. 18/6.

This is a detailed and quite interesting analysis of some of the principal means by which business enterprises in underdeveloped countries can obtain the services or help of experienced managers from advanced countries. Originally prepared for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, it is based for the most part on British experience in India, Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia.

A DECADE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH, 1946–1956. Edited by Neil W. Chamberlain and Others. New York: Harper (for the Industrial Relations Research Association), 1958, 205 p. $3.50.

A number of different authors provide a valuable summary of the contributions made since the end of the war in the broadly defined field of industrial relations. They deal with: union organization, collective bargaining, wage determination, the economic effects of unionism, employee benefit plans, and foreign labor movements. The survey of the last of these topics, by Adolf Sturmthal, will be of particular interest to readers of this journal, covering as it does nationalization and workers' participation in management as well as studies of national labor movements.

THE LONG VIEW AND THE SHORT: STUDIES IN ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY. By Jacob Viner. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1958, 462 p. $7.50.

A selection of essays and reviews by a leading American economist; it does not include his works in the area of international trade.

STUDIES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Alfred Bonné. London: Routledge, 1957, 294 p. 32/. (New York: Humanities Press, 1958, $6.50.)

A study dealing chiefly with conditions and requirements in the underdeveloped areas of the Middle East and India.

PUBLIC FINANCE AND LESS DEVELOPED ECONOMY. By Paul A. M. Van Philips. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1957, 185 p. Guilders 13.50.

A study of the rôle which can be played by public finance in promoting rapid economic development. A theoretical study but directed chiefly toward the experience of Latin American economies.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND PROMOTION OF THE GENERAL WELFARE. By Robert E. Asher and Others. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1957, 1,216 p. $8.75.

This massive and comprehensive volume in the Brookings Institution series on the U.N. deals with the major activities undertaken with respect to social and economic coöperation, human rights and dependent peoples. While the record "leaves much to be desired" the authors find a "basis for qualified optimism about the future."

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THE INSTITUTIONS OF ADVANCED SOCIETIES. Edited by Arnold M. Rose. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958, 691 p. $10.50.

A textbook for the comparative study of social institutions. The nations discussed are the United Kingdom, Australia, Finland, Poland, Jugoslavia, Greece, Israel, France, Brazil and the United States.

The Second World War

STRATEGY AND COMPROMISE. By Samuel Eliot Morison. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1958, 120 p. $3.00.

In these lectures Admiral Morison, author of a definitive history of the U.S. Navy in World War II, examines and appraises the principal Allied strategic decisions in the European and Pacific theaters.

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN. VOLUME I: THE LOSS OF SINGAPORE. By Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby and Others. London: H.M.S.O., 1957, 568 p. 55/. (New York: British Information Services, $10.22.)

ALLIED MILITARY ADMINISTRATION OF ITALY, 1943–1945. By C. R. S. Harris. London: H.M.S.O., 1957, 479 p. 42/. (New York: British Information Services, $7.82.)

These two important studies are volumes in the official History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. The first deals with the tragic and disastrous early months of the war against Japan—the fall of Hong Kong and Malaya, the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*, and the surrender of Singapore. In the second volume, part of a series on Civil Affairs and Military Government, the tide of battle has turned in Europe and we follow the fortunes of that remarkable achievement of Anglo-American coöperation—A.M.G.

LABOUR IN THE MUNITIONS INDUSTRIES. By P. Inman. London: H.M.S.O.; and Longmans, 1957, 461 p. 35/. (New York: British Information Services, $6.53.)

This volume in the official History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series, deals with the mobilization, training and allocation of a labor force for the war economy.

KEY TO VICTORY. By Lieutenant-Commander P. K. Kemp. Boston: Little, Brown, 1958, 382 p. $6.00.

A competent and authoritative short history of the British Navy's rôle in the Second World War. The author is head of the Admiralty's Historical Section.

The United States

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE AMERICAN SPIRIT. By Dexter Perkins. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957, 254 p. $3.75.

A selection of essays by an eminent American diplomatic historian, dealing chiefly with two themes: the uniqueness of the American approach to foreign affairs, and a critique of "revisionist" writings regarding the two world wars.

ISOLATION AND SECURITY: IDEAS AND INTERESTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Alexander DeConde. Durham (N. C.): Duke University Press, 1957, 204 p. $4.50.

Essays, by seven scholars, on the two themes in twentieth-century U. S. diplomacy indicated by the title.

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PROBLEMS OF POWER IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. Edited by Arthur Kornhauser. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957, 239 p. $5.00.

Lectures, delivered at Wayne University, by Robert S. Lynd, Harold D. Lasswell, A. H. Maslow, C. Wright Mills and the editor.

FORGING A NEW SWORD: A STUDY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. By William R. Kintner and Others. New York: Harper, 1958, 238 p. $4.50.

A critical analysis of the Department of Defense, its achievements and shortcomings. Among the latter the author includes the unresolved question of the proper form of civilian control, the adequacy of control of military operations, and the handicaps to formulating a coherent strategic doctrine. A number of proposed reforms are outlined.

REFLECTIONS ON AMERICA. By Jacques Maritain. New York: Scribner, 1958, 205 p. $3.50.

Despite the apparent simplicity and casualness of these "random reflections," M. Maritain has some extraordinarily interesting observations to make, friendly and heartening on the whole but not without touches of thoughtful criticism.

MASTERS OF DECEIT. By J. Edgar Hoover. New York: Holt, 1958, 374 p. $5.00.

After a brief discussion of the background and general purposes of Communism, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation devotes most of his attention to the American Communist Party—its organization, goals, tactics, and how to fight it. Designed as a guide to the citizen.

NO WONDER WE ARE LOSING. By Robert Morris. New York: Bookmailer, 1958, 230 p. $2.50.

Chiefly personal reflections on the author's investigative career over the last 18 years—with the Rapp-Coudert Committee, with Naval Intelligence and with the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

YOU AND YOUR LEADERS. By Elmo Roper. New York: Morrow, 1958, 288 p. $3.95.

The results, with comment and interpretation, of public opinion polls taken by Elmo Roper over the last two decades with regard to our leading public figures.

THE UNFINISHED STORY OF ALGER HISS. By Fred J. Cook. New York: Morrow, 1958, 184 p. $3.50.

Another treatment of this famous case. While the author, a newspaper man, clearly doubts Hiss' guilt, he adds little to the picture already available from the trial and the appeals and from the writings of Chambers and Hiss themselves.

LABOR AND THE NEW DEAL. Edited by Milton Derber and Edwin Young. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958, 393 p. $6.00.

A collection of essays on labor relations and the labor movement in the period of the New Deal.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND CONSERVATION, 1911–1945. Compiled and Edited by Edgar B. Nixon. Hyde Park (N. Y.): Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, 1957, 2 v. $9.50.

These two volumes, the first documentary publication of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, provide a rich selection of the late President's papers relating to the broad subject of the conservation of "natural and renewable resources."

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WOODROW WILSON. By Arthur Walworth. New York: Longmans, 1958, 2 v. $15.00.

A very substantial and comprehensive life of Woodrow Wilson, emphasizing the biographical and personal elements rather than the broader history, domestic and international, of which he was so important a part.

WOODROW WILSON AND THE WORLD OF TODAY. Edited by Arthur P. Dudden. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957, 96 p. $2.75.

Brief essays in appraisal, by Arthur S. Link, William L. Langer and Eric F. Goldman.

AL SMITH AND HIS AMERICA. By Oscar Handlin. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1958, 207 p. $3.50.

A most interesting, brief political biography.

Western Europe

THE STRUGGLE TO UNITE EUROPE: 1940–1958. By Arnold J. Zurcher. New York: New York University Press, 1958, 254 p. $5.00.

This is a very useful, concise account of the work of the European Movement and of the organizations and proposals for political integration that have resulted. The emphasis is on the Council of Europe, E.D.C., the Coal and Steel Community, the proposed European political community. The links with the prewar pan-Europe movement and the "European Movement in America" are interestingly treated.

THE BIG CHANGE IN EUROPE. By Blair Bolles. New York: Norton, 1958, 527 p. $5.95.

An American correspondent's report on developments in Europe over the last half-decade. Principal emphasis is on the unprecedented rise of consumption and consumer demand in Western Europe. Critical of American diplomacy.

NORDISK TOLLUNION OG DE EUROPEISKE FELLESMARKEDS-PLANER. By Just Faaland. Bergen: Grieg (for the Chr. Michelsens Institutt), 1958, 273 p.

This is a thoroughgoing examination of trade among the Scandinavian countries and the implications of a Nordic customs union, followed by a discussion of the relation of these activities to plans for the European common market and the proposed free trade area. Going beyond purely trade analysis, Mr. Faaland deals with such questions as bargaining power and the international payments of the Scandinavian countries as they bear on the proposed measures of economic integration.

LOST STATESMAN: THE STRANGE STORY OF PIERRE MENDÈS-FRANCE. By Alexander Werth. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1958, 428 p. $5.00.

This study has a double purpose: to analyze the mixed political fortunes of Pierre Mendès-France and to discuss the dilemmas confronting France in North Africa.

EN MARGE DE LA POLITIQUE BELGE, 1914–1956. By J. Wullus-Rudiger. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1957, 472 p. Fr. 2000.

This rather personal study deals with the difficulties arising in Belgium from the linguistic controversy and its relation to Germany's efforts to gain control of that country in the two world wars.

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THE BERLIN BLOCKADE. By W. Phillips Davison. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958, 423 p. $7.50.

This excellent and exceptionally interesting study of the background and course of the 1948 Berlin blockade is particularly noteworthy in its combination of diplomatic history and the study of public attitudes. By the combination of these two approaches the author has been able not only to indicate the way the blockade was brought about by the Russians and met by the airlift but also to examine reasons for the sturdy resistance on the part of the population of Berlin—a decisive factor in the outcome of this crisis.

GERMANY AND FREEDOM: A PERSONAL APPRAISAL. By James Bryant Conant. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, 117 p. $3.00.

In these Godkin Lectures, the former American Ambassador to Bonn offers his well-informed reasons for optimism concerning Germany's political and spiritual health.

PROSPERITY THROUGH COMPETITION. By Ludwig Erhard. New York: Praeger, 1958, 260 p. $5.00.

In this book (a translation of "Wohlstand für Alle," Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1957) the Federal German Minister for Economic Affairs surveys the principles and policies which have contributed so significantly to Germany's postwar economic revival and expansion.

BONN-MOSKAU: DIE OSTPOLITIK ADENAUERS. By Adalbert Worliczek. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1957, 160 p. DM. 6.40.

A brief review of Adenauer's policy with respect to the Soviet Union, reunification and East-West relations.

SOLDATEN, BÜRGER, MILITARISTEN. By Emil Obermann. Stuttgart: Cotta, 1958, 326 p. DM. 24.

An inquiry into some 300 years of German history in search of explanations for the antagonistic relations that developed between the military and civil society.

DIE DEUTSCHEN NACHKRIEGSWAHLEN. By Richard Schachtner. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1956, 98 p. DM. 16.80.

A useful collection of postwar election results in the Federal Republic, the Länder, West Berlin, the Saar and the Soviet zone.

FÜR UND GEGEN DEN WEHRBEITRAG. By Hans Edgar Jahn. Cologne: Greven, 1957, 453 p. DM. 42.

A collection of documents, debates, polemics, broadsides and cartoons relating to the issue of West German rearmament.

CHRONOLOGISCHE MATERIALIEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DER SED. Berlin-Schlachtensee: Informationsbüro West, 1956, 637 p. DM. 15.

A heavily documented chronology of the S.E.D. from 1945 to 1956.

RKFDV: GERMAN RESETTLEMENT AND POPULATION POLICY, 1939–1945. By Robert L. Koehl. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, 263 p. $6.50.

A study of the grim wartime effort of the Nazi régime to change the ethnic structure of the populations in the territories on Germany's frontiers, through the agency of the *Reichskommissariat für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums.*

DIE AUSSENPOLITIK DER WEIMARER REPUBLIK 1918/1923. By Heinrich Euler. Aschaffenburg: Pattloch, 1957, 471 p. DM. 18.50.

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A detailed monograph on German foreign policy during the hectic years from the November 1918 armistice to the beginning of the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923.

DIE GESCHICHTE DES DEUTSCHEN GENERALSTABES VON 1918 BIS 1945. By Waldemar Erfurth. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1957, 326 p. DM. 24.

A history of the German General Staff in the Weimar and Hitler eras, by an officer who was on the staff from 1910 to 1945.

DISTELN AM WEGE. By Ernst Siegfried Hansen. Bielefeld: Deutscher Heimat-Verlag, 1957, 456 p. DM. 18.50.

A history of German-Danish relations from the occupation of April 1940 to the Bonn declaration of March 29, 1955.

THE HABSBURG EMPIRE. By Robert A. Kann. New York: Praeger, 1957, 227 p. $5.00.

A stimulating analysis of the factors making for integration and for disintegration in the Habsburg monarchy—an old and much debated issue but here treated with fresh insights.

JOURNAL (25 JUILLET 1932–14 JUIN 1936). By Baron Aloisi. Paris: Plon, 1957, 390 p. Fr. 1500.

This is a significant source for the diplomatic history of the inter-war years. During the years covered by the journal—years of particularly active Italian policy—Baron Aloisi was *chef de cabinet* of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A useful supplement to the Ciano diaries.

SALAZAR UND SEIN NEUES PORTUGAL. By Hans Sokol. Graz: Verlag Styria, 1957, 314 p. Schillings 122.50.

An appreciative portrait of Portugal and Dr. Salazar.

PORTUGAL E O ARTIGO 73 DA CARTA DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS. By Adriano Moreira. Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Políticos e Sociais, 1957, 137 p.

A study of Portugal's position in relation to Article 73 of the U. N. Charter, which deals with non-selfgoverning territories.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

INSIDE RUSSIA TODAY. By John Gunther. New York: Harper, 1958, 550 p. $5.95.

Like the others of Mr. Gunther's Inside books—this is the sixth—this represents a combination of reporter's leg work and extensive reading. Of interest both to the general reader and the possible traveler to the Soviet Union, it provides a wide coverage of Russian life and politics. In the author's view the Soviet Union is probably here to stay, though it is not clear just which way he expects it to develop.

CHILD OF THE REVOLUTION. By Wolfgang Leonhard. Chicago: Regnery, 1958, 447 p. $6.50.

A most interesting political autobiography of a young German, who was trained in the Soviet Union, was active in the Communist apparatus in postwar East Germany, and fled in 1948 to Tito's Jugoslavia. One of the more serious and informative contributions to the "literature of defection."

DAS SOWJETSYSTEM IN DER HEUTIGEN WELT. By Hans von Rimscha and Others. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1956, 279 p. DM. 15.

Essays by eight authors dealing with developments in Soviet life and policies.

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LE TROUDODEN. By Henri Wronski. Paris: Société d'Édition d'Enseignement Supérieur, 1957, 231 p. Fr. 870.

An economic analysis of the means of payment and the standard of living on the Soviet *kolkhoz*.

SOVIET MARXISM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS. By Herbert Marcuse. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958, 271 p. $4.50.

An original and interesting critical essay on Soviet Marxist theory, though by no means easy to read. The author's method of analysis, "immanent critique," proceeds, as he puts it, "under the assumption that Marxian theory plays a decisive part in the formulation and execution of Soviet policy, and that from the Soviet use of Marxian theory inferences may be drawn for the national and international development of the Soviet state."

THE AGRARIAN FOES OF BOLSHEVISM. By Oliver H. Radkey. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958, 521 p. $8.50.

A thorough, scholarly and much needed history of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries from the beginnings of the Revolution to October 1917. An exceptionally interesting and creative effort to answer the question: "Why this collapse of a movement which defended the peasant interest in one of the great peasant lands of the world?"

COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IN EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Irwin T. Sanders. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1958, 214 p. $5.00.

Seven essays, originally presented at a conference at the University of Kentucky, dealing with the peasants of Eastern Europe, the strategy of collectivization and its application since 1945 in the Communist states of Eastern Europe.

SONDERAUFTRAG SÜDOST 1940–1945. By Hermann Neubacher. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1956, 215 p. DM. 13.80.

Informal but occasionally informative personal recollections of Southeast Europe during the war years, by a diplomat and emissary of the Third Reich.

HOME TO POLAND. By Christine Hotchkiss. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1958, 247 p. $3.95.

An informative report on post-October Poland by a staff member of the *Reader's Digest* whose Polish background permitted her to appraise sensitively all the seeming contradictions resulting from the persistence of numerous national traditions and the general acceptance of many economic and social changes introduced by the Communist régime.

SPRING IN OCTOBER: THE STORY OF THE POLISH REVOLUTION 1956. By Konrad Syrop. New York: Praeger, 1958, 207 p. $4.50.

An able account by a B.B.C. analyst of the events in Poland leading up to Gomulka's dramatic reëmergence and victory in October 1956.

LAND WITHOUT JUSTICE. By Milovan Djilas. New York: Harcourt, 1958, 365 p. $5.75.

This book, like "The New Class," was written after Djilas' fall from grace in Jugoslavia in 1954. Dealing only occasionally or inferentially with his more recent career, it is an absorbing account of his childhood and youth in Montenegro, a poor, proud and violent land. Extraordinarily perceptive, it may well prove to be one of the most illuminating autobiographies to emerge from Eastern Europe.

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A SERBIAN VILLAGE. By Joel Martin Halpern. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958, 325 p. $6.00.

An extremely able cultural and anthropological study of the village of Orašac, based on extensive field work in 1953–1954. Of much value in giving a picture of contemporary Serbian rural life.

ESCAPE FROM FEAR. By Martin A. Bursten. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1958, 224 p. $3.50.

A report on the mass exodus of Hungarians from their country after the Soviet suppression of the 1956 revolution, and of the difficulties and achievements attendant upon bringing thousands of them to the United States.

1,000 YEARS OF HUNGARY. By Emil Lengyel. New York: Day, 1958, 312 p. $5.00.

A brief, popular history.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE COMMONWEALTH. By Geoffrey Marshall. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957, 277 p. $5.60.

After an analysis of the theory of sovereignty the author reviews the problems of sovereignty in the Commonwealth and makes an extended study of the controversy in South Africa concerning the limits of parliamentary authority and the functions of the courts.

PROBLEMS OF THE NEW COMMONWEALTH. By Sir Ivor Jennings. Durham (N. C.): Duke University Press, 1958, 114 p. $2.50.

In these lectures a leading authority analyzes the rôle of the Asian members of the Commonwealth.

THE FUTURE OF SOCIALISM. By C. A. R. Crosland. New York: Macmillan, 1957, 540 p. $7.00.

An effort, by an economist and former Labor M.P., to reinterpret Socialism in the light of changes since 1939 and to suggest lines of policy for the future. Feeling that "capitalism has been reformed almost out of recognition," the author concludes that economic growth and efficiency are no longer of primary concern and that reforms should be along more "social" and idealistic lines.

THE FIRST LABOUR GOVERNMENT, 1924. By Richard W. Lyman. London: Chapman, 1957, 302 p. 25/.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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

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

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